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This	 thesis	 investigates	 a	 theoretical	 response	 to	 the	question	of	what	 constitutes	 the	
political	implications	of	the	2008	Global	Financial	Crisis.	This	thesis,	working	within	the	






of	 political	 sovereignty	 on	 the	 other.	 After	 examining	 the	 significance	 of	 Derrida’s	
approach	and	secondary	 literature	debating	 its	 interpretation,	 this	 thesis	deconstructs	
the	political	implications	of	the	crisis	from	politics	in	the	traditional	sense	of	the	nation-
state,	the	textual	politics	of	scholarship,	and	finally	the	politics	of	the	media,	the	domain,	
I	 argue,	 that	 incorporates	 the	 most	 discrete	 and	 sophisticated	 forms	 of	 sovereign	


















































































































repackaged,	 rebranded,	 and	 sold	 as	 derivatives	 and	 securitisations,	 with	 the	 risks	 of	
investments	masked	by	their	complexity	and	savvy	industry	marketing.	These	packages	
proved	 so	 lucrative	 that	 even	 the	 most	 prestigious	 of	 financial	 institutions	 invested	
heavily,	 drawing	 in	 funds	 from	 outside	 the	 United	 States	 to	 keep	 growing.	When	 the	
subprime	bubble	burst	interest	rates	started	to	skyrocket,	and	money	stopped	flowing.	
During	 this	 “credit	 crunch”	 phase	 governments	 around	 the	 world	 offered	 emergency	
loans,	but	when	the	US	government	decided	to	draw	a	line	with	Lehmans	in	September	
2008	 global	 financial	 panic	 ensued	 and	 the	 ‘Global	 Financial	 Crisis’	was	 born.	Despite	
governments	pumping	hundreds	of	billions	of	dollars	into	the	financial	sector,	the	crisis	
triggered	 the	 ‘Great	Recession’,	 the	worst	 recession	 since	 the	Great	Depression	 of	 the	
1930s	(Ciro,	2012;	Blyth,	2013;	Fulcher,	2015).	The	unthinkable	had	happened;	a	global	
collapse	in	the	credibility	of	capitalism.	For	Slavoj	Žižek	the	crisis	indicated	that	‘the	time	






industries	 that	 brought	 about	 the	 crisis;	 policies	 of	 austerity	 were	 inflicted	 on	 those	
already	 marginalised	 by	 societies;	 the	 contradictions	 and	 limitations	 of	 the	 capitalist	
mode	of	production	were	covered	up;	and	there	was	a	failure	to	acknowledge	how	the	
repercussions	would	 intersect	with	so	many	other	 issues	 facing	 the	world	 today,	 from	
inequality,	marginalisation	and	poverty	to	discrimination,	fanaticism,	to	the	collapse	of	
ecosystems	 and	 biodiversity.	 Critical	 and	 cultural	 theorists	 have	 long	 argued	 that	 the	
ability	to	put	forward	alternative,	more	inclusive	responses	to	events	are	conditioned	and	





but	 inevitable.	 In	 doing	 so	 this	 thesis	 particularly	 focuses	 attention	 upon	 Derrida’s	
reflections	on	‘spectres’	(2006).	
The	concept	of	the	spectre	presents	considerable	difficulties	for	undertaking	research	and	
formulating	 coherent	 responses	 to	 contemporary	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 crisis	 of	 2008.	
However,	I	also	assert	that	the	troubling	of	theory	also	translates	into	a	radical	challenge	
to	 authority	 and	 power	 and	 can,	 as	 a	 result,	 be	 seen	 as	 opening	 up	 to	 considerable	
promise.	 I	 suggest	 that	 it	 helps	 to	 unpack	 questions	 about	 ideological	 and	 practical	
traditions,	 sites	 of	 political	 intervention,	 and	 ethico-political	 iterations	 of	 justice	 and	
affinity	to	pursue	when	responding	not	only	to	the	afterlife	of	an	event	such	as	the	crisis	








practices,	 responding	 to	 contemporary	 issues	 and	 problems	 and	 exploring	 new,	more	
inclusive	 social,	 political,	 economic	 and	 cultural	 possibilities.	 Furthermore,	 I	 am	




result	 of	 a	 society	 affected	by	 reification	 and	 alienation	 (Adorno,	 2005).	 Thus,	 Critical	
Theory	focuses	upon	examining	traditions,	norms,	and	practices,	arguing	that	there	needs	
to	be	an	examination	and	contestation	in	the	area	of	ideas.	However,	as	I	explore	in	detail	
in	 the	 following	chapters,	while	Derrida	 references	Benjamin	 (see	1982a)	and	Adorno	
(see	2005a),	his	attempts	to	go	‘beyond’	the	critical	lead	him	to	a	very	different	approach	
to	 tradition.	His	 engagement	with	 theory	emphasises	 the	examination	of	 texts,	 and	he	
suggests	that	the	notion	of	“context”	risks	overlooking	such	a	task	(1988).		








that	 a	 critical	 approach	 risks	 delimiting	 an	 investigative,	 deconstructive	 project.	 In	
addition,	this	is	also	to	say	that	deconstruction	is	not	only	a	commitment	to	implications	
but	 an	 identification	 of	 promise.	 No	 doubt	 this	 risks	 accusations	 of	 dilettantism	 and	
obscurantism,	 but	 Derrida	 responds	 that	 his	 approach	 ‘is	 neither	 obscurantist	 nor	
antiscientific	[since]	it	is	more	“scientific”	to	take	this	limit,	if	it	is	one,	into	account	and	to	
treat	it	as	a	point	of	departure	for	rethinking	this	or	that	received	concept	of	“science”	and	





‘différance’	 (1997a,	 p.	 23).	With	writing,	 there	 is	 always	 an	 attribution	of	 authority	or	
‘weight’	 (‘grammè’).	 However,	 this	 articulation	 of	 authority	 also	 involves	 an	















2008?	Derrida	 emphasises	 responsibility	 towards	 the	 transformation	 of	 logocentrism,	
and	 his	 later	 works	 respond	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 specific	 concerns,	 including	 the	 future	 of	
Marxism	(2006),	 religious	 fundamentalism	and	 Islamic	 fundamentalism	(2002a),	9/11	
(Borradori	 and	 Derrida,	 2003),	 and	 US	 foreign	 policy	 (2005b)	 to	 name	 just	 a	 few.	
However,	while	his	earlier	works	involve	considerable	textual	analysis,	his	 later	works	
incorporate	very	little	empirical	evidence,	to	the	point	at	which	he	often	makes	sweeping	




To	 turn	 around	 an	 injunction	 that	 Derrida	 sets	 out,	 and	 which	 Geoffrey	 Bennington	













not	 really	 the	 economic	 conditions	 that	 determined	 the	 rise	 of	 fascism	but	 rather	 the	
proliferation	of	a	persecution	complex	that	developed	through	the	culture	(1982).	This	
emphasis	upon	the	role	of	 the	symbolic	 in	 forming	political	positions	brings	me	to	my	
second	point.	While	the	imagery	of	anxious	stock	exchange	traders,	unemployed	bankers	
leaving	 gleaming	 skyscrapers	 with	 cardboard	 boxes	 of	 belongings,	 and	 numbers	 on	
screens	seems	hardly	as	significant	as	the	far	more	visceral	imagery	of	a	mass	media	event	
like	9/11,	 Jean	Baudrillard’s	work	on	 the	 trajectory	 towards	simulation	and	simulacra	






















new	articulation	of	 techno-economic	 causalities	 and	of	 religious	ghosts,	 the	
dependent	condition	of	the	juridical	at	the	service	of	socio-economic	powers	
or	states	that	are	themselves	never	totally	independent	with	regard	to	capital	




My	 suggestion	 here	 is	 that	 attention	 should	 turn	 to	 Derrida’s	 argument	 that	 despite	
Marx’s	materialist	emphasis	upon	capital,	his	 legacy	remains	essential	because	of	how	
committed	it	has	been	to	working	at	the	margins	of	what	is	epistemologically	acceptable,	
even	 if	 it	 has	 been	 dismissive	 of	 immateriality	 and	 the	 spectral.	 While	 this	 thesis	
ultimately	 looks	beyond	Derrida’s	engagement	with	Marx,	Marxism,	and	capitalism	for	
questions	 about	 credit	 and	 inheritance,	 it	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 encouraging	 such	 an	
approach.	










crisis.	 Furthermore,	 by	 undertaking	 a	 deconstructive	 examination	 of	 spectres	 I	
subsequently	 involve	 an	 examination	of	 the	 concept	 and	 significance	of	 the	political.	 I	







a	modification	 of	 a	 template	 that	Derrida	 articulates	 in	 Spectres	 of	Marx.	 Although	 he	




65).	 Firstly	 there	 is	 ‘the	 culture	 called	 more	 or	 less	 properly	 political	 (the	 official	
discourses	of	parties	and	politicians	in	power	in	the	world,	virtually	everywhere	Western	
models	prevail);	 secondly,	 there	 is	 ‘what	 is	 rather	 confusedly	qualified	 as	mass-media	
culture’;	 and	 thirdly,	 there	 is	 ‘scholarly	 or	 academic	 culture’	 (2006,	 p.	 65).	 In	 my	
deployment	of	this	tripartite	division,	I	begin	by	examining	politics	in	a	‘properly	political’	
sense.	However,	I	then	turn	to	his	consideration	of	scholarship	before	his	consideration	




is primarily deconstructed through its encounter with knowledge. Secondly, because this 
thesis makes the case that the media is the most constantly evolving, challenging, and 
discrete form of politics to consider. This thesis suggests that a concern not only with the 
politics of the spectres of the global financial crisis of 2008 but politics more generally 
would be best served by directing attention to the politics of the media.  
2. Outline of Chapters 
In Chapter One, I undertake a literature review that works to more thoroughly examine 
the location of this thesis in relation to Critical Theory and set up my argument for 
engagement with the deconstructive project of Derrida. However, before I examine texts 
from Critical Theory I begin by briefly outlining Marx’s arguments about the need for the 
emancipation of the working classes by way of dialectic that focuses upon history and 
materiality rather than ideology, and how this sets up the dilemma of representation 
examined by Critical Theory. Turning then to the Frankfurt School critical theorists, I 
examine their arguments that the incursion of the capitalist mode of production into 
aesthetics and culture places new demands upon dialectics. After that, I examine Fredric 
Jameson’s application of Critical Theory for the theorisation of late-twentieth-century 
phenomena of postmodernism and globalisation. In particular, I consider his argument 
that postmodernism and globalisation indicate that capitalism has invaded 
representation in ways that even Theodor Adorno did not anticipate. Finally, I explain that 
while Jameson retains faith in the role of historical dialectics, it is with Jean Baudrillard 
that I identify a benchmark for critical and cultural theory’s claims about the limits of 
representation, by way of his conceptualisation of pure simulation. As a result, I argue 
that Baudrillard’s writings provide an important theoretical platform from which to 






(or	 departures	 from)	 specific	 issues	 and	 events.	 Finally,	 I	 reflect	 upon	my	 readings	 of	
Derrida	 with	 reference	 to	 three	 notable	 texts	 of	 secondary	 literature:	 Geoffrey	
Bennington’s	 experimental	 introduction	 to	 Derrida	 co-authored	 with	 Derrida	
(Bennington	 and	 Derrida,	 1993);	 Richard	 Beardsworth’s	 focus	 upon	 Derrida’s	
relationship	 with	 the	 political	 (1996);	 and	 Michael	 Naas’	 emphasis	 upon	 Derrida’s	
relationship	 with	 contemporary	 media	 (2008;	 2012).	 In	 Chapter	 Two	 I	 redirect	 my	
readings	 of	 Derrida’s	works,	 and	 the	 debates	 in	 the	 secondary	 literature	 towards	 the	
construction	of	a	theoretical	framework	for	this	thesis.	After	setting	out	the	debates	about	
the	viability	of	a	 theoretical	 framework,	as	opposed	to	a	methodology,	and	discuss	the	















global	 financial	 crisis,	 play	 a	 role	 in	 further	 contributing	 to	 the	 nation-state’s	
‘autoimmunity’.	 As	 a	 result	 I	 examine	Derrida’s	 additional	 argument	 that	 if	we	 are	 to	
investigate	 the	 significance	of	 the	nation-state	on	 its	own	 terms	and	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
specificity	of	 the	global	 financial	crisis	of	2008	there	needs	 to	continue	 to	be	a	careful	
consideration	of	what	constitutes	the	political.	In	following	this	argument	this	leads	me	







the	 hospitality	 offered	 by	 scholarship	 (2001a).	 After	 describing	 how	 scholarship	
facilitates	 sovereignty	 I	 argue	 that	 Derrida’s	 engagement	 with	 Marxism	 develops	 a	
substantial	 framework	 for	 theorising	 the	 types	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 ideas	 can	 facilitate	
sovereignty,	and	that	while	there	are	limitations	to	Marx’s	work	and	Marxism	for	doing	
so,	it	at	least	points	analysis	in	the	direction	of	the	relationship	between	scholarship	and	
contemporary	 forms	 of	 technoscientific	 capitalism	 and	 sovereignty.	 After	 setting	 out	
















how	a	certain	contradiction	marks	 this	 secretion	of	 the	political.	For	discretion	hardly	
springs	 to	mind	 when	 considering	 the	 phenomena	 of	 global	 spectacles,	 including	 the	
global	 spectacular	 transmission	of	 events	 such	as	 the	global	 financial	 crisis,	 as	well	 as	
global	telecommunications.	Here	I	examine	Derrida’s	argument	that	there	is	a	phenomena	
of	 radical	 ‘dissimulation’	 that	 masks	 the	 conditioning	 of	 hospitality	 (Borradori	 and	
Derrida,	2003).	Moreover,	this	emphasis	upon	dissimulation	or	secretion	also	provides	
the	basis	for	my	more	sustained	examination	of	the	concept	of	the	spectre	and	spectral	
effects.	 Here	 I	 work	 with	 Derrida’s	 argument	 that	 while	 there	 are	 very	 sophisticated	
developments	in	media	technologies,	they	nonetheless	also	involve	new	ways	of	returning	
to	 the	 logocentric,	 as	 suggested	 by	 the	 turns	 towards	 mobile,	 prosthetic,	 and	 digital	






My	 substantive	 chapters	 are	 therefore	 heavily	 expository	 in	 their	 engagement	 with	
Derrida’s	works,	preferencing	a	deconstructive	 (‘more	 than	critical’)	 investigation	 into	
Derrida’s	 complex	 examinations	 of	 inheritance	 between	 his	 considerable	 array	 of	
publications.	In	my	final	chapter,	Chapter	Six,	I	work	to	respond	to	how	this	can	neglect	
the	possibilities	of	critical	reflection	by	discussing	responses	to	his	work	that	have	either	
been	 critical	 or	 taken	 in	 a	 different	 direction	 to	 the	 interpretation	 that	 I	 put	 forward.	





how	 contemporary	 technologies	 that	 can	 manipulate	 libido,	 attention,	 cognition,	 and	
memory	have	definitively	undermined	the	capacity	to	register	orthographic	difference,	




analyses	 of	 Derrida’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 contemporary	 media	 he	 ultimately	 brings	















introduce	my	argument	 that	Derrida’s	work	 indicates	 important	 limitations.	Firstly,	 in	
their	 emphases	 upon	 taking	 specific	 critical	 and	 theoretical	 positions	 that	 neglect	
conditions	of	contingency	and	irreducibility.	Secondly,	that	because	of	this	emphasis	upon	
the	 critical	 they	 are	 complicit	 with	 logocentrism.	 As	 a	 result,	 I	 introduce	 Derrida’s	
suggestion	 that	 the	 deconstruction	 of	 the	 political	 involves	 an	 encounter	 with	 an	













critical	 theory,	 for	Derrida’s	work	(particularly	 in	Spectres	of	Marx),	and	because	of	 its	
significance	 as	 a	 theory	 of	 economic	 crisis	 and	 a	 more	 progressive	 society.	 After	
introducing	 the	promise	and	 limitations	of	Marx’s	work,	 I	 then	 turn	 to	 the	critical	and	
cultural	 theories.	 I	 consider	 how	Marx’s	work	was	 taken	 in	 new	directions	 by	Walter	
Benjamin,	 Theodor	 Adorno,	 and	Max	 Horkheimer,	 scholars	 associated	 with	 Frankfurt	
School	Critical	Theory.	Specifically	I	explain	that	they	maintain	Marx’s	theory	of	crises	of	




capitalism,	 I	 turn	 to	 two	 theorists	 of	 postmodernity:	 Fredric	 Jameson	 and	 Jean	
Baudrillard.	While	 Jameson	 has	 updated	 the	 arguments	 of	 the	 Frankfurt	 Scholars	 and	
aligned	 himself	 with	 their	 legacy,	 Jean	 Baudrillard	 radically	 departed	 not	 only	 from	
Marxism	and	Critical	Theory,	but	from	the	notion	that	representation	or	theory	can	play	
a	 role	 in	 constructing	 alternative	 political	 projects.	 After	 discussing	 Baudrillard	 as	 an	
incredibly	troubling	theorist	for	theories	of	emancipation	I	turn	to	an	examination	of	the	
the	 works	 of	 Jacques	 Derrida.	 Here	 I	 divide	my	 reading	 into	 three	 sections.	 Firstly,	 I	





order	 to	 reflect	 upon	 the	 readings	 that	 I	 put	 forward	 in	my	 previous	 sections.	 Here	 I	











themselves,	 about	 what	 they	 are	 and	 what	 they	 ought	 to	 be.	 They	 have	
arranged	their	relationships	according	to	their	ideas	of	God,	of	normal	man,	





thoughts.	 Let	 us	 teach	 men,	 says	 one,	 to	 exchange	 these	 imaginations	 for	
thoughts	which	correspond	to	the	essence	of	man;	says	the	second,	to	take	up	












with	 articulating	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 material	 over	 anything	 as	 phantasmatic	 as	
spectres.	And	yet,	as	I	will	more	thoroughly	examine	later,	Derrida	also	argues	in	that	text	
that	 there	 are	 numerous	 ways	 in	 which	 Marx’s	 works	 open	 up	 reflections	 upon	
inheritance	 and	 inheritances	 that	 remain	 essential,	 and	 which	 even	 involve	 proto-
deconstructive	gestures	(2006,	pp.	94-95).	For	in	‘The	German	Ideology’	Marx	and	Engels	
articulate	the	importance	of	intervening	in	how	the	means	of	production,	and	specifically	
capitalism,	 have	 become	 not	 only	 increasingly	 sophisticated	 in	 their	 exploitative	
character,	but	alienating	for	oppressed	and	oppressors	alike	(2000,	p.	178).	They	assert	
that	there	needs	to	be	a	consideration	of	how:			
The	 social	 structure	 and	 the	 state	 are	 continually	 evolving	 out	 of	 the	 life-
process	of	definite	individuals,	but	of	individuals,	not	as	they	may	appear	in	
their	 own	 or	 other	 people’s	 imagination,	 but	 as	 they	 really	 are,	 i.e.	 as	 they	
operate,	produce	materially,	and	hence	as	they	work	under	definite	material	
limits,	 presuppositions,	 and	 conditions	 independent	 of	 their	 will.	 (2000,	 p.	
180)	
While	Marx	 and	Engels’	 initial	 claims	 to	 intellectual	 insight	 are	 rather	 immodest,	 they	
subsequently	 turn	 to	 what	 seems	 like	 a	 more	 sympathetic	 (and	 even	 humanistic)	


















Marx	and	Engels	direct	attention	 to	alternative	 intellectual	 and	pedagogic	experiences	





with	 how	 the	 capitalist	 mode	 of	 production	 ‘was	 in	 its	 infancy’	 (1986a,	 p.	 217).	 By	
contrast,	Benjamin	argues	that	capitalism	has	become	‘manifest	 in	all	areas	of	culture’,	
and	 as	 a	 consequence	 it	 has	 acquired	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 proletariat	 (1986a,	 p.	 218).	
However,	 in	 making	 this	 case	 Benjamin	 retains	 the	 theory	 of	 overproduction	 and	
identifies	new	implications.	On	the	one	hand	he	argues	that	despite	the	invasion	of	culture	
by	capital,	 the	representational	and	media	 technologies	 that	develop	as	a	 result	of	 the	




the	 means	 for	 a	 radical	 politics	 that	 can	 instigate	 a	 more	 inclusive	 social	 order.	 The	











‘stars’	 into	 everyday	 life	with	 documentary	 film	 and	 correspondence	 from	newspaper	
readers	 (1986a,	 pp.	 231-232).	 Finally,	 Benjamin	 finishes	 the	 essay	 with	 a	 haunting	
epilogue	that	 links	 the	human	countenance	of	cult	value	to	 the	 ‘Führer	cult’	of	 fascism	
(1986a,	p.	241).	











violence	 of	 reactionary	 forces	 circumscribes	 the	 possibility	 for	 critical	 reflection.	
However,	 Benjamin’s	 colleague	 Theodor	 Adorno	 took	 a	 very	 different	 position	 on	 the	
implications	of	representational	technologies.	
In	personal	correspondence	that	responds	to	‘Art	in	the	Age	of	Mechanical	Reproduction’	
Adorno	writes	 to	 Benjamin	 that	 we	 should	 not	 celebrate	 the	 death	 of	 art	 and	 favour	
mechanical	 reproduction.	 Adorno	 argues	 that	 art	 is	 ‘inherently	 dialectical’	 because	 it	
‘juxtaposes	 the	magical	and	the	mark	of	 freedom’	and	that	mechanical	reproduction	 is	
complicit	with	an	instrumentalist	reason	that	involves	a	reductive,	authoritarian	gesture	
(1986a,	pp.	127-129).	Adorno,	with	Max	Horkheimer,	developed	this	theory	in	more	detail	
in	 Dialectic	 of	 Enlightenment	 (2002).	 Horkheimer	 and	 Adorno’s	 work	 suggests	 that	
societies	have	become	dominated	by	attempts	to	instrumentalise	and	industrialise	life	in	
as	total	fashion	as	possible.	Charting	the	rise	and	development	of	the	Enlightenment	they	
identify	 instrumental	 reason	 within	 the	 representational	 frameworks	 of	 religion,	
philosophy,	 science,	 aesthetics,	 culture,	 and	 politics.	 Ultimately	 these	 coalesce	 in	 the	
everyday	 lifeworld	 through	 what	 they	 term	 the	 ‘culture	 industry’	 (2002,	 p.	 94).	
Furthermore,	 Horkheimer	 and	 Adorno	 argue	 that	 the	 instrumentalisation	 of	 reason,	
through	the	culture	industry,	has	resulted	in	the	development	of	totalitarianism.		
Subsequently	Horkheimer	and	Adorno	supplement	Marx	and	Engels’	investigations	into	
capital.	 They	 offer	 more	 substantial	 explanations	 for	 the	 origins	 of	 capitalisation.	





over	 the	present	by	directing	attention	 to	works	of	art	 that	 register	 contradiction	and	
suffering	over	resolution:	‘the	great	artists	were	never	those	whose	works	embodied	style	






free-flowing	 anxiety;	 free-flowing	because	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 able	 to	 attach	 itself	 to	 living	
beings,	whether	to	individuals	or	classes’	(2003,	pp.	124-125).	We	might	therefore	argue	
here	that	 in	this	context	Adorno	reiterates	a	prognostic	approach	that	resembles	Marx	
and	 Engels’	 writings	 more	 than	 Benjamin’s.	 However,	 Adorno’s	 project	 retains	 a	
commitment	to	redemption,	even	if	 it	means	involving	a	 ‘melancholy	science’	(2005,	p.	
15)	 that	 works	 through	 the	most	 problematic	 of	 social	 phenomena,	 from	 the	 culture	
industry	to	anti-Semitism	(2002,	p.	137)	and	totalitarianism	(2002,	p.	152).	However,	in	
the	work	of	Fredric	Jameson	and	Jean	Baudrillard	the	problems	of	contemporary	society	
have	 been	 explored	 in	 more	 fatalistic	 terms	 with	 the	 ascendency	 of	 simulation	 and	
postmodern	culture.		
Jameson	supplements	Adorno	and	Horkheimer’s	culture	industry	thesis	by	arguing	that	
they	have	become	accustomed	 to	 responding	 to	 the	 challenges	of	 overproduction	 and	




his	 arguments	 on	 postmodern	 culture	 via	 a	 series	 of	 sub-phenomena.	 There	 is:	 a	
prevalence	 of	 unsubstantial	 ‘pastiche’	 (1991,	 p.	 17);	 a	 mining	 of	 history	 for	 pastiche	
characterised	by	nostalgia,	 and	a	 subsequent	discarding	of	historicity	 and	 temporality	
(1991,	 p.	 18);	 a	 focus	 on	 ‘simulacra’	 (1991,	 pp.	 25-26);	 and	 the	 sublimation	 of	




Furthermore,	 like	 Adorno,	 Jameson	 takes	 inspiration	 from	 aesthetics	 and	 culture.	 He	
argues	that	there	is	a	burgeoning	response	to	postmodern	culture	that	he	calls	‘cognitive	
mapping’	(1991,	p.	54).		
As	 a	 consequence	 Jameson’s	work	proceeds	by	 following	a	dialectic	 that	distinguishes	
problematic	 postmodern	 culture	 from	 forms	 and	 content	 that	 are	 more	 favourable	
because	 they	 register	 a	 broader	 array	 of	 experiences.	 However,	 in	 doing	 so	 Jameson	
departs	from	Adorno’s	emphasis	upon	suffering	towards	a	broader	emphasis	upon	what	
is	 lost,	 with	 the	 suggestion	 that	 postmodern	 culture	 has	 rendered	 the	 recognition	 of	
















complicity	 with	 the	 forms	 of	 postmodern	 culture	 that	 Jameson	 discusses.	 Indeed,	
Baudrillard	targets	Marx	(along	with	Sigmund	Freud)	as	a	significant	contributor	to	the	
proliferation	 of	 simulation	 through	 the	 privileging	 of	 work	 and	 the	 experiences	 of	
capitalism	 (the	 ‘tele-technics’	 that	 I	 refer	 to	 above)	 (1988b,	 p.	 119).	 In	 doing	 so	
Baudrillard	suggests	that	both	Marx	and	Freud	have	only	contributed	to	the	supplanting	
of	 the	 ‘symbolic	 exchange’	 of	 suffering	 and	 mortality	 in	 ‘primitive’	 societies	 by	
representational	 apparatuses	 that	 respond	 to	 spectre	 of	 being	 scared	 to	 death,	 to	 the	
point	at	which	representational	technologies	have	become	autonomous.	
As	 such	 any	 registration	 of	 suffering	 is	 likely	 a	 ‘simulation’	 rather	 than	 a	 real	 act	 of	
symbolic	exchange.	What	then	is	the	contribution	of	Baudrillard’s	project	to	questions	of	
social	 control?	 In	 a	 speculative	 formulation,	 he	 insists	 that	 the	 absorption	 of	
representation	by	simulation	might	be	of	long-term	benefit	to	society.	In	a	fashion	that	in	
some	 sense	 resembles	 the	 Marxian	 theory	 of	 capitalist	 crises	 of	 overproduction,	 to	



















was	 a	 ‘symbolic	 event’	 that	 represented	 ‘a	 setback	 for	 globalization	 itself’	 because	 it	






that	 this	 forecloses	 an	 engagement	 with	 a	 more	 diverse	 range	 of	 experiences.	 More	
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specifically	 still,	 I	 want	 to	 suggest	 here	 that	 there	 is	 certain	 complicity	 between	 the	
specific	meanings	that	Baudrillard	attributes	to	these	phenomena	and	the	repetitions	that	
have	 characterised	 the	 reduction	of	 the	experiences	of	 these	experiences.	People	with	
AIDS	as	AIDS	victims,	the	9/11	attacks	as	a	singular	event	(rather	than	the	collection	of	
attacks	 that	 took	 place,	 not	 only	 in	 New	 York	 [Redfield,	 2009]);	 the	 lives	 beyond	 the	
rhetoric	and	imagery.	It	is	from	a	concern	to	consider	the	myriad	of	experiences	that	my	







organising	 society.	 In	 his	 lecture	 Derrida	 argues	 that	 while	 Marxism	 is	 certainly	 not	
without	 its	problems	it	still	has	 important	 implications	 for	such	a	political	project.	For	
Derrida	Marxism	continues	to	provide	a	platform	for	asking	questions	if	we	approach	it	
by	 way	 of	 its	 ‘spectres’.	 That	 is,	 the	 troubling	 spectral	 figures	 of	 Marx,	 Marxism,	 and	
Marxists	in	conservative	rhetoric	and	narratives,	the	spectralization	of	whole	populations	
by	 the	 catastrophic	 totalitarian	projects	 inspired	by	Marxism,	 and	 the	 spectres	within	
Marx’s	 writings	 itself,	 from	 the	 spectre	 of	 communism	 haunting	 Europe,	 to	 the	
phantasmatic	character	of	capital.	However,	Derrida’s	work	with	the	figure	of	the	spectre	









We	 are	 therefore	 presented	 with	 a	 rather	 different	 take	 on	 the	 implications	 of	
contemporary	technologies	that	I	have	described	in	section	one.	If	Marxism	is	beneficial	
because	of	its	diversity	of	spectres,	this	should	subsequently	suggest	that	the	proliferation	
of	 ‘spectral	 effects’	 and	 the	 displacement	 of	 the	 political	 are	 also	 beneficial.	 However,	
Derrida’s	 approach	 to	 spectres	 is	 far	 more	 nuanced	 than	 this,	 and	 he	 by	 no	 means	
approaches	the	displacement	of	the	political	without	concern.	In	Spectres	of	Marx	Derrida	
makes	 this	 case	by	 subtly	differentiating	between	 spectres	 that	 dominate	 the	 spectral	
landscape	 and	 spectres	 that	 provide	 the	 basis	 for	 a	 more	 inclusive	 political	 project.	









all	 over	 the	 world’	 he	 claims	 that	 its	 diversity	 is	 ultimately	 ‘reined	 in	 by	 metaphor,	
metaphysics,	and	theology’	(1997a,	pp.	3-4,	my	italics).	While	writing	has	diversified	in	







not	 just	 specific	 conceptual	 frameworks.	 Through	 a	 ‘meditation	 and	 painstaking	
investigation’	 into	 writing,	 exploring	 its	 characteristics	 and,	 furthermore,	 letting	 it	
develop	 its	 ‘positivity’,	he	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	a	 far	more	attentive	approach	 to	how	
writing	instigates	the	event.	The	challenge	is	to	make	sure	that	the	‘inadequacy’	by	which	
closure	has	been	accompanied	does	not	undermine	this	relationship	between	writing	and	








from	 writing	 within	 the	 Western	 metaphysical	 tradition.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 he	
acknowledges	how	this	privilege	 ‘does	not	depend	upon	a	choice	that	could	have	been	
avoided’	(1997a,	p.	7).	He	suggests	that	the	privileging	of	speech	is	the	understandable	
result	of	 the	underpinning	emphasis	upon	 the	 logocentric,	 for	speech	presents	a	more	
intimate	 relationship	 with	 the	 metaphysics	 of	 the	 ideal	 than	 the	 non-ideal,	 the	





between	 speech	 and	 the	 non-ideal,	 empirical,	 disparate,	 and	 outside.	 However,	 while	
writing	 may	 have	 become	 an	 accepted	 part	 of	 everyday	 life	 Derrida	 insists	 that	 the	








metaphor	 and	 metaphysics.	 Although	 Derrida	 insists	 that	 phonocentricity	 is	 largely	
indebted	to	Plato	he	opens	with	the	somewhat	clearer	argument	set	out	by	Aristotle:	
“Spoken	 words”	 (ta	 en	 tē	 phonē)	 are	 the	 symbols	 of	 mental	 experience	
(pathēmata	tes	psychēs)	and	written	words	are	the	symbols	of	spoken	words	
(...)	 because	 the	 voice,	 producer	 of	 the	 first	 symbols,	 has	 a	 relationship	 of	
essential	and	immediate	proximity	with	the	mind.	(1997a,	p.	11)	








This	 emphasis	 then	 subsequently	 encompasses	medieval	 Christian	 theology.	 Although	
attention	is	directed	from	the	logos	of	metaphysics	to	theology,	medieval	Christian	texts	
make	 their	 claims	based	on	 its	natural,	 eternal,	 and	universal	qualities	 (1997a,	p.	15).	
Again,	there	is	an	emphasis	on	its	relationship	to	the	other.	However,	with	Jean-Jacques	
Rousseau	 the	 ‘Platonic	 gesture’	 undergoes	 a	 significant	 transformation.	 Rousseau	
certainly	maintains	the	notion	of	metaphor	–	indeed	he	explicitly	calls	for	a	‘metaphoric’	
form	of	writing	(1997a,	p.	17).	Moreover	he	maintains	a	 theological	basis	 that	 focuses	
upon	 ‘divine	 law’	 (1997a,	p.	17).	The	distinction	of	his	work	rests	 in	his	privileging	of	
‘presence’.	More	 specifically	 it	 is	 a	 ‘self-presence	 in	 the	 senses,	 in	 the	 sensible	 cogito,	




doing	Rousseau	 opens	 up	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 ideal	 from	 the	 texts	 of	metaphysics	 and	
theology	to	experience.	
But	if	Rousseau	relocates	the	metaphoricity	of	classical	Greek	metaphysics	and	Medieval	















Derrida	 subsequently	 asserts	 that	 by	 repeatedly	 crossing	 out	 the	 concept	 of	 being	
Heidegger	instigates	a	new	‘metaphysics	of	presence	and	logocentrism’,	such	that	‘this	last	
writing	is	also	the	first	writing’	(1997a,	p.	23).	Heidegger’s	crossing	out	of	being	remains	
‘legible’	 beneath	 the	marks,	 and	 as	 a	 consequence	 he	 sets	 out	 a	 new	 paradigm	 for	 ‘a	
transcendental	 signified’	 (1997a,	 p.	 23),	 which	 is	 to	 say	 a	 new	 form	 of	 primordial	
authority.	 Nonetheless,	 Derrida	 maintains	 that	 it	 is	 important	 to	 engage	 with	 the	
transgressive	 possibilities	 of	 Heidegger’s	 work.	 Derrida	 takes	 this	 notion	 of	 the	




p.	23,	 italics	 in	original).	Any	decision	 is	 ‘derivative	with	regard	to	difference’.	As	such,	
Derrida	insists	that	we	should	begin	from	the	premise	of	an	‘economy’	of	difference.	More	
specifically,	Derrida	conceptualises	this	economy	as	a	movement	of	‘différance’	(1997a,	p.	




This	 is	a	subtle	and	difficult	distinction	between	 ‘difference’	and	 ‘différance’	 that	 is	no	





citing	 the	 inaudible	distinction	between	difference	and	différance	(in	French)	 that	 this	
concept	is	intended	to	articulate	difference	but	also,	to	refer	to	how	an	economy	is	always	
like	a	tomb,	or	‘Egyptian	Pyramid’,	for	the	Greek	word	to	which	we	inherit	the	concept	of	








Returning	 to	Of	Grammatology	we	 see	 that	Derrida	 characterises	Heidegger’s	negative	
engagement	with	being	in	terms	of	‘hesitation’	or	‘trembling’	1997a,	p.	24).	Derrida	insists	
that	 such	 a	 trembling	 is	 not	 due	 to	 any	 theoretical	 “incoherence”	 (Derrida’s	 inverted	
commas).	Rather,	it	is	because	the	more	that	Heidegger	furthers	his	thesis	the	more	it	is	
subject	to	the	economy	of	différance,	and	to	its	theoretical	‘deconstruction’	(1997a,	p.	24).	






formally	 through	how	 it	 relies	on	 certain	 concepts	and	acquires	 coherence	by	passing	
through	writing.	To	examine	the	management	of	writing	in	closer	detail	Derrida	turns	to	
the	linguistic	and	semiotic	project	of	Ferdinand	de	Saussure.	
In	 a	 sense	 Saussure	 also	 operates	 in	 a	 fashion	 that	 is	 ‘true	 to	 the	Western	 tradition’	
because	he	refuses	 to	offer	 the	concept	of	writing	 ‘more	 than	a	narrow	and	derivative	
function’	 (1997a,	 p.	 30).	 Like	 Aristotle,	 Saussure	 insists	 that	 written	 words	 are	 the	
symbols	of	 spoken	words,	which	are	 in	 turn	 symbols	of	mental	words:	 ‘Language	and	
writing	 are	 two	 distinct	 systems	 of	 signs;	 the	 second	 exists	 for	 the	 sole	 purpose	 of	






This	 distinction	 is,	 Derrida	 writes,	 ‘at	 bottom	 justified	 (...)	 by	 the	 notion	 of	 the	
arbitrariness	 of	 the	 sign’	 (1997a,	 p.	 32).	 For	 Saussure	 this	 affects	 writing	 more	 than	
speech	 because	 while	 it	 maintains	 the	 systematic	 quality	 of	 speech,	 there	 is	 also	 no	
“symbolic”	or	“figurative”	quality	(Saussure	in	Derrida,	1997a,	p.	32).	







disregard	 it.	 We	 must	 be	 acquainted	 with	 its	 usefulness,	 shortcomings,	 and	 dangers’	
(Saussure	in	Derrida,	1997a,	p.	34).	Writing	would	therefore	be	‘an	imperfect	tool	and	a	
dangerous,	 almost	maleficent,	 technique’	 (Derrida,	1997a,	p.	34).	Less	an	emphasis	on	
setting	out,	protecting,	or	recuperating	speech	than	protecting	it	from	writing	(1997a,	p.	
34).	However,	for	Derrida,	like	the	relationship	with	being	and	metaphysics	in	Heidegger,	
the	 ‘outside	 bears	with	 the	 inside	 a	 relationship	 that	 is,	 as	 usual,	 anything	but	 simple	
exteriority’	 (1997a,	 p.	 35).	 This	 “natural	 bond”	 that	 Saussure	 attributes	 to	 the	 phonic	
system	 is	no	more	 innocent	 that	writing.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	not	only	 speech	but	
‘language	is	 first,	 in	a	sense	(...),	writing’	(1997a,	p.	35).	Moreover,	 it	 indicates	that	the	
‘usurpation’	that	Saussure	characterises	the	rise	of	writing	as	‘has	always	already	begun’	
(1997a,	p.	37).		





















But	 how	 can	 this	 destabilisation	 of	 meaning	 possibly	 engender	 a	 political	 project?	
Derrida’s	focus	here	is	on	the	possibilities	raised	by	responsibility	and	to	the	notion	of	
reining	 in	 writing	 by	 metaphor,	 metaphysics,	 and	 theology	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 Of	
Grammatology.	 To	 articulate	 this	 I	 want	 to	 refer	 here	 to	 the	 lecture	 ‘Signature	 Event	
Context’	(1982c).	At	the	beginning	of	the	piece	Derrida	addresses	the	negativity	that	his	
position	suggests.	In	relation	to	communication	he	argues	that	while	meaning,	including	
communication,	 is	 indeterminable	 this	 does	 not	 give	 us	 ‘authorization	 for	 neglecting	
communication	as	a	word,	or	for	impoverishing	its	polysemic	aspects;	indeed,	this	word	
opens	up	a	semantic	domain	that	precisely	does	not	limit	itself	to	semantics,	semiotics,	














that	 presence	 can	 be	 inscribed.	However,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 also	means	 that	 the	
signature	 marks	 a	 singular,	 unique	 event	 of	 ‘deconstruction’	 (1982c,	 p.	 329).	 The	

























hand	 and	 in	 a	 more	 substantial	 way,	 it	 supplements	 his	 work	 on	 the	 trace	 with	 a	





However,	 in	 Spectres	 of	 Marx	 he	 also	 examines	 how	 questions	 of	 embodiment	 are	
developing,	through	the	post-World	War	II	rhetoric	of	human	rights,	liberal	democracy,	
telecommunications	 and	 media	 (teletechnologies),	 and	 advances	 in	 prosthetic	
technologies.	
Before	I	examine	Derrida’s	engagement	with	particular	spectral	forms	I	will	outline	why	
Derrida	argues	 that	questions	of	 life	are	 important.	Derrida	writes	at	 the	beginning	of	
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Spectres	of	Marx	by	 insisting	that	nothing	 is	more	necessary	than	learning	to	 live:	 ‘it	 is	
ethics	 itself’	 (2006,	p.	xvii).	Thus	Derrida	examines	 the	concept	of	 the	spectre	because	
while	 it	 directs	 attention	 to	 questions	 about	 life	 it	 retains	 a	 relationship	 with	 non-









metaphor,	metaphysics,	 and	 theology.	While	 Derrida	 begins	 by	 expressing	 the	 ethical	
implications	of	 spectres	 the	very	 first	 lines	of	 the	 text	state	 that	 ‘Someone,	you	or	me,	
comes	forward	and	says:	I	would	like	to	learn	to	live	finally’	(2006,	p.	xvi,	italics	in	original).	
However,	Derrida	accepts	that	his	attempts	to	pursue	a	project	that	 is	receptive	to	the	
margins	of	questions	of	 life	–	a	 ‘politics	of	memory,	of	 inheritance,	and	of	generations’	













about	 justice.	Admittedly	Derrida	 includes	the	 importance	of	recalling	the	catastrophic	
totalitarian	incarnation	of	Marxism	within	this	equation.	However,	Derrida	also	argues	
that	Marxism	is	significant	for	four	additional	reasons.	Firstly,	there	is	a	vast	plurality	of	
Marx	 and	 Marxism’s	 inheritance	 (hence	 the	 plurality	 of	 ‘spectres’)	 (2006,	 pp.	 1-2).	
Secondly:	
The	 [Marxist]	 tradition	 seems	 as	 lucid	 concerning	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	
political	is	becoming	worldwide,	concerning	the	irreducibility	of	the	technical	
and	 the	 media	 in	 the	 current	 of	 the	 most	 thinking	 thought-and	 this	 goes	









For	 Derrida	 Marxism	 is	 important	 because	 it	 combines	 an	 examination	 of	 a	 host	 of	




































Firstly	 this	 is	because	 the	messianic,	 like	 the	 figure	of	 the	grammé	and	 the	sign	 in	my	
previous	 section,	 necessarily	 include	 the	 negotiation	 of	 the	 trace.	 However,	 secondly,	
Derrida	also	attributes	a	particular	significance	to	the	figure	of	the	messianic.	He	claims	
that:	
What	 remains	 irreducible	 to	 any	 deconstruction,	 what	 remains	 as	
undeconstructible	 as	 the	 possibility	 itself	 of	 deconstruction	 is,	 perhaps,	 a	
certain	 experience	 of	 the	 emancipatory	 promise;	 it	 is	 perhaps	 even	 the	
formality	of	a	 structural	messianism,	a	messianism	without	 religion,	even	a	
messianic	without	messianism,	an	 idea	of	 justice-which	we	distinguish	 from	
law	or	right	and	even	from	human	rights-and	an	idea	of	democracy.	(2006,	p.	
74,	my	italics)	






this	 is	 also	 clear	 from	 Derrida’s	 reciprocity	 to	 spectres	 and	 his	 identification	 of	 the	




or	political	domain’	 (2006,	p.	79).	Now,	 this	 is	not	 to	 say	 that	Derrida	approaches	 the	







is	 characterised	 by	 ‘diastema	 (failure,	 inadequation,	 disjunction,	 disadjustment,	 being	
“out	of	joint”)’	(2006,	p.	81).		
In	 this	way	Derrida’s	 promise	 of	 democracy	 is	 specific	 to	 how	democracy	 is	 ‘to	 come’	
(2006,	p.	81,	italics	in	original).	This	democracy	certainly	has	an	inevitability	about	it,	but	































Derrida’s	 discussion	 of	 how	 sublimation	 risks	 delimiting	 justice	 is	 an	 important	
component	 of	 his	 conceptualisation	 of	 ‘hospitality’.	 Derrida	 briefly	 asserts	 the	 role	 of	
negotiating	hospitality	in	the	encounter	with	the	spectre	in	Spectres	of	Marx,	and	how	this	
encounter	is	conditioned	by	impossibility	(2006,	pp.	81-82).	However,	in	Of	Hospitality	









family	 name,	 with	 the	 social	 status	 of	 being	 a	 foreigner,	 etc.),	 but	 to	 the	
absolute,	unknown,	anonymous	other,	and	that	I	give	place	to	them,	that	I	let	
them	 come,	 that	 I	 let	 them	arrive,	 and	 take	place	 in	 the	place	 I	 offer	 them,	
without	asking	of	them	either	reciprocity	(entering	into	a	pact)	or	even	their	
names.	(2000,	pp.	25-27,	italics	in	original)	




And	 yet	 Derrida	 argues	 that	 unconditional	 hospitality	 does	 have	 an	 impact,	 and	 the	





p.	 135).	 Thus,	 we	 need	 to	 negotiate	 between	 the	 conditionality	 of	 the	 ‘hyperbole’	 of	
unconditional	 hospitality	 and	 the	 laws	 of	 ‘conditional’	 hospitality,	 and	 this	 needs	 to	









Thus	Of	Hospitality	 reflects	 on	questions	 of	 affiliation,	 the	 foreigner,	messianicity,	 and	





articulates	Derrida’s	 concept	 of	 iterability	 –	 as	 the	 deconstruction	 of	 identity	 through	


























a	more	 critical	 approach	 to	Derrida’s	work	 that	 calls	 for	 an	 engagement	with	 it	while	
identifying	certain	caveats	in	relation	to	its	approach	to	the	contemporary	bond	between	
capitalism	 and	 technoscience.	 Secondly,	 with	 Geoffrey	 Bennington’s	 Jacques	 Derrida	




Derrida	 From	 Now	 On	 (2008).	 This	 text	 is	 particularly	 helpful	 for	 reflecting	 on	 the	






adequately	 explore	 the	 ‘increasing	 tension	 between	 internationalization	 and	
virtualization,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 territorial	 difference	 and	 the	 corporal	 realities	 of	
human	life,	on	the	other’	(1996,	p.	xii).	This	is	not	to	say	that	Beardsworth	sees	little	value	
in	 engaging	 with	 Derrida’s	 work.	 Rather,	 he	 suggests	 that	 if	 we	 work	 through	 these	
problems	we	can	find	crucial	contributions	to	the	relationship	between	the	metaphysics	
and	violence,	but	also,	how	the	commitment	to	this	project	comes	with	significant	caveats	
(1996,	 p.	 xii).	 To	 explore	 this	 Beardsworth	 investigates	 Derrida’s	 work	 through	 an	
intricate	 comparison	 with,	 firstly,	 the	 theoretical	 frameworks	 that	 he	 believes	 are	
fundamental	to	the	tension	in	modernist	political	theory:	the	liberalism	of	Immanuel	Kant	
and	communitarianism	of	Georg	Hegel;	and	secondly	 the	 theories	 that	he	suggests	are	





The	 problem	 for	Beardsworth	 is	 that	 this	 commitment	 is	 ultimately	 undercut	 by	 how	
Derrida	pays	too	much	attention	to	the	‘gift’	of	alterity	(the	‘unconditional’,	the	‘arrivant’).	
Nonetheless,	 in	 examining	 Derrida’s	 engagement	 with	 lesser	 violence,	 Beardsworth	
discerns	 three	 levels	 of	 violence	 (1996,	 p.	 24).	 Firstly,	 there	 is	 the	 initial	 violence	 of	
‘identity’	 (1996,	 p.	 24).	 Here	 Beardsworth	 notes	 Derrida’s	 debt	 to	 Heidegger’s	




supplemented	 through	 institutionalisation,	 such	 as	 in	 technologies,	 politics,	 and	 law.	
Finally	 there	 is	 the	violence	 involved	 in	reflecting	upon	these	 laws	(1996,	p.	24).	Here	
Beardsworth	tells	us	that	while	Derrida	retains	a	negotiation	of	how	the	tertiary	level	of	
reflective	 violence	 retains	 violence	 it	 nonetheless	 constitutes	 an	 engagement	 with	
difference	that	would	otherwise	not	take	place	(1996,	p.	24).	
As	 such	 Beardsworth	 discerns	 a	 case	 for	 an	 ethico-political	 project	 that	 can	 endure	
violence,	and	for	Beardsworth	this	has	to	be	a	model	that	welcomes	democracy.	However,	
Beardsworth	argues	that	Derrida’s	emphasis	upon	literature	and	the	idiomatic	as	a	site	of	




and	 thereby	 reinvents	 our	 relation	 to	 these	 contradictions	 according	 to	 the	 lesser	
violence’	 (1996,	p.	46),	he	also	argues	 that	 there	 should	be	a	 recognition	of	how	both	
attempted	to	accommodate	difference	through	explicit	political	theories	and	institutions.	
Firstly,	 Kant’s	 work	 is	 significant	 for	 Beardsworth	 because	 Kant’s	 cosmopolitan	 state	
accommodates	both	empirical	knowledge	(the	‘phenomenal’),	and	faith,	(the	‘noumenal’).	
Thus,	Kant	 intervenes	 in	 the	 authoritarianism	of	 the	 religious,	 but	 also	 articulates	 the	







life	 (Sittlichkeit)	 that	undertakes,	 facilitated	by	dialectics,	 the	 recognition	of	 difference	
(1996,	 p.	 47).	 The	 problem	 that	 Derrida	 identifies	 in	 Glas,	 which	 Beardsworth	
paraphrases,	is	that	while	‘Hegel	thinks	he	is	talking	about	history,	he	is	not;	he	is	talking	
about	history	as	he	desires	it	to	be’	(1996,	p.	59,	italics	in	original).	Instead	he	is	talking	
about	 phantasms	 of	 history	 (1996,	 p.	 59).	 For	 Derrida,	 Beardsworth	 suggests,	 this	
‘misrecognition’	 has	 grave	 consequences	 for	 encounters	 with	 difference,	 which	
Beardsworth	elaborates	upon	by	considering	how	the	determination	of	what	constitutes	
ethical	 life	has	been	 interwoven	 into	 capitalism,	 colonialism,	 and	even	 totalitarianism.	




The	 task	 that	 Beardsworth	 subsequently	 pursues	 is	 to	 consider	 the	 justification	 for	
departing	 from	such	speculation,	by	way	of	a	reading	of	Heidegger	and	Levinas	proto-
postmodern	 projects.	 Specifically,	 Beardsworth	 draws	 attention	 to	 how	 Derrida	 has	
appraised	how	Heidegger’s	work	identifies	the	aporia	(contradictions)	of	the	metaphysics	
of	 time	and	history,	and	Levinas’	work,	 in	part	 in	response	to	Heidegger,	 identifies	the	
aporia	 of	 the	metaphysics	 of	 law	 (1996:	 98).	 That	 is,	 Heidegger’s	 emphasis	 upon	 the	
irreducibility	 of	 spirit,	 and	 Levinas’	 emphasis	 upon	 the	 irreducibility	 of	 political	
difference.	Subsequently,	while	Heidegger	argues	for	the	exposition	or	‘presentation’	of	
metaphysical	 aporia,	 Levinas	 argues	 that	 the	 avoidance	 of	 the	 ‘unpresentable’	 is	
politically	 dangerous.	 Derrida’s	 response,	 Beardsworth	 explains,	 is	 that	 neither	
framework	 adequately	 articulates	 the	 limit	 between	 the	 presentable	 and	 the	
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supplements	 these	 insights	by	posing	 that	Heidegger	 and	Levinas	have	 contributed	 to	
nationalist	 projects,	 albeit	 Heidegger’s	 being	 far	more	 problematic	 (Nazi	 Germany	 for	
Heidegger,	Israel	for	Levinas).	However,	for	Beardsworth	this	is	simply	not	enough	from	
a	political	perspective.		
For	Beardsworth	 this	 feeds	 into	his	 argument	 that	Derrida	places	 too	much	emphasis	
upon	the	‘arrivant’	and	‘the	gift’	of	difference.	He	asserts	that	there	needs	to	be	a	much	
more	forthright	commitment	to	pursuing	the	lesser	violence.	Specifically,	he	suggests	that	
while	 Derrida	 opens	 up	 interesting	 questions	 about	 violence	 in	 Spectres	 of	 Marx	
concerning	developments	in	technoscientific	capitalism,	he	does	not	go	far	enough	(1996,	
p.	 147).	 Furthermore,	 he	 argues	 that	 the	 spectralisation	 that	 Derrida	 writes	 of	 ‘is	
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argues	 that	 Derrida	 avoids	 a	 discussion	 about	 the	 hidden	 technical	 injunctions	 of	
Heidegger’s	work,	and	how	this	intersects	not	just	with	Nazism	but	the	conception	of	‘the	
gift’	and	the	‘promise’	(1996,	p.	155).	Beardsworth’s	claim	is	that	‘Derrida’s	thinking	of	
time	 can	 appear	 formalist’,	 and	 that,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 ‘in	 the	 context	 of	 increasing	
technicization,	the	point	is	politically	telling’	(1996,	p.	155).	
So,	Derrida’s	approach	 is	 important	 for	Beardsworth	because	 it	helps	 to	articulate	 the	
unavoidable	 violence	 of	 metaphysics,	 but	 he	 raises	 some	 very	 serious	 criticisms.	
However,	his	approach	to	Derrida	is	not	without	its	concerns.	This	is	articulated	through	
an	emphasis	upon	a	relationship	between	the	political	and	the	technical.	In	his	concluding	
chapter	 Beardsworth	 argues	 that	 in	 Spectres	 of	 Marx	 Derrida	 articulates	 how	 the	
advancement	of	teletechnologies	–	of	spectres	–	means	that	democracy	is	haunting	‘the	
community	 (family,	 nation,	 world,	 even	 (...)	 humanity)’	 in	 new	 ways	 (1996,	 p.	 146).	
However,	 acknowledging	 a	 certain	 Hegelianism,	 Beardsworth	 argues	 that	 Derrida’s	
approach	is	not	sufficiently	historical.	The	consequence	of	this	can	be	found,	he	argues,	in	
the	way	in	which	Derrida	fails	to	take	into	account	the	capacity	for	cognitive	violence	and	






two	 is	 ultimately	 foreclosed	by	 the	demand	 to	 address	more	pressing	 concerns	 about	
contemporary	society.	We	might	 therefore	be	 left	with	the	sense	that	 for	Beardsworth	
Derrida’s	work	helps	to	constitute	a	warning	about	the	risks	of	deconstruction.	
For	Geoffrey	Bennington	Beardsworth’s	reading	involves	a	significant	aporia	of	its	own	
(2000).	 Firstly,	 Bennington	 argues	 that	 Beardsworth	 overlooks	 how	 Derrida’s	 work	
‘liberates	 us	 from	 some	 of	 these	 pedagogical	 pressures	 [found	 in	 Kant	 and	 Hegel,	
Heidegger	and	Levinas]’	that	make	it	necessary	to	undertake	certain	interventions	and	




















introduced	 in	my	 second	 section	 above,	 that	 systemisation	 is	 impossible	 because	 it	 is	
always	subject	to	deconstruction.	Bennington	adds	that	this	is	problematic	for	teaching	
Derrida	and	troubles	the	idea	of	methodology.	As	a	result	Bennington	helps	to	articulate	
both	 the	 radical	 implications	 and	 the	 possibilities	 of	 Derrida’s	 work	 for	 research.	 To	
explain	 this	 I	 think	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 focus	 on	 Bennington’s	 emphasis	 upon	 origins	 and	
beginnings.	 Specifically,	 the	 argument	 that	 the	 impossibility	 of	 determining	where	we	
begin	is	not	the	same	as	saying	that	we	begin	from	nowhere.		
For	 Bennington	 ‘you	 always	 start	 somewhere,	 but	 that	 somewhere	 is	 never	 just	







problem	 for	 metaphysical	 thought	 (writing,	 trace),	 and	 accentuate	 their	 power	 of	
diversion	 –	 while	 knowing	 a	 priori	 that	 we	 shall	 never	 find	 anything	 but	 nicknames,	
fronts,	pseudonyms’	(1993,	p.	36).	This	might	seem	like	a	thankless	task	and	Bennington	










are	 not	 imported	 into	 metaphysics	 by	 Derrida;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 they	 constitute	
metaphysics’	(1993,	p.	41).	What	should	be	shocking,	for	Bennington,	is	that	‘this	“truth”	
of	metaphysical	truth	can	no	longer	be	thought	of	as	truth’	(1993,	p.	42).	Beginning	with	





























core	 not	 only	 of	 Derrida’s	 work	 but	 his	 life.	 Conceptually	 it	 articulates	 what	 Naas	













pp.	 32-33).	 Furthermore	Naas	 emphasises	 how	problematic	 the	 politics	 of	 hospitality,	
ipseity,	and	autoimmunity	are	through	the	neoliberal	emphasis	on	various	‘autos’,	such	as	
autonomy	and	autarky,	and	particularly	in	the	United	States.	
Naas	 explains	 that	 it	 is	 not	 just	 significant	 that	 a	 focus	 upon	 America	 helps	 to	 direct	
attention	to	the	development	of	the	role	of	spectres,	images,	sounds,	and	‘digital	imprints’	
(2008,	 p.	 160).	 Rather,	 it	 is	 how	 these	 developments	 have	 been	 interwoven	 with	 a	





spectrality	was	 the	 intention	of	 the	 suicide	 attacks	of	9/11	as	well	 as	 intention	of	 the	
media	 institutions	 and	 politicians	 in	 the	 subsequent	 representation	 of	 9/11	 and	 the	
Global	 War	 on	 Terror.	 In	 doing	 so	 Naas	 directs	 attention	 to	 the	 messianic	 figures	





‘Autoimmunity’,	Rogues,	 and	 the	 lecture	 shortly	before	his	death	 titled	 ‘Enlightenment	





















should	 be	 speculations	 about	whether	 institutions	 can	 be	more	 hospitable	 (and	more	
hospitable	 than	 others),	 I	 am	 not	 convinced	 that	 this	 avoids	 sublimating	 the	 idea	 of	








in	 one	 of	 his	 last	 papers,	 referring	 to	 both	 the	 need	 to	 remember	 ‘our	 Enlightenment	
heritage,	 and	 also	 [retain]	 an	 awareness	 and	 regretful	 acceptance	 of	 the	 totalitarian,	
genocidal	and	colonialist	crimes	of	the	past’	(2004a,	online).	However,	I	think	that	there	
this	 should	 not	 lead	 us	 to	 be	 uncritical	 about	 the	 promise	 of	 European	 political	
institutions.	
This	final	section	has	examined	some	of	the	responses	to	Derrida’s	work.	It	has	examined	
Geoffrey	 Bennington’s	 suggestion	 that	 Derrida’s	 work	 can	 liberate	 approaches	 to	
signification	–	and	as	a	consequence	politics	–	from	the	authority	of	certain	narratives.	In	
particular	 I	 have	 focused	 upon	 Bennington’s	 argument	 that	 deconstruction	 works	 to	
dismantle	assumptions	about	authority	by	interrogating	their	origins,	and	it	has	argued	
that	 Bennington’s	 approach	 competes	 with	 Richard	 Beardsworth’s	 argument	 that	 if	
Derrida’s	work	is	important	it	is	because	it	tells	us	something	about	the	teletechnological	
apparatuses	that	shape	our	society.	Ultimately	I	side	with	Bennington	in	this	argument,	
but	not	because	of	 the	 implications	of	Beardsworth’s	 argument	 that	 there	must	be	 an	
engagement	with	teletechnologies	to	further	an	ethico-political	project.	Instead,	I	do	so	
by	considering	Derrida’s	work	on	hospitality,	autoimmunity,	and	the	American	cultural	











Jacques	 Derrida.	 I	 have	 worked	 to	 set	 out	 the	 precedents	 for	 speculating	 upon	 and	




that	 often	 characterises	 critical	 theories,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 totalising	 claims	 that	 have	
accompanied	theories	of	postmodernity.	Focusing	upon	his	theorisation	of	spectrality,	I	
identify	an	openness	to	justice	that	is	not	idealistic,	but	rooted	in	an	acknowledgement	of	
the	 insecurities	 that	 haunt	 sovereignty.	 Moreover,	 I	 have	 also	 suggested	 that	 this	
theorisation	 of	 how	 sovereignty	 is	 haunted	 poses	 issues	 that	 we	might	 otherwise	 be	




of	 his	 work	 in	 secondary	 literature.	 While	 my	 emphasis	 has	 been	 largely	 upon	 his	
conception	of	the	spectre,	I	have	examined	how	it	owes	a	debt	to	and	develops	his	earlier	












Derrida	 and	 the	 Political	 I	 have	worked	 to	 address	 a	 particularly	 thorough	 critique	 of	
Derrida’s	political	significance,	and	by	extension	the	project	of	examining	inheritance	that	
is	central	to	this	thesis.	My	suggestion	is,	after	reading	the	work	of	Geoffrey	Bennington	
and	Michael	Naas,	 that	an	attention	to	 inheritance	can	 indeed	provide	 the	basis	 for	an	
engagement	with	very	specific	critiques	of	political	sovereignty,	and	that	it	is	receptive	to	
the	 significance	 of	 developments	 in	 media	 technologies.	 I	 have	 suggested	 that	 this	 is	
particularly	the	case	in	Geoffrey	Bennington’s	Jacques	Derrida,	where	he	frequently	opens	
up	 speculations	about	 the	 significance	of	Derrida’s	work	 for	 the	political.	 Finally,	with	












located	Derrida’s	writings	 in	relation	 to	an	 inheritance	 that	 threads	 together	Marxism,	
Frankfurt	Critical	Theory,	and	the	cultural	theory	of	Jean	Baudrillard;	the	concern	with	
that	which	delimits	agency.	After	setting	up	this	debate	via	a	reading	of	Marx	and	Engels’	





and	 Jean	 Baudrillard	 in	 relation	 the	 phenomena	 of	 postmodernity	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	





opens	 up	 examinations	 of	 difference	 through	 an	 attentiveness	 to	 the	 specificities	 of	
language.	 Moreover,	 I	 discuss	 how	 Derrida	 developed	 his	 approach	 to	 examine	 the	
significance	 of	 transformations	 in	 the	 dissemination	 of	 language	 through	 media	






























can	capture	how	Derrida	unpacks	 the	political	 from	 its	 traditional	 location	 in	political	
science	 and	 political	 theory,	 through	 its	 relationship	 with	 difference	 –	 through	
scholarship,	and	ultimately	arriving	at	the	site	where	the	politics	take	place	in	the	most	











comfort	with	 a	 Derridean	method	 raises	 some	 valuable	 questions.	 In	 particular,	 I	 am	
interested	in	Beardsworth’s	approach	to	Derrida’s	work	with	the	concept	of	‘khôra’	and	
how,	 for	 Beardsworth,	 it	 articulates	 a	 ‘middle	 ground’	 that	 is	 derived	 from	
deconstruction’s	 methodological	 ‘reorganisation	 of	 the	 empirico-transcendental	




originary	 tension	 between	 empirical	 reality	 and	 transcendental	 questions	 about	
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is	 simply	 not	 enough	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 ‘promise’	 or	 ‘gift’	 of	 difference	 (1996,	 p.	 1).	 So,	
whether	it	is	intended	or	not,	Derrida’s	notion	of	an	economy	of	difference	lends	itself	to	






integral	 to	 empirically-heavy	 academic	 disciplines	 such	 as	 ‘anthropology,	 linguistics,	
literary	 studies	 and	 psychoanalysis’,	 and,	 ‘on	 the	 other	 hand’,	 how	 ‘empiricity	 and	



















Grammatology	 opens	 up	 questions	 about	 the	 privilege	 that	 should	 be	 afforded	 to	 the	
analysis	of	language.	It	is	here	that	Beardsworth	argues	that	Derrida’s	approach,	if	it	is	to	
be	 fully	 realised,	 should	 focus	 on	 questions	 of	 law	 and	 judgement.	 At	 this	 point,	
Beardsworth	 is	more	 sympathetic	 to	Derrida’s	Spectres	 of	Marx	 for	 its	 examination	of	
spectres,	by	way	of	politics,	science,	technology,	and	media,	as	well	as	Derrida’s	proposals	
on	 ‘democracy	 to	come’.	Moreover,	Beardsworth	 is	sympathetic	 to	Derrida’s	argument	





The	 subsequent	 question	 for	 Beardsworth	 is	 how	 best	 to	 explore	 the	 possibilities	 of	
judgement,	 and	 here	 he	 supports	 Derrida’s	 attention	 to	 literature,	 as	 an	 activity	 that	










provide	 worthwhile	 starting	 points	 but,	 ultimately,	 attention	 needs	 to	 be	 directed	
towards	the	political.	After	finishing	his	chapter	on	language	and	literature	he	turns	to	
examine	 a	 Derridean	 approach	 to	 political	 theory.	 In	 turn,	 this	 leads	 Beardsworth	 to	






middle-ground,	 or	 khôra,	 and	 in	 turn	what	 conditions	 this,	 i.e.	 contemporary	 techno-
scientific	 capitalism.	 In	 the	 following	paragraphs,	 I	will	 argue,	 by	way	of	Bennington’s	
work	in	the	text	Jacques	Derrida,	that	methodology	restricts	a	consideration	of	authorial	
responsibility,	and	that	it	is	literature’s	relationship	with	the	‘idiomatic’	which	helps	to	












the	 1960s.	 As	 I	 have	 described	 above,	 for	 Beardsworth	 the	 question	 of	 Derrida’s	
relationship	 to	method	 is	 integral	 to	 the	 question	 of	Derrida’s	 relationship	 to	 politics.	







has	 a	 particularly	 intimate	 relationship	 with	 questions	 of	 metaphysics.	 In	 a	 similar	
manner	to	the	way	in	which	the	integrity	of	metaphysics	is	compromised	by	the	empirical,	
the	idiomatic	quality	of	literature	is	compromised	by	translation:	‘my	desire	to	write	like	
no	 one	 else	 is	 thus	 immediately	 compromised	 in	 the	 desire	 that	 my	 inimitability	 be	
recognized’	 (1993,	 p.	 180).	 For	 Bennington	 responsibility	 is	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	
acknowledgement	 of	 this	 tension	 between	 the	 idiomatic	 and	 translation.	 Bennington	











names’,	 and	 departing	 from	 any	 notion	 of	 ‘method’	 (1993,	 p.	 182).	 It	 indicates	 how	
‘literature	can	give	an	idea	of	a	probity	or	frankness	in	the	negotiation	of	this	singularity	
and	the	letting-be	of	the	other	thing	in	its	alterity,	which	will	guide	us	in	our	discussion	of	
more	 immediately	 “ethical”	 or	 even	 “political”	 questions’	 (1993,	 p.	 187).	 So,	 even	 if	 a	
writing	is	as	idiosyncratic	as	that	of	Ponge	and	Genet	it	‘can	nonetheless	better	open	out	
to	the	singularity	of	the	thing	and	the	coming	of	the	other	than	all	the	apparently	more	
serious	and	referential	writings	 that	 sometimes	would	 like	 to	condemn	Derrida	 in	 the	
name	of	ethics	and	politics’	(1993,	p.	187).	But	how	can	this	possibly	be	used	to	confront	
the	 authority	 of	 technoscientific	 capital?	 The	 attention	 is	 less	 upon	 ‘literature’	 than	
literature’s	 strategic	 relationship	with	 the	 aporetic.	 To	 further	 develop	 this	 argument	
Bennington	turns	to	Derrida’s	writing	on	the	 ‘gift’,	 the	concept	that	Beardsworth	takes	
such	an	issue	with.			
Bennington	 outlines	 the	 argument	 about	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 gift	 in	 the	 following	






was	 at	 best	 ill-prepared	 to	 confront	 Nazism,	 and	 at	 worst	 complicit	 (1993,	 p.	 195).	
Bennington	notes	that	political	agency	is	often	articulated	in	terms	of	a	capacity	to	refuse	
subjection	 –	 of	 saying	 “no”.	 However,	 Bennington	 insists	 that	 Derrida	 is	 directing	
attention	 to	 a	more	 essential	 yes,	 and	 that	 Derrida	 by	 no	means	 rejects	 the	 practical	
importance	of	saying	no.	This	essential	yes	accommodates	restriction	to	the	extent	that	it	
sees	 the	 importance	 of	working	 through	 it	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 and	 respond	 to	 its	
implications	 –	 and	 take	 responsibility.	 It	 means	 saying	 yes,	 and	 asserting	 yes,	 into	 a	
political	 space	 that	 is	 faced	 by	 the	 negativity	 that	 characterizes	 restriction.	Moreover,	




and	 concludes	 with	 an	 emphasis	 upon	 the	 implications	 of	 techné	 and	 the	 machine,	
therefore	 resembling	 with	 Beardsworth’s	 later	 emphasis	 upon	 technoscientific	





















the	paternal	 is	deconstructed.	Secondly,	 this	 indicates	 that	 the	concept	of	 the	paternal	
involves	within	it	a	deconstructive	tendency,	albeit	one	that	is	characterized	by	privilege	
and	 restriction.	 Thirdly,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 the	maternal	 figure	 is	 given	 a	 patriarchal	
power.	Fourthly,	 that	 the	 concept	of	khôra	 indicates	 that	attention	needs	 to	be	placed	
upon	 figures	 that	 are	 disruptive,	 and	 here	Derrida	 and	Bennington	wager	 that	 sexual	












transformation	can	be	 identified	 in	 ‘hearing	one-self	speak’.	 In	so	doing	Naas	works	to	
emphasise	and	supplement	Derrida’s	 later	writing	on	 ‘what	 is	happening	 today	 in	our	
bodies,	 our	 culture,	 our	 cities,	 our	 states’	 (Naas,	 2008,	 p.	 150).	 I	 focused	 upon	 Naas’	
identification,	through	his	reading	of	Don	DeLillo’s	novel	Cosmopolis,	of	nine	phantasmatic	









Referring,	 like	 Bennington,	 to	 the	 politics	 of	 sexual	 difference,	 Naas	 notes	 Derrida’s	
emphasis	in	‘Faith	and	Knowledge’	upon	the	relationship	between	extremism	and	sexual	
violence,	 but	 also	 how	Derrida	 focuses	 upon	 two	 classic	 feminine	 figures,	 rather	 than	
specific	contemporary	examples:	 ‘one	Greek	and	one	Roman,	Persephone	and	Gradiva’	
(2008,	p.	202).	The	argument	is	that	these	figures	demand	attention	because	while	they	




for	 all	 phantasm,	 for	 the	 phenomena	 of	 the	 phantasm,	 [khôra]	 constantly	 eludes	 and	
interrupts	the	phantasm	of	phenomena,	including	every	anthropomorphic	or	theological	
phantasm’	(2008,	p.	202).	However,	while	Naas	refers	to	khôra	and	spectres	he	repeatedly	
returns	 attention	 to	 the	 phantasmatic,	 and	 ultimately	 the	 underpinning	 of	 the	
phantasmatic	in	messianic	religiosity.	In	Chapter	One	I	argued	that	this	is	unhelpful	if	we	
consider	 the	 deconstructive	 possibilities	 of	 metaphysics.	 Here	 I	 want	 to	 set	 out	 the	
implications	 that	 this	 has	 for	 examining	 spectres,	 and	 for	 a	more	 inclusive	 politics	 of	
affiliation.	
While	 Naas	 refers	 to	 these	 two	 feminine	 spectralities	 he	 ultimately	 focuses	 upon	 the	
implications	of	the	phantasmatic.	But	if	the	phantasmatic	is	informed	by	its	relationship	
with	spectres	there	therefore	needs	to	be	a	consideration	of	the	spectres	themselves,	and	
















relation	to	the	global	 financial	crisis	of	2008,	my	suggestion	 is	 to	 focus	upon	a	tension	
between	a	commitment	to	empirical	claims	about	the	event	of	2008	–	indeed	why	I	focus	
upon	that	event	–	and	the	transcendental	legacies	that	we	inherit.	So,	my	question	here	is	
what	 the	 ‘middle-ground’	 (or	 ‘khôra’)	 might	 be	 that	 locates	 the	 facilitation	 of	 such	 a	
project.	Given	that	my	attention	is	upon	the	political	it	would	likely	suggest	a	turn	to	the	
nation-state.	However,	bearing	in	mind	that	I	have	argued	that	the	political	should	not	be	
confined	 to	 that	 sphere,	 the	 question	 subsequently	 becomes	 that	 of	 where	 we	might	
alternatively	organise	such	a	project.	Here	I	turn	to	Derrida’s	albeit	brief	claims	in	Spectres	
of	 Marx	 that	 if	 we	 wish	 to	 examine	 contemporary	 politics	 we	 should	 consider	 the	
interactions	 between	 three	 discrete	 yet	 ‘indissociable’	 domains	 of	 politics,	 the	 mass-

















and	 implications	of	state	policies.	To	do	 this	 I	work	between	a	 text	 that	 is	particularly	





While	 ‘Force	 of	 Law’	 more	 clearly	 examines	 questions	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
inheritance	 and	 deconstruction,	 ‘Autoimmunity’	 deconstructs	 inheritance	 through	
synonymous	concepts	such	as	belief	and,	concepts	particularly	resonant	with	the	global	
financial	crisis,	concepts	of	‘credit’	and	‘debt’.	I	discuss	how,	in	doing	so,	Derrida	considers	




in	 Afghanistan,	 and	 given	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 Global	 War	 on	 Terror,	 likely	 elsewhere.	
However,	I	also	discuss	how	a	limit	of	such	an	emphasis	upon	identifying	and	emphasising	





given	 to	 how	 credit	 in	 politics	 has	 been	 interwoven	 with	 sovereignty,	 and	 how	
sovereignty	has	in	turn	been	interwoven	with	inheritances	of	terror.	
Through	a	consideration	of	Derrida’s	deconstruction	of	inheritances	of	sovereignty	and	
terror	 I	 focus	 upon	 how	 he	 interrogates	 how	 articulations	 of	 terror	 have	 played	 an	
integral	role	 in	 justifying	sovereignty	both	 in	political	 theory	and	political	history,	and	
how	 articulations	 of	 terror	 have	 been	 highly	 selective	 and	 conditioned,	 and	 how	 the	
concept	 of	 terror	 need	 not	 and	 should	 not	 be	 viewed	 as	 something	 that	 is	 purely	







such	 as	 that	 in	 ‘Force	 of	 Law’,	 Derrida	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 not	 only	 a	 significant	 task	 to	





turn	 to	 consider	 how	 Derrida	 suggests	 that	 for	 all	 the	 power	 and	 significance	 of	 the	
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nation-state,	 this	 needs	 to	 be	 accompanied	 by	 a	 consideration	 of	 how	 it	 is	 subject	 to	
deconstructive	 transformation.	 Specifically.	 I	 focus	 upon	 how	 the	 nation-state,	 in	
consideration	 of	 developments	 in	 globalisation,	 economically,	 ideologically,	 and	 in	 the	
media,	faces	an	uncertain	future.	Moreover,	by	focusing	upon	the	relationship	between	
inheritance	and	the	phantasmatic	nature	of	the	nation-state	I	examine	how	they	have,	in	
a	 certain	hospitable	 fashion,	 been	 complicit	with	 these	developments.	 Thus,	while	 the	
deconstruction	and	hospitality	of	the	nation-state	might	be	viewed	in	terms	of	promise,	I	
examine	 Derrida’s	 arguments	 that	 it	 can	 also	 be	 accompanied	 by	 developments	 that	
negate	 the	 possibility	 of	 deconstruction	 by	 turning	 to	 new	 relationships	 between	 the	
nation-state	 and	 spectres.	 Here	 I	 link	 up	 some	 of	 the	 more	 radical	 inheritances	 that	








of	Marx	 that	 there	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 distinction	 between	 international	war	 and	 civil	war	
(2006,	p.	98;	2005,	p.	156).	But	this	also	means	that	the	very	notion	of	the	nation-state,	as	


















Ultimately	 this	 therefore	 means	 asking	 questions	 about	 new	 forms	 of	 sovereignty.	
However,	 I	 also	 pay	 attention	 to	 how	 the	 subtleties	 of	 autoimmunity	 can	 set	 up	 the	
oppression	 and	 marginalisation	 of	 minorities	 in	 ways	 that	 reinscribe	 the	 role	 of	 the	
nation-state,	 albeit	 in	 new	 and	 different	 forms.	 Following	 Derrida’s	 argument	 in	 Of	









needs	 to	 be	 placed	 upon	 the	 conditioning	 of	 hospitality.	 Exploring	 this	 approach	 in	
relation	to	the	2008	crisis	I	work	to	consider	the	forms	in	which	sovereignty	can	take.	This	








But	 I	 also	 examine	 Derrida’s	 emphasis	 upon	 the	 less	 explicit	 implications	 of	 the	
articulation	 of	 the	 event.	 Earlier	 I	 considered	 how	 the	 articulation	 of	 the	 event	 can	
contribute	to	the	inscription	of	sovereignty,	and	here	I	examine	how	the	articulation	of	
the	event,	something	which,	again,	seems	removed	from	questions	of	politics	and	being,	
contributes	 to	 injustice.	 Derrida	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 always	 a	 certain	 restriction	 of	




restricts	 the	 time	 needed	 to	 interpret	 it	 and	 formulate	 a	 response,	 and	 for	 a	 global	
audience.	Furthermore,	this	restriction	of	the	encounter	with	difference	also	indicates	and	





Here	 we	 go	 back	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 intersection	 of	 politics	 and	 the	 media,	 to	 the	
dissemination	of	a	spectre	of	autoimmunity.	But	is	this	not	just	an	intellectual	problem?	





in	political	 and	 socio-economic	divisions,	 and	how	 the	 fear	 of	 nuclear	destruction	has	




would	 rather	 focus	 on	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 spectre	 of	 autoimmunity,	 and	 how	 it	
supplements	the	conditioning	of	hospitality,	than	suggest	that	it	actually	makes	this	likely.	
The	 the	 latter,	 I	 suggest,	 risks	 closing	 down	 the	 possibility	 of	 considering	 alternative	
political	conditions.	
2.4. Defending	the	Nation-state	(in	certain	conditions)	







the	 ‘to	come’,	or	 the	 ‘arrivant’.	 In	Spectres	of	Marx	he	describes	his	proposal	of	a	 ‘New	
International’	as	an	‘alliance	of	a	rejoining	without	conjoined	mate,	without	organization,	
without	 party,	 without	 nation,	 without	 State,	 without	 property’	 (2006,	 p.	 35).	
Furthermore,	 this	 departure	 from	 political	 apparatuses	 extends	 into	 critique	 of	 the	
political	philosophies	of	cosmopolitanism	and	tolerance.	And	yet,	Derrida	makes	claims	





In	 contrast	 to	 ‘certain	 international	powers,	 certain	 ideological,	 religious,	 or	 capitalist,	
indeed	linguistic,	hegemonies’	Derrida	argues	that	nation-state	sovereignty	can	retain,	by	
way	of	 the	 international	multiplicities	 of	 sovereignty	 that	 it	 implies,	 ‘an	 indispensable	
bulwark’	2005b,	p.	158).	Thus,	he	insists	that	we	cannot	‘combat,	head-on,	all	sovereignty,	
sovereignty	 in	 general	without	 threatening	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 beyond	 the	 nation-state	
figure	of	sovereignty,	the	classical	principles	of	freedom	and	self-determination’	(2005b,	
p.	 158).	 Here	 international	 institutions	 become	 important	 –	 of	 international	 law	 and	
human	 rights	most	notably.	There	needs	 to	be	 a	 ‘reasonable	 transaction	between	 two	
antinomic	rationalities’	(2005b,	p.	158).	But	this	emphasis	upon	reason	also	indicates	that	





which	 Derrida	 takes	 to	 task.	 And	 yet,	 in	 distinction	 from	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 9/11	
terrorists,	 he	 insists	 that	 ‘a	 limited	 tolerance	 is	 clearly	 preferable	 to	 an	 absolute	
intolerance’	(Borradori	and	Derrida,	2003,	p.	128),	and	cosmopolitanism,	like	the	nation-
state,	articulates	some	form	of	shared	sovereignty	(2003,	131).		
To	 reflect	 upon	 Derrida’s	 conditional	 support	 for	 cosmopolitanism	 I	 focus	 upon	 his	
identification	 of	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	 secular,	 enlightened	 cosmopolitanism	 of	
European	 politics	 and	 the	 theocratic	 tendencies	 in	 American	 politics,	 articulated	 for	

























without	 conditions	 does	 not,	 in	 fact,	 exist,	 as	 we	 know	 only	 too	 well’	 (2001a,	 p.	 25).	
However,	 secondly,	 he	 also	 claims	 that,	 at	 somewhat	 of	 a	 distance	 from	 the	 actual	
iterations	 of	 the	 university,	 its	 mere	 conception	 indicates	 the	 relationship	 between	
sovereignty	 and	 the	 ‘unconditional’	 –	 therefore	 extending	 his	 claims	 about	 the	
significance	of	the	trace	and	différance.	Moreover,	Derrida	places	a	particular	emphasis	
upon	 the	existence	within	 scholarship	upon	 the	humanities,	 a	 site	of	 reflection	on	 the	
human	 that	 not	 only	 provides	 the	 basis	 for	 ideas	 about	 human	 rights	 but	 about	 the	
concept	and	conditions	of	the	human	more	generally.	
So,	Derrida’s	approach	to	scholarship	is	somewhat	different	to	his	approach	to	the	politics	








that	 a	 concern	with	 the	virtual,	 or	with	 the	 ‘politics	of	 the	virtual’,	means	 that	we	are	
‘abandoning	ourselves	to	the	arbitrary,	to	dream,	to	imagination,	to	utopia,	to	hypothesis’	
(2001a,	 p.	 32).	 Rather,	 it	 is	 the	 fragility	 of	 the	 scholarship	 (so	 committed	 to	 the	









it	 seems	 so	 obscure	 and	 ‘virtual’,	 always	 ‘takes	 place’,	 and	 therefore	 always	 has	
ramifications	(2001,	p.	53).	Here	I	turn	to	his	work	on	the	‘professional’	performativity	of	
scholars.	 That	 is,	 how	 scholars	 have	 emerged	 as	 actors	who	make	 singular	 claims	 (as	
opposed	to	con-fessing	the	condition	of	one’s	spirituality).	So,	this	 leads	Derrida	to	the	
suggestion	that	there	is	a	fragmentation	and	troubling	of	sovereignty	at	the	very	moment	








effects’	 I	 take	 a	 step	 back	 to	 discuss	 the	 possibilities	 of	 opening	 up	 a	 scholarship	 of	
spectres.	 To	 do	 this	 I	 consider	 Derrida’s	 work	 on	 Marx’s	 exploratory	 if	 conflicted	
scholarship	of	spectres	in	Spectres	of	Marx,	and	how	this	contrasts	with	the	implications	
for	 scholarship	 of	 Martin	 Heidegger’s	 avoidance	 of	 the	 spectral.	 After	 setting	 out	 the	
importance	 that	 Derrida	 attributes	 to	 responding	 (and	 exploring	 responsibility)	 to	
spectres,	 I	 discuss	 how,	 for	 Derrida,	Marx,	 despite	 ultimately	 rejecting	 the	 spectral	 in	
favour	of	the	material,	contributes	to	the	consideration	of	spectres	and	spectral	effects	
through	his	persistence	with	the	material.	That	is,	despite	emphasising	the	material,	Marx,	









to	 the	 ghost	 in	 Shakespeare’s	Hamlet.	 Specifically,	 the	manner	 in	which	we	 can	 break	






which	 ‘The	Time	is	Out	of	 Joint’	(Hamlet	 in	Derrida,	2006,	p.	xxi).	Here	I	consider	how	
Derrida	turns	to	Heidegger’s	argument	that	the	articulation	of	crises	generates	justifies	a	
metaphysics	 of	 rationalisation.	 However,	 while	 Derrida	 draws	 from	 this	 proposal	 he	
ultimately	 suggest	 that	 this	 risks	 avoiding	 the	 role	 of	 the	 phantasm,	 and	 therefore	
contributing	to	hidden	forms	of	sovereignty.	
Furthermore,	Derrida	argues	elsewhere,	 in	Of	Spirit	 (1989)	 that	 the	significance	of	 the	
avoidance	 of	 the	 spectral	 is	 particularly	 laid	 bare	 by	Heidegger’s	 infamous	 support	 of	
Nazism.	Thus,	if	Derrida’s	engagements	with	Marx	and	Heidegger	both	explore	some	of	
the	possibilities	that	arise	from	engaging	with	the	limits	of	the	epistemological,	I	describe	
how	 Derrida	 ultimately	 warns	 of	 some	 very	 serious	 consequences	 of	 dismissing	 the	
spectral	 altogether.	 Focusing	 on	 Derrida’s	 examination	 of	 Heidegger’s	 ‘Rectorship	
Address’,	 Derrida	 works	 past	 the	 overt	 references	 to	 the	 need	 for	 an	 authoritarian	
organisation	of	 the	university	and	to	German	ethnic	superiority,	 to	argue	 that	an	even	
more	 problematic	 gesture	 is	 to	 be	 found	 in	 Heidegger’s	 emphasis	 upon	 erasing	
metaphysical,	legal,	political,	and	economic	legacies	that	do	not	preserve	the	possibility	of	
spiritual	 heterogeneity.	 Derrida’s	 suggestion	 being	 that	 Heidegger	 privileges	 the	
authority	of	spirit	in	a	manner	that	evades	any	appraisals	of	its	implications.	Thus,	despite	













p.	 27),	 how	 research	 and	 teaching	 have	 come	 ‘to	 be	 supported,	 that	 is,	 directly	 or	
indirectly	 controlled,	 let	 us	 say	 euphemistically	 “sponsored”,	 by	 commercial	 and	
industrial	 interests’	 (2001a,	p.	28),	and	how	 ‘the	Humanities	are	often	held	hostage	 to	
departments	 of	 pure	 or	 applied	 science	 in	 which	 are	 concentrated	 the	 supposedly	
profitable	investments	of	capital	foreign	to	the	academic	world’	(2001a,	p.	28).	Thus,	the	
university	plays	a	 crucial	 role	 in	 constituting	 the	 ‘phantasm	of	 indivisible	 sovereignty’	
(2001a,	 p.	 26).	 I	 discuss	 how,	 in	 this	 essay	 Derrida	 focuses	 upon	 how	 industries	 are	




the	 hypercritical	 in	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 hyperreal	 formations	 of	 nationalism	 and	
religious	fundamentalism.	By	doing	so	I	suggest	that	the	significance	of	his	comments	on	
the	role	of	virtual	work	become	even	more	pronounced.	On	the	one	hand	we	might	focus	






its	 contribution	 to	 the	 intellectual	 transformation	of	 the	 conception	of	 the	body	 (be	 it	
through	 the	 humanities,	 the	 social	 sciences,	 or	 the	 natural	 sciences).	 However,	 I	 also	
suggest	 that	 the	 impetus	 for	 this	 movement	 towards	 virtual	 work	 acquires	 further	
significance	if	we	consider	his	comments	in	‘Faith	and	Knowledge’	about	the	spectre	of	
marginalisation.	That	 is,	 that	 such	 a	 spectre	 amplifies	 the	 imperative	 to	 register	 one’s	
value	to	the	economy.	
So,	 while	 there	 is	 a	 facilitation	 of	 new	 phantasms	 of	 sovereignty	 there	 is	 also	 a	
contradiction	 in	 that	 they	can	give	credibility	 to	phantasms	that	 in	many	ways	are	 the	
antipathy	of	scholarship	–	indeed	that	they	can	contribute,	in	both	radical	Islamist	but	also	
Christian	 evangelical	 forms,	 to	 explicitly	 anti-intellectual	 and	 anti-academic	 gestures.	
Here	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 new	 virtual	 forms	 of	 work	 is	 again	 important.	 For	 if	
scholarship	can,	largely	in	inadvertent	ways,	lead	to	the	establishment	of	new	forms	of	
sovereignty,	 the	 incongruence	 can	 be	more	 acutely	 articulated	 by	 focusing	 upon	 how	
there	is	a	disruption	to	the	inheritance	of	the	role	of	confession.	Now,	as	I	will	elaborate	
upon	in	my	next	paragraphs,	Derrida	argues	that	promise	is	to	be	located	in	a	certain	type	
of	 interdisciplinary	 activity	 that	 manages	 to	 avoid	 ‘dissolving	 the	 specificity	 of	 each	
discipline	into	what	is	called,	often	in	a	very	confused	way,	interdisciplinarity’	(2001a,	p.	
50).	He	calls	for	an	engagement	between	the	humanities	and	the	‘departments	of	genetics,	
natural	 science,	medicine,	 and	 even	mathematics’,	 suggesting	 that	 they	 no	 doubt	 take	











to	 engage	with,	 it	 can	 also	benefit	 from	an	 intersection	with	 a	deconstructive	 cultural	
studies.	However,	in	doing	so	I	run	up	against	an	explicit	claim	by	Derrida	that	cultural	

















credibility	 towards	 an	 anti-intellectual	 gesture.	 For	 Kamuf	 Derrida’s	 call	 for	 a	 ‘new	
humanities’	(from	which	the	interdisciplinary	project	is	to	be	disseminated	from)	retains	
its	 significance	 because	 of	 how	 it	 works	 within	 the	 traditions	 of	 reflecting	 upon	 the	
sovereignty	of	the	human.	She	suggests	that	cultural	studies	is	simply	too	focused	upon	
resistance.	With	 Spivak’s	work	 I	 discuss	 a	 somewhat	 less	 hostile	 approach	 to	 cultural	
studies.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 Spivak	 extends	 her	 critique	 of	 a	 Gramscian	 emphasis	 upon	
‘counter-hegemony’	and	‘organic	intellectuals’	to	its	adoption	within	cultural	studies	that	

















the	 gift	 and	 the	 symbolic,	 Wortham	 suggests	 that	 Derrida	 points	 towards	 how	 the	











investing,	 performing,	 ordering,	 and	 selecting	 ‘actuality’	 (being),	 and	 that,	 as	 such,	 the	
media	 is	 a	 site	 of	 far	 more	 discrete	 and	 invasive	 forms	 of	 sovereignty	 (Derrida	 and	
Stiegler,	 2002,	 p.	 3).	 And	 yet,	 I	 also	 argue	 that	 to	 consider	 how	 the	media	 goes	 about	
selecting	and	filtering	it	is	necessary	to	consider	the	inheritances	that	Derrida	articulates	
elsewhere,	 from	 the	 nation-state	 and	 the	 humanities,	 and	 more	 generally,	 to	 sexual	





Thus,	 to	 begin	 with	 I	 consider	 the	 history	 and	 development	 of	 the	 media.	 Derrida	
considers	 that	 despite	 ‘internationalization’	 (what	 we	 might	 otherwise	 call	
“globalization”),	 the	 relationship	between	selection	and	 the	 conditioning	of	hospitality	
that	articulates	sovereignty	means	that	there	is	an	‘ineradicable	privilege	of	the	national,	
the	 regional,	 the	 provincial	 or	 the	Western’	 (2002,	 p.	 4).	 He	 insists	 that	 ‘in	 the	 news,	







condition	 of	 the	 media	 are	 interwoven	 with	 his	 arguments	 about	 global	 politics	 and	
globalization.	 But	 they	 are	 also	 interwoven	 with	 his	 arguments	 on	 messianicity	 and	
sovereignty	more	generally,	and	with	his	arguments	in	the	earlier	texts	of	his	career	on	
speech	and	logocentrism.	
This	 emphasis	 upon	 messianicity,	 sovereignty,	 and	 logocentrism	 plays	 a	 vital	 role	 in	
Derrida’s	 attention	 to	 developments	 in	 “live”	 broadcast	media.	 This	 is	 because	 of	 the	
manner	 in	which	 it	 is	 linked	to	attempts	to	appropriate	discrete	articulations	of	being.	
Thus,	for	Derrida	this	emphasis	upon	live	media	indicates	that	the	logic	of	sovereignty	can	
in	new	ways	be	serviced	by	the	production	and	performance	of	‘actuality’,	through	what	
















text	Derrida	states,	 in	this	case	 in	specific	relation	to	television,	 that	 ‘television	always	
involves	a	protest	against	television;	television	pretends	to	efface	itself,	to	deny	television.	
It	 is	 expected	 to	 show	 you	 the	 thing	 itself,	 “live”,	 directly’	 (2001b,	 p.	 62).	 Derrida	
references	 ‘pretends’,	 but	 he	 emphasises	 that	 this	 tension	 between	 the	 technological	
apparatuses	of	live	broadcast	and	the	content	is	not	to	be	dismissed.	For	he	argues	that	










a	mouth,	 and	 an	 ear,	 which	make	 it	 possible	 to	 hear	 yourself-speaking’	 (Derrida	 and	
Dufourmantelle,	2000,	p.	91).	As	such,	my	emphasis	here	is	upon	the	tensions	within	the	
mediation	of	the	events	of	2008	that	suggest	that	the	body	as	opposed	to	media	forms	in	
the	 more	 traditional	 sense	 of	 advanced	 technological	 mechanisms	 of	 selection	 and	
filtering.	However,	Of	Grammatology	also	suggests	that	logocentrism	is	not	just	about	the	
importance	of	voice	alone.	Rather,	it	alludes	to	the	Christian	inheritance	of	the	voice	of	
God.	 For	 Derrida	 it	 is	 imperative	 to	 consider	 that	 this	 restriction	 of	 the	media	 to	 the	
logocentric	is	also	a	restriction	of	critical	thinking	inherited	from	Christianity.	
So,	how	does	 the	restriction	of	critical	 thinking	translate	 into	 the	reinforcement	of	 the	
hegemony	of	Western	states,	and	particularly	of	the	United	States?	Picking	up	with	‘Above	
All,	No	Journalists’,	Derrida	states	that	if	we	refer	to	the	significance	of	Christianity,	live	
media	 resembles	 a	miracle	 (specifically,	 ‘the	 “transubstantiation”	 or	 the	 “Eucharist”	 ‘)	
(2001b	,	p.	62).	Thus,	Derrida’s	theory	of	the	influence	of	Christianity	is	further	qualified	
by	 this	 correlation,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 media	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 constraints	 of	 the	
sovereignty	of	Christianity.	Even	the	concept	of	media	suggests	that	the	acts	of	production	
are	masked	(2001b	,	p.	74).	Thus,	‘media’	and	‘mediatisation’	suggest	a	similar	implication	
to	 ‘representation’	 that	 Derrida	 articulates	 in	 ‘Signature	 Event	 Context’	 (1982c).	Why	
Christianity	specifically?	Are	there	not	similar	ideas	in	the	other	religions?	Are	the	other	
religions	not	also	obsessed	with	spreading	the	word	of	their	significance?	For	Derrida,	of	














the	 violence	of,	 for	 instance,	 ethnocentrism,	 sectarianism,	nationalism,	 racism,	 sexism,	



























nation-state	 there	 needs	 to	 be	 a	 consideration	 of	 how	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 it	
disappears	 altogetherHe	 argues	 that	 the	 more	 that	 the	 media	 contributes	 to	
spectralization,	the	more	complicated	the	integrity	of	the	originary	force	becomes,	and	
this	must	include	dissemination.	As	such	Derrida	identifies	an	autoimmune	process.	This	





questions	about	 the	credibility	of	 inheritances.	 Irrespective	of	any	narrative	about	 the	
 95 
 
viability	 of	 financial	 systems	 or	 the	United	 States,	 the	 spectacular	 nature	 of	 the	 event	
demands	a	reorganisation	of	the	symbolic	order.	At	this	moment	new	sovereignties	form,	






argues	 for	 an	 engagement	 with	 spectres	 ‘in	 the	 name	 of	 justice’	 (2006,	 p.	 xviii).	 To	
reconcile	this	tension,	I	focus	here	on	his	arguments	in	Echographies	of	Television	that	the	
audience	or	 ‘receiver’	 is	never	passive	 (Derrida	and	Stiegler,	2002,	pp.	54-55).	Rather,	
Derrida	 argues,	 the	 audience	 is	 always	 involved	 in	 the	 production	 of	 spectres.	 For	
instance,	while	Derrida	argues	that	the	return	of	religion	is	made	possible	in	part	by	the	
globalization	of	the	media,	he	also	argues	that	the	role	of	the	receiver	can	be	identified	
























There	 is	 the	 communication	 of	 justice.	 He	 argues	 that	 developments	 in	
telecommunications	 and	 teletechnologies	 played	 a	 vital	 role	 in	 undermining	 Soviet	
totalitarianism	(2002,	p.	72),	and	he	points	to	the	dissemination	of	the	Rodney	King	video	
(2002,	 p.	 90).	 More	 substantially	 however	 he	 argues	 that	 if	 we	 consider	 how	 live	
broadcast	media	masks	its	production	we	can	surmise	that	it	undermines	the	autonomy	







But	 I	 do	 so	 by	 beginning	with	 how	 the	more	 restrictive	media	 forms	 such	 as	 the	 live	
broadcast	media	start	to	fall	apart	at	the	seams.	
5. Reflections	
I	have	outlined	above	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 that	 I	use	 to	approach	 the	 three	case	
study	 chapters	 in	 this	 thesis,	 a	 framework	 firmly	 rooted	 in	Derrida’s	work	 as	well	 as	
critiques	of	it.	I	end	here	with	a	brief	survey	of	the	key	texts	which	inform	my	final	chapter	








to	 assess	 Derrida’s	 political	 contribution.	 In	 doing	 so	 I	 reach	 a	 critical	 assessment	 of	
Beardsworth’s	proposals.	Nonetheless,	I	also	argue	that	Beardsworth’s	text	is	helpful	for	
considering	the	political	contribution	of	Derrida’s	work.	Here	I	want	to	return	to	Richard	
Beardsworth’s	 approach	 to	examine	a	 final	 appraisal	of	Derrida’s	work	on	 the	nation-













Beardsworth’s	 text	 therefore	 provides	 a	 platform	 for	 appraising	 Derrida’s	 particular	




Beardsworth	 affirms	 the	 contributions	 of	 postmodern	 theorists,	 including	 Michel	
Foucault	and	Giorgio	Agamben	alongside	Derrida,	provide	‘telling	critiques’	of	the	ideas	





As	such,	Beardsworth	examines	 International	Relations	 for	 its	empirical	contributions,	
and	 particularly	 the	 International	 Relations	 theory	 of	 Realism.	 He	 argues	 that	 an	
encounter	between	the	normative	concern	of	cosmopolitanism	and	the	empirical	concern	





This	 is	particularly	 important	 for	Beardsworth	because	he	argues	 that	 the	 ‘distinction	
between	 the	 normative	 and	 the	 empirical	 (...)	 is	 becoming	 blurred’	 (2011,	 p.	 2)	 –	 a	
distinction	that,	for	him,	postmodernism	and	cultural	studies	are	no	doubt	contributing	
to.	This	question	of	empiricity	is	important	for	my	thesis	more	generally	because	of	the	







(and	 more	 recently	 neoliberal)	 economics;	 capitalism.	 For	 Beardsworth	 there	 is	 a	
difference	 between	 the	 cosmopolitan	 inscription	 of	 alterity	 and	 liberalism’s	 use	 of	
diversity	 as	 a	 point	 from	 which	 to	 justify	 irresponsibility.	 Moreover,	 Beardsworth	
emphasises	the	importance	of	economics	for	power	relations;	the	systemic	inequalities	of	
capitalism;	 and	 the	 material	 limitations	 of	 neoliberalism,	 both	 domestically	 and	
internationally	(2011,	pp.	8-9).		
Moreover,	 a	 Marxist-informed	 critique	 of	 capitalism	 is	 all	 the	 more	 important	 for	
Beardsworth	‘in	the	context	of	the	present	financial	and	economic	global	crisis’	(2011,	p.	





Derrida	 deconstructs	 in	 ‘Signature	 Event	 Context’).	 So	 here	 I	 again	 refer	 to	 Geoffrey	
Bennington’s	critique	of	Beardsworth’s	earlier	text	–	that	Beardsworth’s	emphasis	upon	
describing	conditions	(technological,	economic,	social,	political,	and	economic)	is	at	odds	
with	 an	 investigative	 project,	 which	 in	 turn	 limits	 the	 empirical	 emphasis	 that	
Beardsworth	emphasises.	In	doing	so	my	suggestion	is	that	Beardsworth	overlooks	the	
role	of	knowledge	and	the	humanities	in	a	way	that	risks	an	unresponsive	approach	to	
theorising	 an	 inclusive	 political	 project.	 Indeed,	 Beardsworth	 criticises	 what	 he	 calls	
























that	 underpins	 education	 is	 formed	 and	 re-formed	 (2015,	 p.	 152).	 Here	 we	 find	 an	
explicitly	different	approach	to	the	importance	of	the	university	from	that	of	Derrida:	
While	 it	 may	 seem	 obvious	 that	 for	 “academics”	 (...)	 the	 function	 of	 the	
university	and	of	its	professors	is	above	all	to	“profess	the	truth”,	as	Derrida	










technologies	 are	 the	 logical	 extension	 of	 attempts	 to	 improve	 the	 efficiency	 of	
technologies.	They	have	been	implemented	as	therapeutics.	The	problem	for	Stiegler	is	
that	 they	 are	 have	 had	 certain	 ‘toxic’	 side-effects	 for	 politics,	 society,	 economics,	




academics	 have	 given	 up	 on	 thinking	 alternatives	 or	 acknowledging	 the	 history	 of	
idealism	 and	materialist	 dialectics	 (2015,	 pp.	 168-169).	We	 have	 arrived	 at	 a	 state	 of	
‘systemic	stupidity’	(2015,	p.	174).	And	yet	Stiegler	does	not	argue	that	the	situation	is	










which	 this	 has	 taken	 place	 –	 critical	 considerations	 of	 digital	 humanities,	 computer	
science,	the	proliferation	of	editing	techniques,	youth	brought	up	to	adeptly	manipulate	
the	 digital	 as	 digital	 natives,	 social	 media	 and	 Wikipedia.	 Thus,	 there	 are	 not	 just	
possibilities	but	indications	of	the	pharmacological	nature	of	knowledge	and	scholarship.	
Thus,	Stiegler	argues	that	it	is	not	enough	to	take	Derrida’s	approach,	also	pursued	in	this	






unfair	 to	Derrida’s	new	humanities	and	university	to	come;	 I	wonder	whether	there	 is	










is	 an	 inherent	 issue	 when	 approaching	 Derrida’s	 work,	 and	 which	 has	 important	
implications	for	this	thesis.	For	while	I	identify	Derrida’s	focus	on	the	media	in	this	thesis	
–	most	notably	in	Spectres	of	Marx,	Echographies	of	Television,	and	‘Faith	and	Knowledge’	





p.	 1)	 an	 introduction	 specifically	 to	 ‘Faith	 and	Knowledge’,	 an	 ‘essay	 that	 condenses	 a	























consideration	 of	 the	 media,	 and	 suggest	 that	 they	 provide	 the	 basis	 for	 a	 project	 of	
considering	the	media	as	a	site	of	a	more	inclusive	politics.		










for	 examining	Naas’	work	 on	 the	media	 is	 that	 he	 addresses	 the	 efficacy	 of	 assessing	
specific	examples	from	the	media,	as	opposed	to	the	underworld	that	he	alludes	to.	And	
this	 frames	 the	 question	 that	 I	 end	my	 last	 chapter	with;	whether	 a	 focus	 on	 a	mass-
mediatised	 event	 such	 as	 the	 2008	 global	 financial	 crisis	 is	 really	 that	 beneficial,	 or	
whether	 attention	 should	 instead	 by	 focused	 upon	 the	 broader	 questions	 of	 the	
‘underworld’	of	spectral	inheritance.		
Conclusion	
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 turned	 my	 readings	 of	 Derrida’s	 works	 towards	 a	 theoretical	
framework	 for	 this	 thesis.	 In	 doing	 so	 I	 have	 addressed	 the	 challenging	 issue	 that	
Derrida’s	work	does	not	present	a	methodology	but	rather	a	collection	of	questions	about	
inheritance.	 I	 have	 discussed	 how	 these	 incorporate	 a	 fundamental	 question	 about	
spectrality,	 and	 how	 the	 spectre	 of	 inadequacy	 haunts	 sovereignty	 in	 all	 its	 guises,	
towards	more	specific	inheritances	that	ultimately	culminate	with	the	apparatuses	of	the	
nation-state,	 the	 university,	 and	 media	 technologies.	 Derrida’s	 work	 is	 undoubtedly	
complex,	 both	 theoretically	 and	 epistemologically,	 but	 then	 in	 its	 complexity	 it	 is,	 I	
suggest,	 perhaps	 far	 more	 open	 and	 attuned	 to	 the	 subtleties	 of	 everyday	 life	 than	
methodologies	permit.	While	Richard	Beardsworth	puts	 a	provocative	 and	 compelling	











the	messianic	 promise	 of	 spectres,	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 speculating	 upon	 the	 types	 of	









In	my	previous	 chapters,	 I	 have	 set	out	 the	basis	 for	 reading	Derrida	 	 after	 the	global	
financial	crisis	of	2008.	In	Chapter	One	I	set	out	the	tradition	in	which	this	thesis	works	in	
order	 to	 articulate	 the	 significance	 that	 I	 identify	 in	 Derrida’s	 work,	 and	 I	 assess	my	
reading	of	Derrida	by	way	of	three	seminal	texts	of	secondary	literature	to	help	reflect	
upon	my	interpretation	and	the	contribution	that	a	reading	of	Derrida’s	work	can	make.	
In	 Chapter	 Two,	 I	 reorient	 my	 reading	 of	 Derrida,	 accompanied	 by	 a	 re-reading	 of	
secondary	 literature,	 towards	 the	 production	 of	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 that	 can	






In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 begin	 my	 substantive	 element	 of	 this	 thesis	 by	 focusing	 upon	 the	
significance	of	the	politics	of	the	nation-state.	As	I	set	out	in	Chapter	Two,	I	do	so	for	a	
number	of	reasons:	the	significance	of	the	nation-state	in	terms	of	its	involvement	in	the	
politics	 of	 spectres	 (the	 policies	 and	 inactivity	 of	 the	 nation-state,	 its	 involvement	 in	
facilitating	 a	 politics	 of	 traditions,	 industry,	 and	 so	 on);	 because	 of	 the	 possibilities	 of	
intervening	in	the	politics	of	the	nation-state	for	an	examination	of	justice	and	because	of	
the	 limitations	 of	 the	 nation-state,	 and	 how	 these	 limitations	 direct	 attention	 to	 the	





that	 terror	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 in	 political	 history,	 from	 the	English	 Civil	War	 to	 the	
French	Revolution,	the	Nazi	occupation	of	France	to	the	Global	War	on	Terror;	and	how	
political	 theory,	 including	 Thomas	 Hobbes,	 Carl	 Schmitt,	 and	 Walter	 Benjamin	 has	
referred	 to	 its	 existence	 to	 justify	 their	 particular	 approaches	 to	 sovereignty	 and	 the	
political.	But	I	also	argue	that	this	insecurity	is	integral	to	the	figure	of	the	spectre,	and	


















inflected	 concept	 of	 ‘autoimmunity’.	 Finally,	 in	 Section	 Four	 I	 work	 to	 emphasise	 the	
possibilities,	despite	 the	problems	 they	are	 faced	by,	and	risks	of	Eurocentrism,	of	 the	






tension	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 political.	 I	 work	 with	 how	 Derrida	 often	 made	 very	 timely	
interventions	 in	 contemporary	 political	 issues,	 including	 on	 the	 nation-state,	
international	 politics,	 human	 rights,	 and	 international	 law	 (2006;	 2002a;	 2005b;	
Borradori	 and	Derrida,	 2003).	 Yet,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 his	works	 are	 often	 sparse	 and	








the	crisis	of	2008.	However,	while	 this	 is	 certainly	helpful	my	 focus	here	 is	upon	how	






texts	 that	 more	 thoroughly	 examine	 questions	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	
inheritance,	credit,	and	politics	(see	2006;	1997b;	2002a,	2005b),	my	suggestion	here	is	
that	 ‘Autoimmunity’	 is	 significant	 because	 of	 the	 timeliness	 with	 which	 it	 applies	
deconstruction	to	an	empirical	issue	in	contemporary	politics.	The	text	is	a	publication	of	
an	interview	given	only	five	weeks	after	9/11	that	responds	in	a	thorough	manner	to	the	
attacks,	 to	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 declaration	 of	 Global	 War	 on	 Terror,	 and	 poses	
questions	about	the	spectral	significance	of	a	mass	global	event.		






of	 the	 form	 of	 inheritance	 of	 ‘credit’	 attributed	 to	 the	 United	 States	 ‘on	 every	 level:	
economic,	 technical,	military,	 in	 the	media,	even	on	 the	 level	of	discursive	 logic,	of	 the	
axiomatic	 that	 supports	 juridical	 and	 diplomatic	 rhetoric	 worldwide,	 and	 thus	
international	law’	(2003,	pp.	92-93).	He	even	suggests	that	credit	is	even	attributed	to	the	











Referring	 to	 Nietzsche	 and	 Benjamin	 in	 Spectres	 of	 Marx,	 Derrida	 warns	 of	 how	
complacency	can	creep	into	claims	about	how	and	what	are	dominant	(2006,	p.	68).	More	
specifically,	 I	 am	 concerned	 that	 this	 generalization	 risks	 limiting	 the	 analysis	 of,	 and	
intervention	 in,	 specific	 political,	 legal,	 and	 institutional	 decisions.	 And	 yet	 Derrida’s	
generalization	 about	 US	 hegemony	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	 circular	 deconstruction	 that	
returns	 to	 consider	 its	 different	 discrete	 aspects.	 He	 raises	 a	 series	 of	 provocative	
questions	about	the	implications	of	US	influence	over	politics,	law,	and	sovereignty.	In	this	
regard	 it	 is	 perhaps	 helpful	 to	 refer	 back	 to	 a	 difference	 between	 the	 approaches	 of	
Derrida	and	Jean	Baudrillard	that	I	discuss	in	Chapter	One.	
It	is	very	easy	to	focus	solely	upon	how	the	reduction	of	the	events	of	2008	to	‘the	global	
financial	 crisis	 ‘	 is	 problematic	 because	 of	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 it	 reduces	 complex	
financial,	economic,	political	technological,	and	social	issues	to	a	‘name-date’,	in	much	the	
same	way	as	 ‘9/11’.	That	 is,	 in	 a	 similar	manner	 to	how	Baudrillard	 characterises	 the	













works	 with	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 symbolic,	 despite	 being	 famous	 (or	 infamous)	 for	 his	
emphasis	upon	writing;		
I	 believe	 always	 in	 the	 necessity	 of	 being	 attentive	 first	 of	 all	 to	 this	
phenomenon	of	 language,	naming,	and	dating,	 to	 this	repetition	compulsion	
(at	 once	 rhetorical,	magical,	 and	poetic).	 To	what	 this	 compulsion	 signifies,	
translates,	or	betrays.	Not	in	order	to	isolate	ourselves	in	language,	as	people	
in	too	much	of	a	rush	would	like	us	to	believe,	but	on	the	contrary,	in	order	to	
try	 to	 understand	what	 is	 going	 on	 precisely	 beyond	 language	 and	what	 is	
pushing	 us	 to	 repeat	 endlessly	 and	 without	 knowing	 what	 we	 are	 talking	
about,	precisely	there	where	language	and	the	concept	come	up	against	their	
limits.	(Borradori	and	Derrida,	2003,	pp.	87-88,	italics	in	original)	
As	 such	 he	 directs	 attention	 towards	 the	 empirical	 by	 way	 of	 a	 deconstruction	 of	
inheritance	within	writing	and	the	symbolic.	He	does	not	just	deconstruct	the	empirical	
through	a	consideration	of	inheritance.	He	maintains	a	tension	and	relationship	between	
the	 two.	 Of	 particular	 interest	 for	 an	 analysis	 of	 politics,	 in	 ‘Autoimmunity’	 Derrida	
examines	 links	 between	 the	 reductive	 language	 of	 the	 name-date	 of	 ‘9/11’	 with	 the	
political	through	its	relationship	with	terror.		






or	 civilian,	 another	distinction	 that	has	become	 less	 and	 less	 reliable)	 from	















also	 deployed	 terror.	 However,	 he	 also	 interrogates	 the	 concept	 of	 terror	 by	 asking	
whether	we	 can	 consider	 it	 in	 terms	 of	 something	 beyond	 violence	 that	 is	 ‘voluntary,	





resulted	 in	 reduced	quality	of	 life	and	 lower	mortality	 [see	Stuckler	and	Basu,	2013]).	
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Thus,	Derrida	 is	 attentive	 to	how	 the	nation-state	has	 taken	up	 responsibility	 for	 that	
which	is	perhaps	most	terrifying:	the	control	of	life	and	death.	
Involved	in	marginalisation,	from	the	reduction	of	the	symbolism	of	the	events	of	9/11	to	
‘9/11’,	 to	 reduction	 of	 enemies	 to	 terrorists,	 and	 the	 terrifying	 condition	 of	 socio-
economic	 deprivation.	 However,	 he	 also	 supplements	 these	 arguments	 derived	 from	
political	history	with	 some	additional	 arguments	developed	 from	an	engagement	with	
political	theory.	For	from	a	consultation	of	political	theorists	from	Thomas	Hobbes	to	Carl	





and	 Schmitt,	 terror	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 in	 order	 or	 justify	 sovereign	monopoly	 over	






In	Chapter	Two	 I	discuss	Richard	Beardsworth’s	 argument	 that	Force	of	Law	 is	 a	 text	
where	Derrida	sets	out	most	convincingly	the	contribution	of	deconstruction	to	political	
theory.	 In	 so	 doing	 I	 refer	 to	 Beardsworth’s	 explication	 of	 Derrida’s	 agreement	 with	





the	 imposition	of	 ‘choice,	 the	 “either/or:”	 “yes	or	no”	 [that]	would	be	virtually	violent,	
polemical,	inquisitorial’,	even	going	as	far	as	to	say	that	it	involves	‘some	instrument	of	
torture’	(2002c	,	p.	231)	(in	specific	relation	to	the	question	given	to	him	by	the	conference	
organisers	 at	 which	 the	 paper	 was	 delivered:	 ‘Deconstruction	 and	 the	 Possibility	 of	
Justice’).	 Derrida	 is	 more	 concerned	 to	 consider	 the	 violence	 of	 inheritances.	 For	
Beardsworth	 this	 refusal	 to	 impose	 choices	 undermines	 the	 credentials	 of	 Derrida’s	
commitment	 to	 the	 political.	 For	 Derrida	 it	 is	 important	 to	 foster	 active,	 responsible	
readership,	and	to	respond	to	empiricity	in	a	much	more	flexible	and	contingent	manner.	
Derrida	 therefore	 acknowledges	 that	 justice,	 ethics,	 and	 politics	 have	 not	 been	 at	 the	







that	 he	 looks	 to	 deconstruct	 it	 by	 considering	 inheritance.	 This	 raises	 two	 distinctive	
possibilities.	Firstly,	 it	directs	attention	towards	an	assessment	of	the	violence	that	we	








approach	 to	 politics	 with	 his	 proposals	 about	writing,	 language,	meaning	 and	 origins	
found	 in	 earlier	 texts	 like	 Of	 Grammatology	 (2002c,	 p.	 241).	 Derrida	 insists	 that	 the	
tension	 between	 the	 empirical	 and	 inheritance	 is	 woven	 into	 the	 ‘very	 moment	 of	
foundation	 or	 institution’	 of	 political	 conditions	 (2002c,	 p.	 241).	 This	 question	 of	
inheritance,	therefore,	destabilises	any	attempt	to	focus	on	empirical	issues.	And	yet	an	
emphasis	upon	the	question	of	inheritance	opens	up	subsequent	questions	about	how	a	
politics	 of	 inheritance	 is	 at	 play	 in	 ways	 that	 help	 to	 inform	 the	 implications	 of	
contemporary	politics.	It	suggests	how	inheritance	plays	a	role	in	justifying	sovereignty	




comes	 from	 commentators	 and	 academics	 (with	 this	 thesis	 being	 complicit).	 The	 real	
problem	is	that	while	political	responses	such	as	austerity	continue,	the	spectres	of	2008,	
have	been	relied	upon	less	and	less.	The	spectres	of	the	crisis	have	become	increasingly	
ephemeral.	 Here	 a	 justification	 for	 considering	 inheritance	 becomes	 even	 more	





nation-state.	 For	 Derrida	 argues	 that	 the	 nation-state	 is	 being	 rendered	 increasingly	
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outdated	 by	 developments	 in	 globalization.	 While	 I	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	
completely	 untie	 the	 relationship	 between	 politics,	 knowledge,	 and	 teletechnology,	 I	
nonetheless	set	out	how	I	leave	these	considerations	to	Chapters	Four	and	Five,	and	how,	
in	this	section,	 I	 focus	specifically	upon	Derrida’s	arguments	about	how	the	manner	 in	
which	 the	 nation-state,	 its	 institutions,	 and	 the	 ideals	 that	 underpin	 them	have,	 in	 an	
autoimmune	 fashion,	 been	 complicit	 with	 these	 developments.	 I	 set	 out	 Derrida’s	
arguments	 about	 the	 problems	 with	 liberal	 democracy,	 state	 institutions,	 ethnic,	








instance,	 that	 the	withering	 away	 of	 the	 nation-state	 (to	 borrow	Marxist	 language)	 is	
indicated	 by	 the	 increasing	 difficulty	 with	 distinguishing	 between	 civil	 war	 and	
international	 war	 (2006,	 p.	 100).	 His	 point	 here	 is	 that	 nation-states	 only	 exist	 in	
distinction	 from	 each	 other,	 and	 once	 there	 is	 a	 sole	 superpower,	 as	 there	 is	 in	 the	
aftermath	of	the	Cold	War	in	the	form	of	the	United	States,	there	can	no	longer	be	any	real	
international	war,	any	military	conflict	involving	the	United	States	will	only	ever	lead	to	
its	 victory.	We	 are	 therefore	 discussing	 some	 form	 of	 global	 civil	 war	 rather	 than	 an	















their	 own	 demise	 in	 an	 autoimmune	 fashion,	 he	 does	 not	 systematically	 examine	 the	














différante);	 it	 is	 always	 a	 matter	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 force	 and	 form,	
between	 force	 and	 signification,	 of	 “performative”	 force,	 illocutionary	 or	













the	 politicians	 and	 institutions	 of	 the	 United	 States	 have	 called	 upon	 inheritances	
associated	with	 the	national	 identity	of	 the	United	States,	 I	 think	we	might	do	well	 to	
consider	 that	 the	 events	 have	 provoked	 the	 continuation,	 albeit	 reformulation	 of	 the	
United	States’	credibility.	In	‘Force	of	Law’	Derrida	cites	Montaigne	thus:	‘Lawes	are	now	















filial	bonds	both	contribute	 to	 the	 formation	of	 the	 institutions	of	 the	nation-state	and	
outlive	it.	Nonetheless,	this	should	not	prevent	us	from	considering	how	there	are	certain	
significant	 elements	 of	 the	 return	 to	 these	 archaisms	 that	 are	 dependent	 upon	
developments	 in	 contemporary	 global	 telecommunications,	 teletechnologies,	 and	
simulacra.	 Here	 then	 I	 intend	 emphasise	 the	 role	 of	 Derrida’s	 argument	 that	 the	
contemporary	phenomena	of	the	return	of	the	religious	should	be	completely	explained	







this	 suggests	 that	 the	 absolute	 identity,	 or	 what	 Derrida	 prefers	 to	 call	 ‘ipseity’,	 of	
sovereignty	is	never	really	possible.	I	have	set	this	out	already,	in	relation	to	différance.	I	








by	 its	 dependence	 upon	 difference,	 there	 is,	 nonetheless,	 an	 attempt	 to	 consolidate	
difference	through	a	restrictive	return.	For	instance,	through	logocentrism,	the	return	to	
the	authority	of	the	Father-figure	of	God.	
In	 these	 terms,	 the	 nation-state	 and	 state	 institutions	 constitute	 specific	 restrictive	
economies	of	difference.	The	importance	of	the	return	thus	helps	to	consider	how,	despite	
globalization,	 there	 is	 a	 proliferation	 of	 ‘phantasm	 of	 community,	 the	 nation-state,	
sovereignty,	 borders,	 native	 soil	 and	 blood’	 (2006,	 p.	 102).	 For	 deconstruction,	 and	
particularly	 deconstruction	 through	 increasingly	 sophisticated	 forms	 of	 writing	 and	
teletechnology,	should	otherwise	indicate	that	they	are	‘more	outdated	than	ever’	(2006,	
p.	102).	To	consider	this	I	think	it	is	helpful	to	refer	to	his	arguments	about	why	the	return	
is	 such	 a	 dogged	 political	 dynamic.	 For	 as	 I	 mention	 above,	 Derrida	 argues	 that	
deconstruction	 is	 impossible	 without	 writing	 and	 law.	 There	 has	 to	 be	 a	 return	 for	
deconstruction	 to	 take	 place.	 Thus,	 while	 the	 return	 to	 the	 archaic	 can	 manifest	 in	










state	 continues	 to	 take	 place	 through	 the	 apparatuses	 of	 social	 care	 and	 healthcare,	





dynamic	 is,	 therefore,	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	 return	 of	 religion.	 Again,	 this	 return	 of	 the	
religious	has	been	presented	as	something	surprising,	bearing	in	mind	global	advances	in	
science,	 technology,	 and	 the	 media.	 And	 yet,	 Derrida	 suggests	 that	 the	 return	 of	 the	
religious	 should	 not	 come	 as	 a	 surprise.	 Firstly,	 this	 is	 because	 concepts	 such	 as	
sovereignty,	 tolerance,	 and	even	democracy	have	 theological	 origins	 (all	 three	 involve	
redemption).	However,	more	subtly,	Derrida	identifies	a	particularly	close	resemblance	
between	religion	and	the	return	(and	more	specifically	the	return	to	origins).	
The	 theological	conditions	of	politics	and	 the	state	and	are	not	 just	characterised	by	a	
return	to	the	religious,	they	also	involve	a	theological	turn	to	questions	of	what	is	to	come	








66).	 To	 this	 end,	 he	 suggests	 that	 as	 tempting	 as	 it	 is	 to	 focus	 upon	 the	 return	 of	 the	
religious	or	 the	religiosity	of	 the	politics	of	United	States,	we	need	 to	consider	a	more	
subtle	 combination	 that	 manifests	 in	 the	 sovereignty	 attributed	 to	 scientific,	
technological,	industrial,	economic,	and	philosophical	rationalities.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	
he	responds,	in	a	robust	manner,	to	the	assumption	of	his	interviewer	in	‘What	Does	It	










are	 not	 often	 associated	 with	 the	 concept.	 Up	 to	 this	 point	 I	 have	 focused	 upon	 the	
inheritance	of	the	political	and	how	its	credit	is	being	eroded	by	the	dynamic	of	the	return	
and	its	demand	to	reconsider	inheritance.	This	subsequently	leads	us	to	the	question	of	










being	conjured	anew	by	conservative	politics	after	 the	Cold	War,	paradoxically,	 	 as	an	
‘enemy	to	be	conjured	away’,	and	an	indication	of	the	deconstruction	of	ontology	through	
‘hauntology’	 (2006,	pp.	62-63).	And	yet,	Derrida’s	 later	works	such	as	Rogues	 and	The	
Beast	and	the	Sovereign	do	not	articulate	the	identities	in	question	as	spectres	(to	‘Rogue	
States’,	global	terrorism)	(2005b;	2009;	2011).	Rather,	the	spectre	is	something	far	more	







sovereignty.	 To	 approach	 this	 transformation	 I	 therefore	 wish	 to	 refer	 to	 Derrida’s	
conception	of	hospitality,	touched	upon	in	relation	to	spectres	in	Spectres	of	Marx	(2006,	
p.	81-82),	and	more	thoroughly	explored	in	Of	Hospitality	(Derrida	and	Dufourmantelle,	





the	destabilisation	of	 the	 logocentric	by	the	 ‘trace’.	As	a	consequence,	we	can	view	the	
spectre	of	something	like	the	crisis	of	2008,	when	articulated	by	the	nation-state,	as	an	
articulation	 of	 the	 negotiation	 of	 its	 limitations,	 and	 its	 deconstruction	 through	 new	
articulations	 of	 sovereignty,	 with	 accompanying	 conceptions	 of	 political	 subjects	 and	
citizens,	and	foreigners.	However,	to	consider	how	this	negotiation	sets	up	a	solicitation	
of	inheritances	that	inform	sovereignty,	citizenry,	and	the	foreign,	my	focus	begins	here	
with	 the	way	 in	which	 hospitality	 is	 negotiated	 by	way	 of	 autoimmunity’s	 spectrality.	





unscathed	 in	 the	 most	 autonomous	 living	 present	 without	 a	 risk	 of	






obsession	with	 ‘living-on’,	 in	which	 ‘a	 survival	whose	 possibility	 in	 advance	 comes	 to	
disjoin	or	dis-adjust	the	identity	to	itself	of	the	living	present	as	well	as	of	any	effectivity,	








It	 is	 through	 the	emphasis	upon	autoimmunity	 that	 I	 subsequently	want	 to	emphasise	
here	that	I	believe	that	‘Faith	and	Knowledge’	(2002a)	provides	some	of	Derrida’s	most	
urgent	 interventions	 in	contemporary	politics.	Derrida	undertakes	a	meditation	on	the	
inheritance	 of	 the	 ontotheological	 through	 religion,	 philosophy,	 reason,	 science,	
technology,	and	the	media,	as	well	as	an	exposition	of	the	dual	roles	of	western	religion	
and	reason	on	globalization.	On	the	one	hand,	‘Faith	and	Knowledge’	can	be	viewed	as	a	
response	 to	questions	about	 the	 significance	of	 Islamic	 fundamentalism	and	 terrorism	
that	would	come	to	dominate	US	politics	after	9/11.	But	on	the	other	hand	he	examines	
how	 this	 phenomena	 has	 been	 made	 possible	 by	 what	 he	 calls	 ‘globalatinization’,	 a	
portmanteau	concept	that	combines	globalization	with	the	‘Latin’	in	order	to	refer	to	the	
manner	in	which	contemporary	politics	are	dominated	by	the	Western	tradition	(2002a,	
p.	67).	 In	 so	doing	he	suggests	 that	 if	 the	shocking	corporeal	violence	of	 religious	and	
nationalist	 extremisms	 is	 to	 truly	be	 confronted	 there	needs	 to	be	 an	 appraisal	 of	 the	




tied	 to	 the	 symbolic	 (2002a,	 p.	 61).	 They	 are	 prosecuted	 through	 technologies	 that	
‘control	the	sky	with	finger	and	eye:	digital	systems	and	virtually	immediate	panoptical	











into	 everyday	 life	 through	 the	 symbolic	 forces	 in	 large	 part	 dominated	 by	 the	West.	
Derrida	consequently	suggests	that	we	need	to	focus	on	responsibility.	
Now,	 for	 Derrida,	 the	 religiosity	 that	 is	 secreted	 is	 not	 problematic	 in	 itself.	 As	 with	







inheritance	 of	 the	 religious	 we	 also	 inherit	 the	 ontological.	 We	 inherit	 the	
‘ontotheological’;	 the	 ‘two	 sources’	 of	 religion	and	 reason	 (2002a,	p.	66).	We	have	 the	
theological,	that	refers	to	the	act	of	faith,	belief,	and	the	attribution	of	credit,	but	we	also	
have	 the	 role	 of	 the	 ontological	 –	 of	 the	 object	 of	 being	 that	 faith	 is	 directed	 towards	












economic,	 technological,	and	political	 implications.	He	 insists	 that	we	need	to	consider	
how	‘some	breathe	there	better	than	others,	some	are	stifled’	(2002a,	p.	67).	His	response	
is	 that	 this	 stifling	 can	 exacerbate	 the	 very	 conditions	 that	 bring	 it	 into	 existence.	 He	
argues	that	when	faith	in	the	ontological	is	disturbed	by	contingency	there	can	be	even	
more	 idiosyncratic	 explorations	 of	 faith,	 and	 faith	 involves	 more	 idiosyncratic	
explorations	of	that	which	is	attributed	sanctity.	It	is	as	if	‘what	is	involved	is	a	machine,	a	
tele-machine’	(2002a,	p.	78,	my	italics).		
The	 spectres	 of	 2008	 therefore	 make	 it	 possible	 for	 the	 pursuit	 of	 new	 forms	 of	
ontotheological	expression.	In	terms	of	the	political,	this	means	that	we	might	be	faced	
with	 an	 increasing	 condition	 of	 depoliticization,	 or	 ‘pacification’	 (2002a,	 p.	 79).	 To	
reiterate	his	approach	to	politics,	Derrida	argues	that	the	law,	the	political,	metaphysics,	
and	writing	always	involve	pacification.	However,	in	‘Faith	and	Knowledge’	he	refers	to	







As	 a	 consequence,	 everyone	 is	 haunted	 by	 the	 spectre	 of	 exclusion,	 and	 with	 the	
increasing	 secretion	 of	 this	 spectre	 of	 autoimmunity,	 there	 is	 the	 possibility	 for	 an	
intensification	of	a	‘struggle	[for]	access	to	world	(transnational	or	trans-state)	networks	
of	telecommunication	and	of	tele-technoscience’	(2002a,	p.	79).	The	spectrality	of	2008,	
therefore,	 has	 the	 possibility	 of	 being	 another	 object	 of	 knowledge	 that	 is	 up	 for	
acquisition.		
Beyond	any	explicit	attempts	to	shut	down	alternative	narratives	of	the	events	of	2008	on	
ideological	 grounds,	 there	 is,	 therefore,	 necessarily,	 a	 pacification	 that	 derives	 from	 a	
certain	spectre	that	these	events	will	be	used	by	others	(even	if	the	reasons	are	not	set	
out).	 However,	 Derrida	 is	more	 specific	 still	 about	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	 pacifying	
tendency	 within	 the	 ontotheological	 inheritance.	 Here	 his	 concept	 of	 ‘autoimmunity’	





to	 the	 autonomy	 that	 auto-immunity	 acquires.	 Translating	 autoimmunity	 into	 politics	
through	 what	 he	 refers	 to	 as	 ‘auto-co-immunity’	 (2002a,	 p.	 87,	 italics	 in	 original),	
explaining	 how	 we	 are	 faced	 by	 the	 overwhelming	 inequalities	 and	 exploitations	 of	
sophisticated	 techno-scientific	 globalization	 and	 how	 it	 makes	 possible	 the	 new	
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articulations	 of	 sexual	 and	 archaic	 violence	 found	 with	 various	 contemporary	
extremisms.	
To	examine	this	politics	of	auto-co-immunity	Derrida	sets	out	a	‘demographic	calculation’	
(of	which	 the	 history	 of	 antisemitism	 is	 for	 Derrida	 a	 vital	 example):	 ‘when	 they	 feel	
themselves	threatened	by	an	expropriative	and	delocalizing	tele-technoscience,	“peoples”	
also	fear	new	forms	of	invasion.	They	are	terrified	by	alien	“populations”,	whose	growth	
as	well	 as	 presence,	 indirect	 or	 virtual-but	 as	 such,	 all	 the	more	 oppressive	 becomes	
incalculable’	(2002a,	p.	90).	And	yet,	Derrida	emphasises	that	intervention	in	these	issues	
can	 be	 substantially	 supplemented	 by	 considering	 the	 exclusion,	 both	 corporeal	 and	
virtual,	of	the	contemporary	world.	That:	‘never	in	the	history	of	humanity,	it	would	seem,	





it	 is	 possible	 to	 intervene	 and	 manage	 it’s	 the	 possibility	 for	 the	 competition	 for	
possession	to	lead	to	conflict.		
That	 is,	 there	needs	to	be	a	consideration	of	whether	 institutions	such	as	the	state	are	
committed	to	not	only	intervening	in	the	spectres	of	autoimmunity	that	are	engendered	
an	event	such	as	the	global	financial	crisis,	but	whether	they	are	committed	to	addressing	





from	 the	 very	 same	 phenomena,	 and	 is	 always	 under	 threat	 from	 the	 ontotheological	
inheritance	 of	 credit,	 faith,	 belief.	 The	 problem	 is	 not	 autoimmunity	 itself	 –	 it	 is	 as	




itself	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 promise,	 despite	 its	 inscription	 of	mortality	 and	 finitude:	 ‘without	
autoimmunity,	with	absolute	immunity,	nothing	would	ever	happen	or	arrive;	we	would	






limits	 of	 hospitality	 will	 always	 be	 conditioned	 by	 the	 spectrality	 of	 autoimmune	
insufficiency.	 Indeed,	 I	 think	 it	should	be	emphasized	here	how	Derrida	states	 that	we	
must	 not	 avoid	 taking	 decisions	 about	 hospitality	 and	 negotiating	 the	 spectre	 of	
autoimmunity.	 In	Of	Hospitality	he	asserts	 that	 ‘keeping	silent	 is	already	a	modality	of	
possible	 speaking’	 (Derrida	 and	Dufourmantelle,	 2000,	 p.	 135),	 and	we	 can	 see	much	
earlier	in	‘White	Mythology’	about	the	unavoidability	of	decision	(1982d).		So,	why	would	
we	wish	to	refer	to	the	haunting	of	the	political	by	autoimmunity	rather	than	the	spectre	






suggest	 that	what	 is	unconditional	 is	necessarily	 troubling.	Autoimmunity	need	not	be	









Derrida’s	 argument	 that	 by	 overemphasising	 the	 autonomy	 of	 contemporary	 religion,	
technology,	science,	and	politics	we	can	be	complicit	with	the	secretion	of	responsibilities.	
Instead,	we	need	to	focus	on	the	insecurity	of	these	phenomena,	and	the	insecurity	that	





In	 the	 first	 three	 sections	 of	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	worked	 to	 discuss	 the	 significance	 of	
politics	in	the	traditional	sense	of	the	nation-state	and	governments.	In	doing	so	I	have	





political,	 the	 nation-state	 no	 doubt	 retains	 significance	 in	 the	 broader	 sense	 of	 the	
political.	Specifically	I	direct	attention	to	policy	decisions	such	as	those	of	the	austerity	









institutions	 of	 the	 nation-state,	 international	 law,	 human	 rights,	 cosmopolitanism,	




















Derrida’s	 commitment	 to	 these	 projects	 is	 misleading.	 They	 articulate	 how	
deconstruction	takes	place	in	relation	to	the	political.	They	refer	to	the	manner	in	which	
the	international	and	democratic	have	been	integral	to	the	deconstruction	of	the	political.	




(2005,	p.	158)?	To	consider	 this	 I	 continue	with	 the	discussion	of	 responsibility	 that	 I	
undertake	in	section	three.	For,	to	recall,	Derrida	argues	that	one	of	the	most	troubling	
possibilities	 of	 contemporary	 politics	 is	 that	 of	 ignoring	 the	 role	 of	 responsibility.	
Difference	will	always	disrupt	the	illusion	of	the	indivisibility	of	identity	and	sovereignty,	






with	 the	apparatuses	of	 the	nation-state	or	 liberal	democracy.	Firstly	 there	 is	what	he	
often	 refers	 to	as	 ‘perfectibility’	 the	 liberal	national	 and	 international	 institutions	 (the	
nation-state,	international	law,	universal	human	rights).	As	imperfect	as	these	institutions	
are,	with	how	they	are	interwoven	with	capitalism,	dominated	by	certain	nation-states,	
substantially	 undermined	 by	 the	 hypocricies	 of	 those	 nation-states,	 and	 at	 a	 more	





capital,	 exploitation	 (2005b,	 p.	 158).	 Furthermore,	 he	 argues,	 at	 the	more	 conceptual	
level,	that	we	cannot	have	the	concept	of	conditions,	responsibility,	freedoms,	and	agency	
(‘self-determination’)	 without	 some	 framework	 of	 sovereignty	 (2005b,	 p.	 158).	 To	
investigate	 this	 further	 we	 might	 therefore	 focus	 upon	 his	 comments	 on	 liberal	
democracy	 in	 some	 more	 detail.	 To	 do	 this	 I	 turn	 here	 to	 Derrida’s	 short	 essay	 On	
Cosmopolitanism	(2001c).	I	suggest	that	On	Cosmopolitanism	is	helpful	here	because	it	sets	
out,	rather	pragmatically,	forms	of	‘conditional	hospitality’	offered	by	nation-states	that	












p.	 4).	 He	 proposes	 that	 an	 attention	 to	 the	 city	 in	 its	 difference	 from	 the	 nation-state	

























seeking	 refuge,	 out	 of	 a	 commitment	 for	 a	 just	 and	 democratic	 politics,	 but	 also	 the	
problematic	 implications	 of	 refusing	 to	 do	 so	 (2001c,	 p.	 9).	 For	 in	 conditioning	 the	
construction	of	the	metropolis,	on	the	basis,	for	instance,	of	national	identity,	or	economic	
imperatives,	as	happens	in	both	the	refusal	to	accept	refugees	on	the	grounds	of	national	
integrity,	 or	 economics,	 provides	 the	 basis	 for	 an	 emboldened	 police,	 and	 as	 such	
sovereignty:	‘one	has	to	be	mindful	of	the	profound	problem	of	the	role	and	status	of	the	
police,	of,	in	the	first	instance,	border	police,	but	also	of	a	police	without	borders,	without	













‘tautologous’	 (2001c,	 p.	 16).	 Rather,	 hospitality	 for	 Derrida,	 we	 might	 recall,	 is	 the	










22).	 As	 such	 Kant’s	 cosmopolitanism	 has	 a	 particular	 incorporation	 of	 ‘natural	 law’	

























and	anti-Eurocentrism’	(1992,	pp.	12-13).	 In	 this	chapter	 I	have	 investigated	Derrida’s	












ignore	how	the	European	 tradition	 includes	 the	Enlightenment,	and	with	 it	a	 series	of	
ideas	 about	 permitting	 the	 exchange	 of	 different	 political	 ideas	 to	 take	 place,	 mass	
participation	 in	politics,	human	rights,	and	questions	about	responsibility,	even	 if	 they	
have	been	pushed	back	against	at	every	moment	by	lawyers,	politicians,	and	capitalists,	
and	philosophers	 that	are	concerned	with	articulating	such	an	 inheritance	as	an	 ideal,	
even	in	the	name	of	‘perpetual	peace’	(as	with	Kant).	So,	I	think	that	Derrida’s	articulation	
of	 the	 promise	 of	 Europe	 risks	 privileging	 the	 European	 tradition	 and	 marginalizing	
experiences	 and	 ideas	 found	 elsewhere,	 including	 his	 own,	 frequent,	 autobiographical	
writings	 on	 his	 experiences	 at	 the	margins	 of	 French	 identity	 (see	 2004b,	 pp.	 75-93).	
Nonetheless,	 this	 privileging	 is	 not	 inscribed	 by	 Derrida	 himself.	 Derrida	 provides	 a	
framework	for	exploring	the	limits	of	the	European,	and	in	so	doing	points	to	both	the	
responsibility	 for	 responding	 to	 inheritance,	 and	 the	 possibilities	 of	 taking	 this	




In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	worked	 to	 open	up	 the	 question	 of	 how	best	 to	 respond	 to	 the	
spectrality	of	the	global	financial	crisis	by	way	of	an	attention	to	politics	in	the	traditional	
sense	 of	 the	 governance	 of	 the	 nation-state.	 In	 Section	 One	 I	 worked	 with	 Derrida’s	





spectres	 of	 the	 crisis,	 an	 examination	 of	 inheritance	 opens	 up	 questions	 about	 the	
implications	that	are	at	stake.	With	this	emphasis	upon	inheritance	I	turn	in	Section	Two	
to	the	question	of	what	this	means	for	the	future	of	the	political	and	the	nation-state.	I	
discuss	 Derrida’s	 argument	 that	 the	 nation-state,	 as	 a	 deconstruction	 of	 writing,	 has	
always	 been	 subject	 to	 deconstruction	 itself,	 but	 that	 the	 technologies	 of	 the	















of	 how	 spectres	 can	 be	 approached.	 However,	 in	 Section	 Four	 I	 refer	 to	 how	 the	

















ultimately	 argue	 that	 as	 beneficial	 as	 the	 European,	 Enlightenment	 project	 of	
cosmopolitanism	is	when	faced	by	theocratic	politics	and	extremism,	this	position	that	
Derrida	takes	risks	letting	slip	of	the		benefits	of	examining	and	interrogating	inheritance,	


















means	 of	 conditioning	 not	 only	 the	 singularity	 of	 the	 events	 associated	 with	 that	
spectrality,	 but	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 event	 itself,	 with	 restrictive	 implications	 for	 the	
hospitality	of	the	nation-state.	However,	I	also	set	out	Derrida’s	argument	that	the	nation-
state,	 as	 a	 site	 of	 the	 political,	 can	 provide	 the	 basis	 for	 interventions,	 and	 that	 the	
existence	of	the	nation-state	 is	threatened	by	developments	in	science,	technology	and	
industry,	 and	 the	globalisation	of	media	and	 communications	 technologies,	 capitalism,	
and	ideology.	At	the	conclusion	of	my	last	chapter	I	refer	to	the	importance	that	Derrida	











the	 history	 of	 the	 relationship	 with	 the	 foreigner.	 I	 explain	 his	 argument	 that	 in	 this	
context	cosmopolitanism	is	a	more	nuanced	approach	to	the	question	of	hospitality	than	









between	 scholarship	 and	 politics,	 and	 more	 specifically	 sovereignty.	 I	 focus	 upon	
Derrida’s	arguments	about	how	scholarship	is	linked	to	the	spectre	of	the	unconditional,	




to	 spectres.	 To	 do	 this	 I	 undertake	 a	 comparative	 discussion	 of	 the	 approaches	 to	
scholarship,	 spectres,	 and	 spirit	 of	 Karl	 Marx	 and	 Martin	 Heidegger.	 Section	 Three	
 145 
 
combines	 the	 reflections	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 sovereignty	 and	 scholarship	 in	
section	one,	and	scholarship	and	spectres	in	section	two,	to	examine	the	implications	of	
contemporary	spectral	effects,	including	the	spectrality	of	2008.	Finally,	in	section	four	I	
examine	 how	 scholarship	 and	 university	 might	 become	 particularly	 hospitable,	 and	
‘speak	with	ghosts’.	In	doing	so	I	explore	a	tension,	largely	examined	by	Derrida	scholars,	
between	Derrida’s	emphasis	upon	a	‘new	humanities’	and	his	antipathy	towards	cultural	
studies.	 I	do	so	on	the	basis	 that	while	 the	humanities	are	particularly	well	positioned	





to	 the	 political	 concept	 of	 sovereignty.	 As	 such	 this	 section	 ultimately	 argues	 that	 the	





possibilities	 without	 that	 which	 limits	 this	 promise.	 Moreover,	 my	 concern	 at	 the	
beginning	here	is	not	the	manner	in	which	the	promise	of	the	university	is	inhibited	by	













faith:	 faith	 in	 the	 University	 and,	 within	 the	 University,	 faith	 in	 the	 Humanities	 of	
tomorrow’	 (2001a,	 p.	 24).	 And	 yet	 this	 does	 not	 prevent	 him	 from	 emphasising	 the	
inheritance	of	an	axiomatic	in	which	the	scholarship	serves	to	supplement	sovereignty.	
Deploying	 his	 deconstructive	 framework	 in	 which	 metaphysics	 is	 interwoven	 with	
différance,	 he	 deconstructs	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 conditionality	 of	 sovereignty	 is	
dependent	 upon	 unconditional	 hospitality	 to	 speculate	 that	 scholarship	 and	 the	
university	meet	this	demand	and	combines	the	claim	with	an	empirical	consideration	of	
how	 the	 university	 has	 been	 a	 site	 of	meditation	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 sovereignty	 in	 its	
various	 forms,	 from	 the	 nation-state	 to	 religion,	 culture,	 economics,	 technology,	 and	
science.	
More	 specifically,	 Derrida	 argues	 that	 if	 we	 are	 to	 focus	 upon	 the	 significance	 of	 any	
specific	 form	of	 scholarship	 in	 its	 relationship	sovereignty,	we	need	 to	 focus	upon	 the	
form	that	is	most	closely	linked	to	questions	of	the	phantasmatic.	He	argues	that	we	need	
to	 focus	 on	 the	 field	 of	 the	 humanities,	 the	 field	 that	 ‘has	 always	 been	 linked	 to	 the	








that	 ‘the	 university	 is	 also	without	 any	 power	 of	 its	 own’	 (2001a,	 p.	 27).	 There	 is,	 he	
argues,	 a	 fundamental	 fragility	 in	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 university	 when	 it	 faces	
conditional	 sovereign	 forces	such	as	 the	nation-state,	organised	religion,	 ideology,	and	
capitalism;	 it	 is	 ‘often	 destined	 to	 capitulate	 without	 condition,	 to	 surrender	
unconditionally’	(2001a,	p.	28).		
As	an	obvious	example,	Derrida	notes	that	‘the	organization	of	research	and	teaching	have	
to	 be	 supported,	 that	 is,	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 controlled,	 let	 us	 say	 euphemistically	
“sponsored”,	by	commercial	and	industrial	interests’	(2001a,	p.	28).	But	he	also	argues	





there	 is,	 as	 with	 cosmopolitanism,	 a	 consideration	 of	 different	 lived	 experiences.	 He	
insists	that	that	the	promise	that	he	identifies	can	be	found	in	other	academic	fields,	such	







Nonetheless,	 in	a	manner	similar	 to	 the	way	 in	which	he	argues	 in	 ‘Force	of	Law’	 that	
deconstruction	 is	 made	 possible	 by	 sovereignty	 (2002b),	 Derrida	 suggests	 that	 this	
sovereign	commitment	makes	possible	an	expanded	terrain	of	idiomatic,	aesthetic,	legal,	









But	 also,	 that	 this	 delocalization	 might	 be	 to	 suggest	 a	 certain	 abandonment	 ‘to	 the	
arbitrary,	to	dream,	to	imagination,	to	utopia,	to	hypothesis’	(2001a,	p.	32).	And	yet,	on	



















phantasmatic,	 sovereign	 figure	 most	 associated	 with	 scholarship:	 ‘the	 profession	 of	
professor,	 the	 principle	 of	 authority	 that	 derives	 from	 it,	 and	 the	 profession	 of	 faith’	




commitment’	 (2001a,	p.	35).	He	acknowledges	 that	 this	 interpretation	of	profession	 is	
highly	 specific,	 and	 that	 there	 is	 a	 very	 different	 interpretation	 that	 is	 perhaps	more	
common	that	refers	‘craft’	and	‘career’,	and	therefore	a	certain	‘competence,	knowledge,	
know-how’	 (2001a,	 p.	 36).	 But	 he	 also	 argues	 that	 profession	 is	 linked	 to	 the	










mean	 that	 scholars	 make	 a	 conscious	 effort	 to	 consider	 that	 their	 actions	 have	
implications,	and	that	they	are	not	just	confined	to	the	ivory	tower	of	the	academy.	But	on	
the	 other	 hand,	 Derrida’s	 articulation	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 scholarship	 is	 also	 an	
articulation	of	the	responsibility	of	scholarship.	This	second	articulation	of	scholarship	
troubles	 the	 notion	 that	 there	 can	 be	 specific	 conventions	 about	 the	 form	 in	 which	
responsibility	 should	 take,	 and	 as	 such	 the	 notion	 that	 there	 should	 be	 specific	
conventions.	So,	Derrida	asserts	that	even	if:	
In	 a	 classical	 university,	 in	 conformity	 with	 its	 accepted	 definition,	 one	
practices	 the	 study,	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	 normative,	 prescriptive,	
performative,	and	fictional	possibilities	(...)	that	are	more	often	the	object	of	




So,	 while	 Derrida	 asserts	 that	 scholarship,	 the	 university,	 and	 the	 humanities	 are	 in	
danger	of	being	appropriated	by	 sovereignty,	due	 to	 the	 fragile	autoimmunity	of	 their	
unconditionality,	 Derrida	maintains	 that	 its	 unconditionality	will,	 nonetheless,	 always	












of	 lived	 experience	 they	 repress	 their	 deconstructive	 irreducibility.	 This	 has	
consequences	 for	 academic	 inquiry,	 but	 also	 more	 broadly	 for	 the	 political,	 since	 it	
inscribes	a	certain	‘passivity’	at	the	moment	of	investigation.	
In	 Chapter	 Three	 I	 examine	 Derrida’s	 articulation	 of	 a	 tension	 relating	 to	
cosmopolitanism,	a	theory	of	the	political	that	is	in	large	part	indebted	to	Kant,	between	
its	 limitations	 upon	 difference	 that	 result	 from	 such	 rigid	 articulations	 of	 faith	 and	
knowledge,	and	the	possibilities	in	its	reference	to	multiplicity.	Here	Derrida	articulates	a	
similar	tension.	On	the	one	hand	Kant’s	axiomatics	provide	the	basis	for	examining	the	
deconstructions	 involved	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 dichotomies	 such	 as	 ‘art	 and	
nature’,	 and	 which	 in	 turn	 have	 consequences	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 interventions	 such	 as	
performance,	 production,	 the	 idiomatic,	 and	 effect	 (2001a,	 p.	 42).	 However,	 the	










Thus,	 while	 Derrida	 maintains	 the	 deconstructive	 promise	 of	 what	 we	 might	 term	 a	




the	biological.	And	yet,	within	 that	his	examination	of	 the	confession	–	on	a	 scale	 that	
extends	 beyond	 scholarship	 in	 the	 traditional	 sense	 to	 include	 aspects	 of	 life	 more	
generally	such	as	work,	he	argues	that	we	also	need	to	be	attentive	to	a	subtle	change	in	








identifies	 within	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 sovereignty	 and	 scholarship.	 More	
specifically,	 I	 have	 worked	 to	 explain	 Derrida’s	 faith	 in	 the	 conceptual	 promise	 of	
scholarship,	 the	 university,	 and	 the	 humanities	 that	 stands	 in	 contrast	 with	 their	





that	 they	 are	 particularly	 significant	 because	 of	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 they	 are	 so	
intimately	 bound	 up	 with	 questions	 of	 lived,	 human	 experience	 (even	 if	 this	 has	 not	









spectres,	 by	 referring	 specifically	 to	 the	 spectre	 of	 autoimmunity.	 I	 emphasise	 how	 a	
repressive	approach	to	spectralities	of	foreigners,	refugees,	migrants,	terrorists	and	other	
others,	 as	 well	 as	 spectralities	 that	 do	 not	 immediately	 suggest	 the	 spectral	 in	 its	
embodied	characteristics,	such	as	war,	famine,	marginalisation,	and,	in	the	context	of	this	
thesis,	 economic	 crisis,	 provoke	 a	 questioning	 of	 inheritance	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 a	
return,	 which	 is	 really	 a	 turn,	 to	 messianisms,	 found	 in	 the	 so-called	 “return”	 of	
nationalism	 and	 religious	 fundamentalism,	 as	 well	 as	 within	 the	 supposedly	 secular	
domain	 of	 sophisticated	 techno-scientific	 rationality.	 Thus,	 if	 scholarship,	 and	 the	




spectres	can	be	engaged	with.	To	do	this	 I	 turn	here	 to	Derrida’s	writing	on	Marx	and	
Heidegger.	 Firstly,	 I	 engage	 with	 Derrida’s	 argument	 that,	 despite	 Marx’s	 explicit	
disregard	for	the	significance	of	spectres,	Marx	nonetheless	provides	a	vital	framework	
for	the	possibilities	of	considering	the	multiplicity	that	Derrida	puts	at	the	heart	of	his	
























Marx	 and	 Marxism	 are	 particularly	 important.	 While	 Marx	 has	 a	 contradictory	









Before	 I	 focus	 upon	 the	 plurality	 of	 Marx’s	 spectres	 I	 will	 follow	 here	 how	 Derrida	
approaches	the	concept	of	the	spectre	via	Shakespeare’s	Hamlet,	a	text	that	he	focuses	










Derrida	 this	 is	 a	 depiction	 of	 how	 ghosts	 always	 remain	 liminal,	 and	 the	 authority	 of	
armour	is	doubly	important.	The	spirit	is	accompanied	by	what	he	calls	the	‘visor	effect’:	
a	‘power	to	see	without	being	seen’	(2006,	p.	8).	And	yet,	despite	how	such	a	ghost	can	
become	 increasingly	 haunting,	 Derrida	 insists	 that	 its	 spectrality	 is	 subject	 to	
deconstruction,	 that	 this	 deconstruction	 can	 be	 examined,	 and	 that	 a	 commitment	 to	
justice	can	be	pursued.		
To	do	this	Derrida	sets	out	three	components	of	such	a	haunting.	Firstly,	that	haunting	
always	 involves	 ‘mourning’	 (2006,	 p.	 9).	 Hamlet	 is	 aggrieved	 by	 the	 injustice	 of	 his	
Father’s	murder,	but	he	is	also	in	mourning.	His	Father’s	spirit	appears	in	response	to	this	
mourning.	 Secondly,	 the	 mourning	 is	 impossible	 without	 some	 form	 of	 ‘language’	 or,	
better	still,	in	a	Derridean	vein,	‘writing’	(2006,	p.	9).	And	thirdly,	mourning	and	writing	
are	 impossible	without	 ‘work’	 (2006,	p.	9).	With	spirits	and	spectres	 there	 is	always	a	
work	 of	 mourning	 that	 can	 be	 traced	 through	 writing.	 This	 emphasis	 upon	 work	 of	
mourning	 subsequently	 exposes	 the	 multitude	 of	 actions	 that	 are	 involved	 in	 the	
articulation	of	the	spirit	and	the	spectre.	And	yet,	despite	this	framework,	Derrida	insists	





The	 engagement	 with	 spectres	 is	 not	 completely	 ignored	 within	 scholarship.	 More	
generally	he	notes	that	the	examination	of	oppositions	between	‘the	real	and	the	unreal,	




(2006,	 p.	 12).	 Now,	 returning	 to	 Marx,	 Derrida	 insists	 that	 Marx	 provides	 a	 seminal	
critique	 of	 spirit	 as	 it	 manifests	 in	 capitalism	 and	 its	 effects	 in	 society,	 economics,	
technology,	politics,	history,	literature	and	aesthetics,	as	well	as	on	an	international	scale.	
However,	Derrida	 also	 sees	problems	 in	 the	manner	 in	which	Marx	 reacts	 against	 the	
spectres.	 As	 I	 set	 out	 in	 Chapter	 One,	 in	 The	 German	 Ideology	 Marx	 argues	 that	 the	
bourgeoisie	 is	prevented	 from	articulating	 the	 reality	of	 society	by	an	 ideology	 that	 is	
determined	 by	 its	 particular	 economic	 interests.	 But	 as	 Derrida	 also	 explains,	 Marx	
argues,	with	a	critique	of	the	work	of	Max	Stirner,	that	bourgeois	ideology	manifests	in	an	
obsession	 with	 spectres	 (2006,	 p.	 6).	 Thus,	 Marx	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 consistent	 with	 the	
dismissal	 of	 spectres,	 even	 if	 he	 pays	 attention	 to	 them	 and	 contributes	 to	 the	
deconstruction	of	spirit.		
Thus,	Derrida	warns	 that	with	Marx’s	 emphasis	 upon	 the	 real	 economic	 conditions	 of	
society	he	establishes	a	new	spectral	entity,	hidden	behind	a	visor.	But	he	also	refers	to	











and	the	refusal	 to	engage	with	 its	spectral	plurality	 inevitably	provides	 the	basis	 for	a	
spectre	of	crisis.	As	Prince	Hamlet	laments,	‘the	time	is	out	of	joint’	(2006,	p.	xxi).	
To	examine	the	consequences	of	the	out	of	joint	Derrida	turns	to	Heidegger’s	examination	












before	I	continue	with	this,	 I	will	examine	Heidegger’s	repression	of	 the	spirit	 in	more	
detail,	as	it	poses	particular	problems	for	examining	spectres.	
To	 do	 this	 I	want	 to	 briefly	 refer	 here	 to	 Derrida’s	 closer	 examination	 of	 Heidegger’s	
approach	 to	 spirit	 in	 Of	 Spirit	 (1989).	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 this	 effaces	 the	 notion	 of	
Heidegger’s	avoidance	of	the	concept	spirit	because	it	focuses	upon	Heidegger’s	explicit	
engagement	with	 the	concept	 in	 the	 ‘Rectorship	Address’	of	1933	and	 ‘Introduction	 to	
Metaphysics’	in	1935.	However,	on	the	other	hand	Derrida	describes	how	the	spirit	that	




particularly	 troubling	 given	 how	 they	 run	 alongside	 Nazism,	 and	 how	 Heidegger,	
particularly	with	the	‘Rectorship	Address’	(in	fact	titled	by	Heidegger	‘The	Self-assertion	
of	 the	 German	 University’),	 supplements	 Nazism	 with	 an	 intellectual	 project	 that	 is	
specific	 to	 the	 university.	 Since	 this	 text	 refers	 explicitly	 to	 the	 university	 Derrida’s	
examination	 of	 it	 is	 my	 focus	 here.	 Initially	 there	 are	 the	 overtly	 nationalist	 and	





it	 leads	 the	 very	 leaders’	 (1989,	 p.	 33).	 The	 relationship	 with	 Nazism	 becomes	more	
detailed	however	when	Derrida	sets	out	Heidegger’s	argument	that	the	university	has	a	












make	 this	 claim	would	 be	 to	 overlook	 Heidegger’s	 avoidance	 of	 how	 ‘Geist	 is	 always	
haunted	by	its	Geist’;	the	repression	of	spectrality,	and	with	it	justice	(1989,	p.	40).	










there	 is	 nonetheless	 a	 commitment	 to	 consider	 the	 role	 that	 spectres	 play	 in	 all	 their	
diversity.	In	particular	we	might	consider	Derrida’s	opposition	to	attempts	to	reclassify	
Marx	as	a	philosopher,	and	‘to	depoliticize	profoundly	the	Marxist	reference’	(2006,	pp.	
37-38).	 To	 do	 so	 would	 be	 completely	 disregard	 Marx’s	 critique	 of	 capitalism	 on	 its	
international	scale,	Marx’s	role	in	establishing	the	First	International,	a	meeting	that,	due	
to	political	 conditions,	 ‘had	 to	 remain	quasi-secret’,	 and	which	was	 characterised	by	a	







also	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 spectre	 provides	 Marx,	 albeit	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 Marx	
ultimately	 confines	 through	 a	 commitment	 to	 materialism,	 with	 a	 framework	 that	
investigates	 so	many	 forms	 of	 exploitation.	 I	 discuss	 how	Derrida	works,	 by	way	 of	 a	
consideration	of	the	spectres	of	Marx,	to	not	rely	upon	observation,	and	consider	how	to	
let	spectres	speak	by	speaking	with	them.	I	note	that	this	may	seem	problematic	for	those	
who	make	 the	 case	 for	 those	who	 argue	 for	 the	 role	 of	 representation	 in	 a	 politics	 of	
affiliation,	but	Derrida	insists	that	the	alternative	is	to	repress	the	plurality	of	spectres,	




considers	 how	 speaking	 with	 spectres	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 Derrida’s	 approach	 to	 the	
humanities.		
3. Scholarship	and	Contemporary	Spectral	Effects	
In	 this	section	I	continue	with	the	emphasis	upon	the	“as	 if”	and	the	humanities	 that	 I	
discuss	 in	 section	 one	 and	 focus	 upon	 the	 consideration	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
scholarship	and	discrete	spectral	effects.	Accompanied	by	a	reflection	on	speaking	with	
ghosts,	I	focus	here	upon	examining	the	global	conditions	that	thread	through	Derrida’s	
discussion	 of	 the	 contemporary	 promise	 of	 the	 humanities,	 but	which	 are	 articulated	
more	 explicitly	 in	 Spectres	 of	Marx,	 and	which	 is	 fundamental	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 this	






question’	 (2006,	 p.	 66).	More	 specifically,	 this	 section	 considers	 how	 this	 relationship	
affects	 a	 scholarship	 that	 intends	 to	 talk	with	 the	 spectrality	 of	 2008.	 It	 refers	 to	 the	
significance	of:		





As	 I	 explain	 in	 section	 one,	 as	 daunting	 as	 these	 spectral	 affects	 are,	 for	 Derrida	 the	
suggestion	 that	 these	 technologies	 limit	 how	 the	 university	 and	 the	 humanities	 can	
deconstruct	sovereignty	not	only	overlooks	a	fundamental	aspect	of	how	they	rely	upon	
unconditionality	 to	 be	 brought	 into	 existence,	 but	 contributes	 to	 the	 repression	 of	
deconstruction.	 If	 there	 is	 a	 responsibility	 to	 these	 affects	 there	 needs	 to	 be	 a	
consideration	of	their	specificity	that	goes	in	hand	with	their	general	spectral	condition.	
A	 focus	 of	 Derrida’s	 here	 is	 the	 manner	 in	 which,	 with	 a	 specific	 relationship	 with	




















Here	 I	 want	 to	 focus	 upon	 how	 Derrida	 suggests	 that	 the	 university	 is	 subject	 to	
appropriation	by	‘the	power	of	the	nation-state’,	the	‘economic	powers	(to	corporations	
and	 to	 national	 and	 international	 capital)’,	 and	 ‘the	 powers	 of	 the	media,	 ideological,	




















And	 yet,	 confessional	 attempts	 at	 relevance	 disrupt	 the	 integrity	 of	 these	 bodies,	 and	
renders	them	spectral.	We	need	not	focus	on	the	manner	in	which	the	global	market	has	
become	 supplemented	 with	 virtual	 work,	 and	 manual	 labour	 treated	 as	 archaic.	 For	
instance,	he	 refers	 to	how	 there	exist	various	 forms	of	 ‘tele-work’,	 such	as	 that	of	 air-
traffic-controllers,	‘those	who	guarantee	the	mediations	or	transmissions	of	which	there	
remain	only	virtual	traces’	(2001a,	p.	37).	Rather,	we	can	focus,	as	Derrida	does,	upon	the	
manner	 in	 which	 the	 repression	 of	 spectral	 effects,	 means	 that	 ‘others	 can	 also	 be	

























Here	 Derrida’s	 reasoning	 for	 discussing	 work	 in	 relation	 to	 scholarship	 becomes	
apparent.	On	 the	one	hand	 it	 links	scholarship	 to	 the	conditions	of	 the	market.	On	 the	
other	hand,	he	considers	how	work	involves	a	particularly	intimate	relationship	with	the	
phantasmatic	 that	 restricts	 the	 unconditional	 promise	 of	 scholarship.	 To	 examine	 the	








work’	 (2001a,	 p.	 42).	 Furthermore,	 to	 consider	 how	 this	 distinction	 is	made	 between	
profession	and	confession	he	focuses	upon	the	“professionalisation”	(as	confession)	of	the	
humanities.		
It	 may	 seem	 like	 a	 melodramatic	 academic	 statement	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 fate	 of	 the	
humanities	is	significant	for	questions	about	human	rights	and	workers’	rights.	However,	
aside	 from	 the	 conditions	 faced	 by	 ‘unemployed	 teachers	 or	 aspiring	 professors,	 in	
particular	in	the	Humanities’	(2001a,	p.	46),	Derrida	argues	that	such	a	focus	brings	to	the	
forefront	the	encroachment	of	a	commitment	to	phantasms	in	relation	to	articulations	of	













work,	 to	 a	 professorial	 ‘thinking	 of	 the	 “perhaps”	 of	 that	 dangerous	 modality	 of	 the	






medicine,	and	even	mathematics’	 (2001a,	p.	50).	 In	so	doing	Derrida	again	 inscribes	a	
commitment	to	something	like	a	cosmopolitan	form	of	scholarship	that	recognises	both	
the	 possibilities	 and	 limits	 of	 both	 dividing	 and	 collapsing	 their	 distinctiveness.	More	
broadly,	 this	means	 linking	up	with	 the	variety	of	ways	 in	which	 idiomatic	 reflections	
about	everyday	life.	But	this	possibility	is	also	a	responsibility	to	consider	the	implications	
















conjures.	The	end	of	 the	work	might	mean	 ‘the	origin	of	 the	world’	 (2001a,	p.	45),	 an	
engagement	with	the	unconditional,	but	it	can	also	conjure	the	spectre	of	marginalisation.	
How	then	can	an	attention	to	scholarship,	the	university,	and	the	humanities	in	particular	
intervene	 in	 such	 a	 situation?	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 we	 might	 say	 that	 scholarship	 can	
contribute	 by	 focusing	 attention	 upon	 the	 broader	 experience	 of	 spectrality,	 with	 an	
attention	to	the	spectral	effects	of	rhetoric	but	also	contemporary	media	technologies,	or	
with	a	Marxist	approach,	upon	the	role	of	capitalism.	In	this	way	we	might	suggest	that	a	
particular	 focus	upon	 the	spectrality	of	2008	 is	 restrictive,	and	only	establishes	a	new	




political.	 And	 secondly,	 that	 the	 spectrality	 articulates	 responsibility,	 and	 with	 it	 the	






the	 ideas	 that	 make	 appropriation	 possible.	 But,	 as	 his	 work	 on	 deconstruction	 and	
différance	suggests,	we	cannot	really	talk	about	appropriation	in	the	truest	sense.	In	this	
axiomatic	sovereignty	is	always	subject	to	deconstruction,	and	if	we	suggest	that	it	is	not,	
and	 that	 we	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 absolute	 control	 of	 sovereignty,	 we	 are	 repressing	
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beginning	 with	 that	 of	 free	 subjectivity,	 thus	 of	 emancipation	 as	 ordered	 by	 these	
concepts)’	(2006,	p.	112).	In	my	final	chapter	I	will	explore	in	more	detail	my	proposal	
that	the	most	significant	forms	of	spectral	effects,	and	‘exappropriation’,	are	to	be	found	







therefore	 its	 encounter	with	 the	 unconditional).	 In	 this	 final	 section	 I	 examine	 how	 a	










approach	 to	 scholarship,	 we	 would	 likely	 do	 well	 to	 consider	 his	 emphasis	 in	 ‘The	
University	 Without	 Condition’	 upon	 the	 ‘humanities	 to	 come’,	 a	 phrase	 that	 closely	
resembles	‘democracy	to	come’.		
However,	as	I	have	also	worked	to	articulate,	he	argues	that	we	are	faced	by	an	aporia	









within	 the	 natural	 sciences	 such	 as	 ‘genetics,	 natural	 science,	 medicine,	 and	 even	
mathematics’	 (2001a,	 p.	 50).	 He	 argues	 that	 while	 they	 do	 not	 explicitly	 refer	 to	 the	
humanities,	 there	 are	 nonetheless	 those	 within	 these	 departments	 that	 will	 ‘take	
seriously’	 questions	 about	 the	 implications	 of	 science	 for	 humanity.	 However,	 shortly	
before	making	this	claim	he	makes	two	qualifying	statements.		
Firstly,	 that	 this	 interdisciplinarity	 should	 not	 mean	 that	 distinctions	 between	 the	
departments	should	be	collapsed	in	a	way	that	would	satisfy	those	wishing	to	reduce	the	
number	of	faculty	that	are	employed	and,	as	such,	diminish	the	diversity	of	endeavours	








with	 multiplicities	 that	 he	 identifies	 in	 the	 humanities.	 Here	 I	 identify	 four	 main	
contributions	 by	 cultural	 studies:	 1)	 it	 has	 historically	 been	 characterised	 by	 the	
interrogation	of	 the	western	 tradition	(a	concern	 that	has	been	so	central	 to	Derrida’s	
project),	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 it	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	marginalisation	 and	 oppression	 of	
individuals	and	communities;	2)	it	retains,	today,	a	certain	disciplinary	sovereignty	that	
provides	a	basis	 for	 the	examination	of	 the	humanities,	even	 if	 it	does	not	articulate	 it	
within	its	name;	3)	as	a	consequence	of	its	concern	with	the	margins,	it	has	sought	out	a	
supplementary	 examination	 of	 politics	 that	 pushes	 beyond	 the	 confines	 of	 traditional	
political	science	and	political	theory;	and	finally	4)	it	has	opened	up	questions	about	the	
politics	 of	 the	 symbolic,	 and	 therefore	 explored	 a	 liminal	 space	 that	 has	 a	 particular	
affinity	with	Derrida’s	concept	of	spectrality.	






My	 attention	 turns	 here	 to	 a	 volume	 of	 the	 online	 journal	 Culture	 Machine	 titled	
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‘Deconstruction	 is/in	 Cultural	 Studies’.	 In	 this	 volume	 Derrida’s	 dismissive	 line	 about	
cultural	 studies	 is	 frequently	 deployed	 as	 a	 point	 of	 departure	 for	 discussion,	 and	 it	
involves	arguments	in	favour	of	a	deconstructive	cultural	studies	as	well	as	those	that	side	
with	Derrida’s	gesture	(Herbrechter,	2004;	Kamuf,	2004).	Here	I	will	focus	upon	Peggy	










in	 institutionalising	 the	 progressive	 elements	 of	 cultural	 studies.	 Nonetheless,	 she	
develops	 Readings’	 argument	 by	 arguing	 that	 cultural	 studies	 provides	 an	 ‘incredible	
alibi’	for	a	desire	to	be	accepted	by	authority	through	the	legitimacy	that	is	bestowed	by	











‘as	 if’	as	a	 ‘politics	of	the	virtual’	(2001a,	p.	31).	Derrida,	 I	will	note	again,	works	to	go	












Without	 Condition’	 that	while	 the	 humanities	 have	 promise	 it	 is	 also	 the	 case	 that	 in	
practice	 they	are	generally	unfulfilled	and	that	 they	are	at	 the	service	of	new	forms	of	














Here	 Spivak	 identifies	 two	 issues	 with	 cultural	 studies.	 Firstly,	 that	 it	 has	 been	
incorporated	within	academic	disciplines	such	as	Comparative	Literature,	Area	Studies,	
History,	 and	 Anthropology,	 disciplines	 that	 she	 suggests	 are	 far	 more	 congruent	 and	
complicit	with	capitalisation	and	the	legacies	of	colonialism	(2000,	p.	30).	Secondly,	is	the	





specifically	 she	 refers	 to	 how	 Subaltern	 Studies	was	 influenced	 by	 Antonio	 Gramsci’s	
theory	 of	 ‘counter-hegemony’	 (the	 promotion	 of	 alternative	 forms	 of	 ideology	 and	
culture)	and	the	‘organic	intellectual’	(the	intellectual	that	supports	such	a	project).	This	
is	interesting	here	because	of	how	counter-hegemony	and	the	organic	intellectual	were	





suggests	 that	 a	 new	 deconstructive	 cultural	 studies	 that	 acknowledges	 their	 radical	
project	 but	 negotiates	 the	 pitfalls	 of	 the	 idealisation	 of	 difference	might	 take	 place	 in	




I	 would	 even	 go	 so	 far	 as	 to	 say	 that,	 with	 its	 concern	 for	 anti-	 and	 inter-
disciplinarity,	emphasis	on	‘practical’	politics,	its	relation	to	popular	culture,	
the	everyday	and	the	other	(be	it	seen	in	terms	of	sexuality	or	gender,	race	or	
ethnicity	 or	whatever),	 and	willingness	 to	 be	 ‘adventurous’	 and	 ‘ambitious’	
and	 to	 use	 ‘continental	 theory’	 (such	 as	 that	 of	 Derrida)	 (…)	 to	 innovate	
‘outside	the	scholarly	tradition’	(McRobbie)	–	not	to	mention	its	self-conscious	






time	 or	 space	 to	 qualify,	 and	which	 is	 incongruent	with	my	 attention	 in	 this	 thesis	 to	
theory.	 However,	 without	 wishing	 to	 diminish	 the	 importance	 of	 attention	 to	 how	
questions	of	the	 improper	relate	to	questions	of	the	oppressed	and	the	marginalised,	 I	
nonetheless	wish	to	turn	here	to	an	emphasis	upon	Cultural	Studies’	examination	of	the	
symbolic	 and	 how	 this	 links	 up	with	Derrida’s	work	 on	 spectrality,	 as	 emphasised	 by	
Simon	Morgan	Wortham	 (2006).	Having	 set	 out	Derrida’s	 ‘deeply	 complex	 and	 highly	
ambivalent	 relationship	 to	 orthodox	 academia’	 (2006,	 p.	 1),	Wortham	 describes,	 in	 a	
fashion	that	resonates	with	Stuart	Hall’s	emphasis	upon	the	organic	intellectual,	Derrida’s	




(Group	 de	 Recherches	 sur	 L’Enseignment	 Philosophique,	 or	 Research	 Group	 on	 the	
Teaching	 of	 Philosophy),	 a	 group	 campaigning	 for	 the	 study	 of	 philosophy	 in	 French	
secondary	education	 (with	a	view	 to	 teaching	 the	 impact	 and	 implications	of	Western	
philosophy),	 Derrida’s	 ‘counter-institutional’	 approach	 worked	 to	 generate	 debates	
beyond	the	university	about	the	impact	of	philosophy	and	the	Western	tradition,	in	a	way	
that	 resembles	 to	 some	 degree	 the	 emphasis	 in	 Cultural	 Studies	 in	 the	 Birmingham	
tradition	of	studying	marginalised	groups	(2006,	p.	9).		
But,	furthermore,	Wortham	contributes	to	the	critique	of	Derrida’s	argument	that	cultural	
studies	 is	 just	 a	 ‘good-for-everything	 concept’	 (Derrida	 in	 Wortham,	 2006,	 p.	 23)	 by	
arguing,	with	reference	to	Derrida’s	text	Given	Time,	that	an	attention	to	culture	involves	
and	examination	of	the	symbolic,	which	is	in	turn	a	vital	examination	of	‘an	inextricable	




an	 obligation	 to	 register	 the	 gift,	 and	 therefore	 an	 obligation	 to	 give	 something	 back,	
otherwise	the	gift	would	not	be	registered	as	such	a	gift.	Now,	Wortham	notes	Derrida’s	
point	 that	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 an	 encounter	 with	 unknown	 risks	 ‘a	 kind	 of	 incalculable	
madness’,	 but	 he	 also	 refers	 Derrida’s	 argument	 that	 it	 demands	 a	 response,	 a	
responsibility,	and	the	question	of	what	that	responsibility	might	perhaps	entail	(2006,	




Thus,	 Wortham	 directs	 attention	 to	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 Derrida’s	 ‘new	 humanities’	
touches	upon	the	liminality	of	spectrality	(2006,	p.	26).	Furthermore,	we	are	taken	back	
to	 the	 premise	 that	 Derrida	 sets	 out	 in	 ‘Force	 of	 Law’	 (2002c),	 in	 which	 law	 makes	
deconstruction	possible.	Thus,	 for	Wortham	the	symbolic	 is	a	means	of	working	at	 the	









in	 terms	 of	 its	 relationship	with	 the	 question	 of	 affiliation.	 In	 doing	 so	 I	 have	 set	 out	
Derrida’s	 argument	 that	 scholarship	 not	 only	 provides	 the	 basis	 for	 a	 more	 nuanced	
approach	than	the	nation-state	and	cosmopolitanism	permits,	but	also	provides	the	basis	
for	 opening	 up	 some	 of	 the	 more	 discrete	 implications	 of	 contemporary	 forms	 of	
sovereignty.	Integral	to	this	proposal	is	the	hospitality	of	scholarship	to	the	conditional,	








that	scholarship	provides	 the	basis	 for	 the	exploitation	of	 lived	experience,	but	also	 to	
developments	in	human	rights	and	the	conception	of	democracy	as	a	viable	form	of	state.	
In	Section	Two	I	examine	Derrida’s	work	on	how	sovereignty	and	scholarship	should	be	
approached	 by	 comparatively	 assessing	 Derrida’s	 writing	 on	 a	 Karl	 Marx	 and	Martin	
Heidegger.	 In	 doing	 so	 I	 argue	 that	 Derrida	 is	 not	 only	 more	 sympathetic	 to	 Marx’s	
approach,	despite	substantial	reservations.	 I	examine	the	attention	that	Derrida	places	
upon	 Marx’s	 references	 to	 spectres	 to	 articulate	 the	 consequences	 of	 ideology,	
philosophy,	 history,	 technology,	 and	predominantly	 the	 capitalist	mode	of	 production,	
while	being	attentive	to	the	contradiction	of	Marx’s	dismissive	approach	to	spectres.	But	
Derrida	 contrasts	Marx’s	 approach	with	Heidegger’s	 avoidance	of	 spectres,	 and	how	a	
thread	can	be	identified	between	Heidegger’s	‘openness’	and,	firstly,	the	explicit	support	
he	gave	for	Nazism	and,	secondly,	how	he	provided	it	with	spiritual	legitimacy.	Focusing	
upon	 the	 unconditionality	 of	 the	 university	 and	 the	 attention	 that	 Derrida	 places	 on	
Marx’s	critique	of	capitalism	Section	Three	considers	how	the	university	is	affected	by	the	






conjures	 the	 spectre	 of	marginalisation.	 Here	 I	work	 to	 supplement	 this	 argument	 by	
considering	 Derrida’s	 examination	 of	 how	 scholarship	 –	 and	 more	 specifically	 the	
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academic	 position	 of	 the	 professor	 –	 sits	 in	 a	 tension	with	 the	 conception	 of	 work.	 I	
examine	 his	 argument	 that	 the	 confessional	 nature	 of	 work	 amplifies	 the	 spectre	 of	
marginalisation	that	is	essential	to	the	market,	and	how	this	threatens	scholarship	as	a	
site	of	engagement	with	the	unconditional,	the	event,	and	the	‘perhaps’.	Finally,	in	section	
four	 I	 assess	how	Derrida’s	 commitment	 to	a	 ‘new	humanities	might	 take	place	 in	 the	
contemporary	 university.	 Revisiting	 the	 promise	 of	 a	 critical	 intervention	 in	 the	
humanities	 outlined	 in	 section	 one,	 I	 argue	 that	 its	 conceptual	 relationship	 with	 the	




















broadly.	 I	 examine	 how	 they	 affect	 scholarship’s	 particular	 relationship	 with	
unconditional	hospitality.	 In	 so	doing	 I	 have	been	working	under	 the	proviso	 that	 the	


















the	 2008	 global	 financial	 crisis	 plays	 in	 this	 relationship,	 and	 possibilities	 that	 an	
encounter	with	the	media	can	have	for	a	more	hospitable	politics.	
In	Section	One	I	set	out	the	relationship	that	Derrida	identifies	between	the	media	and	the	




mediation.	 In	Section	Two	 I	 focus	upon	 this	 contradiction	more	specifically.	Returning	
again	 to	 the	 tension	 between	 examining	 contemporary	 evidence	 over	 inheritance,	 I	

















there	 is	 a	 secretion	 of	 actions	 such	 as	 filtering,	 selecting,	 and	 organising,	 actions	 that	













































essay	 ‘Différance’	 (1982a)	by	 including	an	attention	 to	 ‘information’	and,	 in	particular,	
“live”	broadcast.	His	suggestion	 in	 ‘Artifactualities’	 is	 that	attention	needs	 to	be	placed	








It	 is	 problematic	 enough	 for	 Derrida	 here	 that	 contemporary	 media	 outmanoeuvres	
analysis,	but	he	also	suggests	that	there	is	an	intersection	between	the	political	economy	
















media	were	being	manipulated	by	 the	ethno-religious	 forces,	he	also	 suggests	 that	we	
need	to	consider	how	there	is	an	affinity	with	the	economic	concentration	of	‘information	
and	broadcast	capital’	(2002,	p.	5).		
On	 the	 one	 hand	 Derrida	 asserts	 that	 attention	 should	 be	 placed	 upon	 how	 Europe	
ignored	the	rise	of	nationalism	because	its	‘only	reality	(...)	is	economic	and	national,	and	
whose	only	law,	in	the	case	of	alliances	as	well	as	conflicts,	remains	that	of	the	market’	
(2002,	 p.	 5).	 But	 on	 the	 other	hand,	 there	 is	 also	 an	 affinity	 between	nationalism,	 the	
emphasis	upon	the	accumulation	of	capital	 (and	why	an	emphasis	upon	capital	has	 its	
limitations),	and	concentration	 in	what	Derrida	calls	 ‘artifactuality’.	 	A	portmanteau	of	
‘artefact’	 and	 ‘actuality’	 that	 attempts	 to	 articulate	 the	 artificiality	 and	 particular	











of	 contemporary	 teletechnologies	 (2002,	 p.	 5).	 The	 task,	 therefore,	 is	 to	 examine	how	
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real	 actuality’.	 This	 may	 at	 first	 seem	 a	 contradiction,	 since	 Derrida	 argues	 that	 the	
artifactual	is	characterised	by	the	masking	of	its	very	artifactuality.	The	role	of	the	‘virtual	
image,	virtual	space,	and	so	virtual	event’,	and	how	it	can	‘no	longer	be	opposed,	in	perfect	
philosophical	serenity,	 to	actual	reality’,	 indicates	how	the	obsession	with	“live”	 is	at	a	









how	 contemporary	 media	 technologies	 can	 provide	 the	 basis	 for	 a	 turn	 to	 the	 body,	
Derrida	 turns	 here	 to	 the	manner	 in	 which	 the	 French	 Far	 Right	 have	 gained	 appeal	
amongst	voters	traditionally	sympathetic	to	the	politics	of	the	Left.	Specifically,	Derrida	
describes	 Jean-Marie	 Le	 Pen’s	 attacks	 on	 the	 “free-trade-ism”,	 and	 “economic	









Nonetheless,	 it	 also	 indicates	 how	 difficult	 it	 is	 to	 examine	 politics	 from	 a	 scholarly	












inheritance.	 For	 while	 Derrida	 refers	 to	 the	 movement	 towards	 the	 virtual	 and	 ideal	
media	forms,	there	is	not	a	great	deal	of	detail	about	specific	teletechnological	forms.	
In	 the	 interview	 conducted	 by	 Bernard	 Stiegler	 that	 follows	 ‘Artifactualities’	 in	
Echographies	of	Television	Derrida’s	reluctance	to	disassociate	contemporary	media	from	




encourages	 Derrida	 to	 elaborate	 upon	 why	 he	 refers	 to	 ‘teletechnology’,	 and	 Derrida	
explains	that	his	intention	is	to	articulate	that	‘what	appears	to	be	most	alive,	most	live’	
nonetheless	 retains	 	 the	 element	 of	 ‘différance	 or	 delay,	 the	 time	 it	 takes	 to	 exploit,	
broadcast,	 or	 distribute	 it’	 (2002,	 p.	 39).	 Stiegler	 asks	 whether	 the	 resonance	 of	 live	
transmission	with	lived	experience	–	being	–	is	really	possible,	hinting	at	the	argument	
that	 he	 sharpens	 elsewhere	 (Stiegler,	 2001)	 that	 Derrida	 overlooks	 the	 theoretical	
possibility	for	–	and	empirical	evidence	that	strongly	suggests	that	–	technologies	have	
developed	 to	 the	 point	 at	 which	 only	 a	 commitment	 to	 an	 alternative	 counter-
technological	 project	 can	 suffice	 (2002,	 p.	 39).	 But	 Derrida	 responds	 that	 while	 it	 is	
tempting	 to	 commit	 to	 a	 specific	 approach	 to	 the	 technological,	 there	 is	 always	 a	





whether	 there	should	be	an	emphasis	upon	articulating	more	 favourable	 inheritances,	
supported	 by	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 nation-state.	 However,	 Derrida	 argues,	 on	 the	
contrary	that	‘we	must	awaken	to	critical	vigilance	with	regard	to	the	politics	of	memory:	
we	must	 practice	 a	 politics	 of	memory	 and,	 simultaneously,	 in	 the	 same	movement,	 a	
critique	of	the	politics	of	memory’	(2002,	p.	63).	To	do	this	Derrida	suggests	that	there	
needs	 to	 remain	 an	 emphasis	 upon	 a	 vigilance	 that	 goes	 beyond	 specific	 modes	 of	














West	 and	 the	 United	 States	 with	 the	 teletechnological	 through	 its	 affiliation	 with	 an	


































technologies	 today,	 he	 questions	 the	 integrity	 that	 these	 technologies	 have.	 Here	 he	




hear	 yourself-speaking’	 (2000,	 p.	 91).	 There	 is	 always	 concern	 that	 the	 utterance	 of	
decision	what	we	wish	to	be	disseminated	or	affected	will	not	take	place.	So,	he	maintains	




this	 sense	 of	 insecurity	 threads	 through	 the	 questions	 of	 the	 filial,	 the	 familial,	 the	
patriarchal,	 the	 territorial,	 and	 the	 national,	 and	 ultimately	 the	 political.	 However,	 in	
doing	so	he	also	makes	important	comments	about	how	the	media	can	be	a	site	of	the	
political	 in	ways	 that	are	not	acknowledged.	To	set	out	 such	a	 situation	he	 turns	here	
Sophocles’	Oedipus	at	Colonus.	Specifically,	Derrida	discusses	Oedipus’	request	to	Theseus	
that	 his	 daughters,	 Antigone	 and	 Ismene,	 be	 shielded	 from	 the	 knowledge	 of	 his	 final	
resting	place,	such	that	they	will	always	have	his	memory.	However,	as	Derrida	suggests,	
this	 is	 both	 a	 considerable	 gift	 and	 wounding,	 since	 Oedipus	 essentially	 traps	 his	
daughters	 in	 a	 condition	 of	 ambiguity,	 mourning	 an	 inability	 to	 mourn	 properly.	 For	
Derrida	this	story	articulates	a	link	between	the	patriarchal	bond	that	Sophocles	imagines	
and	the	manners	in	which	phantasms	of	fraternity,	ethnicity,	and	nationality	demand	a	







So,	 Derrida’s	 approach	 to	 hospitality	 does	 not	 begin	with	 any	 intrinsic	 spectre	 of	 the	
foreigner,	but	rather	the	spectre	of	language’s	uncertainty	–	a	disruption	to	being	unable	
to	hear	oneself	speak.	Thus,	it	is	in	this	sense	that	there	can	be	a	paradoxical	situation	in	
which	 there	 is	 a	 trajectory	 towards	 media	 forms	 that	 provide	 for	 the	 secretion	 of	
inheritances	but	also	do	so	in	such	spectacular	and	global	ways.	This	returns	us	to	the	





close	 links	 between	 globalisation	 and	 Christianity,	 or	 what	 he	 prefers	 to	 call	
‘globalatinization’	 (2002a,	 p.	 50).	 Derrida’s	 concern	 with	 ‘globalatinization’,	 and	 its	
dissemination	primarily	 from	 the	United	 States,	 is	 pursued	 in	 a	 number	 of	 texts	 from	
‘Faith	and	Knowledge’	(2002a)	onwards	(2005b;	Borradori	and	Derrida,	2003),	but	here	




think	 that	 it	would	 translate	 into	 today’s	media	 landscape	 as	 an	 injunction	 to	 exclude	
journalists	(hence	‘above	all,	no	journalists’)	(2001b,	p.	56).	It	would	be	an	‘unconditional	
secret’	in	which	everything	would	be	subsumed	within	the	secret	(2001b,	p.	56,	italics	in	









–	 and	 specifically	 the	various	Protestantisms	–	 in	 the	United	States,	because	of	how	 it	






in	 a	 space	 that	 as	 a	 result	 is	 neither	 private	 nor	 secret’	 (2001b,	 p.	 61).	 However,	 a	
contradiction	that	Derrida	identifies	here	is	that	there	is	a	secretion	of	the	mechanism	of	
mediation.	With	Christianity	the	negotiation	of	spectres	is	to	be	found	in	the	manner	in	




in	which	 this	 promise	 of	 the	media	 continues	 to	 summon	 the	 presence	 of	 that	which	
threatens	to	disturb	it.		




characterised	 by	 a	 contradiction	 in	 which	 ‘technology	 is	 used	 to	 protest	 against	
technology.	Television	always	involves	a	protest	against	television:	television	pretends	to	
efface	itself,	to	deny	television.	It	is	expected	to	show	the	thing,	“live”,	directly	‘	(2001b,	p.	
62).	 If	 attention	 is	 therefore	 places	 upon	 the	 proficiency	 of	 media	 technologies,	 it	 is	
therefore	 accompanied	 by	 a	 secret	 that	 they	 can	 never	 be	 enough.	 He	 suggests	 that	
attention	 should	 be	 placed	 upon	 the	manner	 in	which	 televangelism	manifests	 in	 the	
United	States	offers	the	Good	News,	and	how	it	indicates	a	certain	interaction	between	
capitalism,	Christianity,	and	tele-technological,	but	he	also	suggests	that	attention	needs	
to	 be	 placed	 upon	 the	manner	 in	which	 CNN	offers	 a	 secular	 access	 to	 the	miracle	 of	
mediation.	This	secretion	of	authority	would	therefore	lead	Derrida	to	suggest	that	it	is	
important	 to	 protest,	 at	 certain	 moments,	 ‘against	 the	 cosmopolitical	 tendencies	 of	




Important	 here	 is	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 religious	 extremisms	 today	 involve	 a	
departure	 from	 the	 religious	 in	 a	more	 traditional	 sense.	 They	 are	made	 possible	 by	
interactions	with	contemporary	media.	This	happens,	Derrida	tells	us,	through	how	they	









with	 the	 interaction	between	questions	 of	 being,	 even	when	 concerned	with	 concepts	
such	 as	 the	 secret	 or	 the	 spirit.	 These	 would	 manifest,	 he	 points	 out,	 in	 terms	 of	 a	






and	Knowledge’	 that	 the	 ‘new	wars	of	 religion’	 are	derived	 from	 the	 teletechnological	
capacities	of	‘digital	culture,	jet	and	TV’	(2002a,	pp.	61-62).	If	we	focus	upon	the	way	in	
which	 the	 teletechnological	 threatens	 certain	 forms	 of	 secret	 –	 of	 nation,	 community,	
religious	community	–	my	suggestion	here	 is	 that	we	would	do	well	 to	 focus	upon	the	
underlying	framework	for	Derrida’s	approach	to	the	political	disruption	brought	about	by	
teletechnological	developments:	that	in	‘a	more	or	less	secret	fashion,	and	thus	more	or	
less	public,	 there	where	 this	 frontier	between	 the	public	 and	 the	private	 is	 constantly	
being	displaced,	remaining	less	assured	than	ever,	as	the	limit	that	would	permit	one	to	
identify	 the	 political’	 (2006,	 p.	 63).	 There	 is	 a	 disruption	 of	 the	 onto-theological	 here	


































of,	 for	example,	 ‘the	surge	of	“Islam”	 ’,	can	only	really	be	addressed	by	considering	the	
imposition	 of	 a	 ‘borderline’	 between	 the	 internal	 and	 the	 external,	 the	 relationship	
between	secret	and	teletechnological:	‘the	passageway	between	this	interior	and	all	the	




ways	 in	which	a	 return	 to	 identity	and	 the	home	are	 inscribed.	 In	 so	doing,	 there	 is	 a	
certain	provocation	to	think	how	contemporary	media	in	the	west	are	underpinned	by	
forms	 of	 faith	 that	 operate	 at	 a	 remove	 from	 considerations	 of	 difference	 and	 justice.	
However,	there	are	also	more	serious	concerns	about	where	a	dependence	upon	certain	































that	 there	 are	 new	 teletechnological	 affiliations.	 In	 the	 interview	 ‘Echographies	 of	
Television’	(Derrida	and	Stiegler,	2002).	Here	he	asserts	that	the	importance	of	a	‘right	of	
inspection’	 because	 of	 how,	 even	 when	 he	 is	 at	 home,	 he	 feels	 subject	 to	 ‘all	 these	
machines	and	all	these	prostheses	watching,	surrounding,	seducing	us,	[such	as]	the	quote	
“natural”	conditions	of	expression,	discussion,	reflection,	deliberation	are	to	a	large	extent	
breached,	 falsified,	 warped’	 (2002,	 p.	 32).	 Thus,	 contemporary	 teletechnological	
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developments	 have	 come	 to	 affect	 the	 traditional	 ‘rhythm’	 of	 inspection	 and	 for	









‘was	always	 the	 case,	but	 today	 the	accelerated	deployment	of	particular	 technologies	
increases	more	rapidly	than	ever	the	scope	and	power	of	what	is	called	private	sociality,	
far	 beyond	 the	 territory	 of	 measurable-surveyable	 space’	 (2000,	 p.	 57).	 Specifically,	
Derrida	draws	attention	to	how	this	occurs	‘through	the	phone,	the	fax,	e-mail,	and	the	
Internet,	 etc’	 (2000,	 p.	 57).	 Here	 we	 have	 two	 phenomena	 that	 I	 have	 referred	 to	 in	
Chapter	Three	already	which	I	think	are	worth	recalling.	Firstly,	the	troubling	of	nation-
state,	 and	 the	manner	 in	which	 it	 articulates	 the	division	between	 the	private	and	 the	
public	–	how	the	nation-state	is	‘suddenly	smaller,	weaker	than	these	non-state	private	
powers’	(2000,	p.	57).	This	is	the	basis	for	the	new	affiliation	of	the	teletechnological.	But	
before	 setting	 this	 out	 it	 is	worth	 considering	how,	 secondly,	 there	 is	 a	 reaction	 from	




In	 its	 attempts	 to	 counteract	 challenges	 to	 its	 sovereignty	 from	 contemporary	
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With	 the	 spectre	 Derrida	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 a	 certain	 homogeneity	 shared	 by	 the	
sovereignty	 of,	 for	 instance,	 the	 nation-state,	 and	 counter-forces	 (be	 they	 criminal,	
insurgent,	 or	 emancipatory	 forces).	 But	 if	 there	 are	 effects	 that	 make	 it	 particularly	




notion	 of	 the	 event:	 ‘It	 is	 also	made	more	manifest	 by	what	 inscribes	 the	 speed	 of	 a	
virtuality	 irreducible	 to	 the	opposition	of	 the	act	 and	 the	potential	 in	 the	 space	of	 the	






the	 event,	 supplements	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 event	 is	 bound	 up	 with	 questions	 of	
unconditionality,	and	therefore	how	teletechnological	is	subject	to	différance.	However,	













What	 are	 these	 phantasms,	 or	 rather,	 which	 phantasms	 should	 be	 given	 particular	











of	 democratic	 sovereignty	 that	 privileges	 the	 taking	 of	 decisions	 over	 the	 defence	 of	
justice.	In	this	way	we	are	presented	with	a	type	of	sovereignty	that	can	make	use	of	the	
diversity	 of	 decision-making	 opportunities	 that	 accompany	 developments	 in	









occasional	 acts	 of	 affiliation	 with	 liberal	 democracy	 we	 might	 be	 concerned	 about	 a	
certain	privileging	of	 the	West	here.	However,	 this	would	be	 to	overlook	a	 subtle	 and	
important	point.	That	 is,	 that	 those	who	have	access	 to	 taking	decisions	are	attributed	
sovereignty,	while	 those	who	 are	 not	 are	 denied	 it.	Moreover,	 if	we	 consider	 that	 the	
sovereignty	of	liberal	democracy	and	freedom	is	being	supplemented	through	advances	













and	 knowledge,	 such	 that	 religious	 extremism	 can	 be	 just	 as	 concerned	 with	 ‘the	
calculable	 and	 the	 incalculable’	 as	 what	 might	 seem	 more	 secular	 scientific	 and	
technological	projects	 (2002a,	p.	 90).	 It	 is	 in	 relation	 to	 this	 combination	of	 corporeal	
politics	and	calculation	that	Derrida	suggests	that	the	sectarian	politics	of	Judaism,	Islam,	
and	Christianity	are	concerned	with	questions	of	demographics	(2002a,	p.	90).		
More	 specifically,	 Derrida	 suggests	 that	 the	 politics	 of	 spectres	 can	 be	 more	 fully	
examined	by	considering	 its	articulations	of	 ‘violent	sundering’	and	 ‘counter-fetishism’	
(2002a,	p.	92).		‘Violent	sundering’	in	that	there	is	a	violence	committed	against	some	form	
of	 ‘originary	 physis’	 (2002a,	 p.	 92).	 Firstly,	 violence	 against	 ‘originary	 physis’	 means	
violences	against	an	entity	that	is	‘authentically	generative,	sacred,	unscathed,	“safe	and	












Texts	 such	 as	 ‘Above	 All,	 No	 Journalists’	 and	 ‘Faith	 and	 Knowledge’	 allude	 to	 the	
complicity	 of	 the	 West	 with	 religious	 extremism,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 own	 Christian	
fundamentalism,	 but	 also	 the	 secreted	 religiosity	 of	 technology,	 and	 teletechnology	
specifically.	 For	Derrida	we	undoubtedly	 need	 to	 be	 vigilant	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 extremism.		
However,	he	also	argues	that	in	order	to	respond	to	it	in	more	responsible	ways	we	need	
to	 also	 consider	 how	 they	 are	 the	 continuation	 of	 attempts	 to	 live	 with	 the	













sectarianism,	 is	 that	 the	 teletechnological,	 and	 by	 extension	 the	 inheritance	 of	 the	




with	 his	 approach	 to	 the	 promise	 of	 Europe,	 that	 Derrida	 identifies	 promise	 in	 the	
teletechnological	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 possibilities,	 alliances,	 and	 solidarities	 that	 have	
otherwise	not	been	considered.	My	reading	here	being	that,	firstly,	attention	needs	to	be	
placed	upon	how	the	analysis	of	the	teletechnological	offers	the	most	advanced	means	
addressing	 the	 secretion	 of	 the	 theological	 through	 the	 teletechnological,	 but	 also,	
secondly,	 that	 this	 exposes	 the	 promise	 that	 the	 teletechnological	 expresses	 the	most	
sophisticated	 response	 to	 the	 incompleteness	of	 sovereignty.	 In	my	 final	 section	 I	will	
explore	 the	 particular	 relationship	 that	 Derrida	 sets	 out	 between	 teletechnological	
advances	and	his	conception	of	‘democracy	to	come’.	
4. Tele-technological	Dissonances	
So,	 despite	 all	 the	dire	warnings	 that	Derrida	 explores	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 expansion	of	
spectral	effects,	from	the	politics	of	the	nation-state	to	scholarship	and	more	traditional	
forms	 of	 writing,	 Derrida	 ultimately	 argues	 that	 the	 provocation	 of	 questions	 of	
sovereignty	and	affiliation	should	be	viewed	as	a	moment	of	promise.	He	suggests	that	an	
emphasis	 be	 placed	 upon	 exploring	 the	 inheritance	 to	 the	 responsibility,	 or	 ‘right	 of	
inspection’	 that	 is	 derived	 from	 teletechnology’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 secret.	 My	
suggestion	here	is	to	focus	upon	how	Derrida	focuses	his	attention	to	acts	of	‘sharing’	that,	





the	manner	 in	which,	 as	 I	 set	 out	 in	my	previous	 sections,	 they	 provoke	 fundamental	
questions	about	faith,	and	subsequently	regenerate	questions	of	political	affiliation.	That	
said,	the	questions	of	their	conceptual	possibility	and	their	likelihood	are	very	different.	
My	 suggestion	 here	 is	 that	 when	 approaching	 Derrida’s	 promotion	 of	 a	 ‘right	 of	
inspection’	we	should	bear	in	mind	his	claims	about	concepts	such	as	responsibility	and,	







need	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 act	 of	 taking	 decisions,	 and	 of	 choosing	 how	 to	 use	
teletechnologies.	Moreover,	contrary	to	Bernard	Stiegler’s	argument	that	the	 ‘technical	




Derrida	 asserts	 that	 within	 the	 disturbance	 of	 traditions	 there	 is	 a	 questioning	 of	









contemporary	 teletechnologies	displace	 interpretations	of	place,	 impose	 incompetence	
and	a	sense	of	marginalisation,	and	sets	up	 the	basis	 for	 the	return	of	so	many	ghosts	
(2002,	 p.	 57).	 But	 this	 proliferation	 also	 indicates	 how	 the	 ‘information’	 and	
‘communications’,	 otherwise	 attributed	 such	 integrity,	 are	 altered	 and	 transformed	
through	discrete	interpretations	(2002,	p.	58).		
This	 says	 something	broader	 about	how	 the	use	of	 contemporary	 teletechnologies	 for	
regressive	political	forces	should	not	be	classified	as	a	‘reappropriation’	of	forms	that	owe	






this	 condition	 of	 différance	 holds	 promise.	 Here	 the	 possibilities	 of	 teletechnologies	














every	 day	 –	 both	 as	 a	 threat	 and	 as	 a	 chance.	 Every	 time	 we	 turn	 on	 the	








unlike	 the	 restrictions	 of	 community,	 ‘if	 by	 community	 one	 understands	 a	 unity	 of	
languages,	of	cultural,	ethnic,	or	religious	horizons’	(2002,	p.	66).		
How	 then	 to	 focus	 upon	 sharing	 that	 precedes	 the	 boundaries	 and	 boundedness	 of	
community?	 Firstly,	 we	 might	 consider	 here	 Derrida’s	 arguments	 in	 ‘Faith	 and	
Knowledge’	about	how,	before	being	bound	in	religious	community,	there	is	a	necessity	
of	 a	 ‘fiduciary	 “link”	 ‘	 that	 links	 ‘pure	 singularities	 prior	 to	 any	 social	 or	 political	





in	 relation	 to	 globalization,	 or	 rather	 ‘globalatinization’.	 More	 specifically,	 how	
globalization,	 despite	 its	 claims	 to	 heterogeneity,	 ultimate	 ‘dissimulates’	 difference	 by	
















teletechnologies	 for	 authoritarian	 policies	 both	 domestically	 and	 internationally,	 we	
might	suggest	that	this	is	rather	naïve.	However,	Derrida’s	discussion	of	the	relationship	
between	evidence	and	testimony	suggests	to	me	that	there	remains	an	opening	up	of	the	
question	of	 authority,	 even	 if	 it	 seems	unlikely	 to	deliver	 a	more	progressive	political	















–	 or	 rather	 ‘reopens	 the	 question	 of	 testimony’	 (2002,	 p.	 90).	 This	 consideration	 of	
testimony,	 for	 Derrida,	 more	 broadly	 reopens	 questions	 about	 credit,	 debt,	 and	 faith.	
However,	more	surgically,	for	Derrida	it	is	particularly	important,	from	the	perspective	of	
considering	spectrality,	to	consider	how	it	opens	up	questions	about	the	significance	of	
corporeal	 identity.	 He	 proposes	 that	 there	 have	 been	 positive	 developments	 in	 the	
medical	media	of	‘radiography,	scanners,	and	grafts’	that	have	enabled	an	emancipatory	
transformation	of	‘our	body	and	our	relationship	to	our	body’	(2002,	p.	96).	
Now,	 if	 spectres	 trouble	 the	 body,	we	might	 be	 concerned	here	 that	 there	might	 be	 a	
destabilization	of	human	rights,	and	that	 the	 transformation	of	 the	body	might	benefit	
some	but	lead	to	new	forms	of	marginalisation	and	oppression	for	others.	However,	for	



















is	 an	 articulation	 of	 democracy’s	 failure	 as	 much	 as	 its	 progressive	 possibility.	 That	








intervention,	 and	 selecting	 in	 the	 media,	 but	 he	 also	 emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	
recognizing	that	democracy	is	underway	through	the	media.		
Thus,	as	J	Hillis	Miller	emphasises,	while	the		
Spectral	 cyberspace	 in	which	 so	many	 people	 around	 the	world	more	 and	
more	 live	has,	willy-nilly,	 transformed	politics	and	is	weakening	the	nation-
state	and	party-politics,	it	also	is	the	space	within	which	the	“link	of	affinity,	
suffering,	 and	 hope”	 that	 Derrida	 calls	 the	 New	 International	 is,	 through	
innumerable	 e-mails,	 openings	 of	 websites,	 use	 of	 chat	 rooms,	 and	mobile	
phone	 conversations,	 allowing	 those	 almost	 clandestine	 alliances,	 without	
name,	without	party,	without	country,	without	class	affiliation,	without	status,	
to	form	themselves,	across	all	national	borders	and	across	all	barriers	of	class,	
race,	 and	 gender.	 The	 new	 regime	 of	 tele-communications	 allows	 these	
alliances	 to	 form	 and	 then	 to	 perform	 their	 counter-conjurations	 of	 that	






upon	 how	 traditional	 forms	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 affiliation	 are	 destabilized	 by	 the	
spectrality	of	2008.		
My	suggestion	here	then	is	to	take	the	destabilising	implications	of	the	spectrality	of	2008	
as	 a	 chance	 for	 an	 alternative	 politics.	 The	 destabilization	 of	 traditional	 notions	 of	
sovereignty	and	affiliation	can	no	doubt	demands	a	consideration	of	inheritances	that	can	
result	in	the	manifestations	of	phenomena	such	as	the	return	of	the	religious.	Moreover,	
we	 should	 be	 attentive	 to	 how	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 such	 inheritances	 provides	 for	







it	 is	 to	be	 located	 in	 its	disruptive	dissonances	 rather	 specific	 forms	of	alternatives	or	
resistances.	 The	 latter	 risks	 short-circuiting	 ongoing	 practices	 of	 sharing,	 and	
subsequently	 the	 chance	 of	 a	more	 hospitable	 politics.	 As	 such,	 I	would	 instead	 draw	
attention	to	the	religious	question	of	the	link;	of	the	moment	at	which	faith	opens	up	to	











that	we	 should	not	be	 as	pessimistic	 as	 the	 theorists	 that	 I	 discuss	 in	Chapter	One,	 in	
particular	Theodor	Adorno	and	Fredric	Jameson,	but	also	in	a	more	complex	sense	Walter	
Benjamin	and	Jean	Baudrillard,	Derrida	identifies	issues	that	help	to	explain	the	violence	








By	 focusing	upon	 the	 relationship	between	 the	media	and	 its	discrete	acts	of	decision	
making	I	suggest	that	there	 is	a	particular	relationship	between	Derrida’s	work	on	the	
media	and	his	work	on	inheritance.	With	an	emphasis	upon	concepts	like	the	secret	and	
inheritance,	 my	 attention	 therefore	 turns	 to	 the	 relationship	 that	 Derrida	 explores	
between	the	media	and	the	religious,	as	a	question	of	origins.	In	Section	Two	I	examine	
how	Derrida	explores	the	ramifications	of	these	arguments	through	an	analysis	of	how	
they	 intersect	 with	 considerations	 of	 the	 inheritance	 of	 Christianity,	 and	 specifically	
Protestant	evangelistic	Christianity	found	emanating	from	the	United	States.	I	discuss	his	
argument	 that	 of	 all	 the	 Abrahamic	 religions,	 the	 developments	 in	 teletechnologies	
indicate	the	development	of	a	globalised	Christianity	because	of	the	particular	emphasis	

























In	 my	 previous	 substantive	 chapters	 I	 have	 explored	 a	 deconstructive,	 expositional	
approach	that	aims	to	be	what	Derrida	calls	‘more	than	critical’	(Derrida,	2001a,	p.	26).	I	
have	 investigated	 Derrida’s	 proposal	 that	 an	 ethico-political	 project	 can	 be	 served	 by	
deconstructing	 specific	 issues	 and	 events	 such	 as	 the	 spectrality	 of	 the	 2008	 global	
financial	crisis	by	turning	to	questions	of	inheritance	to	explore	the	terrain	of	the	political.	
In	doing	so	I	have	examined	the	political	in	the	traditional	sense	of	its	relationship	with	
government	 and	 the	 nation-state,	 scholarship,	 and	 the	 media.	 In	 each	 chapter	 I	 have	
developed	my	examination	of	questions	of	spectres	and	inheritance	to	work	to	identify	
the	 locations	 and	 means	 of	 political	 interventions.	 Moreover,	 it	 has	 engaged	 with	
Derrida’s	argument	that	attention	be	placed	upon	the	condition	of	sovereignty	rather	than	
idealising	 certain	 forms	 of	 resistance	 or	 suffering.	 This	 has	 led	 me	 to	 engage	 with	
Derrida’s	arguments	about	the	significance	of	the	inheritance	of	an	interaction	between	
faith	and	knowledge	–	the	‘two	sources’	(2002a).	So,	this	thesis	has	taken	the	crisis	of	2008	
as	 a	 starting	 point	 and	 a	 provocation	 but	 is	 has	made	 a	 case	 for	 an	 engagement	with	
theories	of	inheritance	to	progress	from	that	starting	point.		
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 work	 to	 take	 a	 step	 back	 and	 reflect	 upon	 my	 findings.	 I	 do	 so	 by	
consulting	 the	 works	 of	 three	 writers,	 Richard	 Beardsworth,	 Bernard	 Stiegler,	 and	
Michael	Naas,	that	reach	very	different	conclusions	to	those	that	I	develop	and	in	relation	
to	 the	 three	 themes	 that	 frame	 my	 previous	 substantive	 chapters.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
Beardsworth	 (on	 the	 politics	 of	 the	 nation-state)	 and	 Stiegler	 (on	 scholarship)	 they	
present	 critiques	 of	 Derrida’s	 work,	 while	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Michael	 Naas	 he	 presents	 a	
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distinct	 approach	 to	 the	 question	 of	 inheritance	 and	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 media.	
Subsequently	I	divide	this	chapter	into	three	sections,	one	for	each	of	my	previous	three	









contributions	 to	 defending	 and	 strengthening	 the	 rights	 of	 citizens	 in	 contemporary	
societies.	 In	 response	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 overlooks	 some	 very	 important	 questions	 that	
Derrida	 raises	 about	 the	 limitations	 of	 cosmopolitanism,	 and	 how	 this	 feeds	 into	 an	










that	 he	 risks	 abrogating	 responsibility	 to	 a	 certain	messianicity	 that	 plays	 around	 the	
technological	representation	of	events.		
1. Richard	Beardsworth:	Hospitality	and	Cosmopolitanism	
In	 Chapter	One	 I	 discuss	 Richard	 Beardsworth’s	Derrida	 and	 the	 Political	 (1996)	 as	 a	




Hegel),	 and	 theorists	 that	 have	made	 a	 key	 contribution	 to	 theorising	 postmodernity	
(Heidegger	and	Levinas).	However,	on	the	other	hand,	 I	also	argue	that	Beardsworth’s	
criticisms	of	Derrida’s	engagement	with	politics	are	somewhat	unfair,	and	problematic	in	
their	 own	 terms.	 Specifically,	 I	 argue,	 by	 way	 of	 a	 counter-argument	 by	 Geoffrey	








politics	 in	 the	 traditional	 sense	of	 the	political	 and	his	work	on	 their	possibilities	 and	








not	 give	 enough	attention	 to	 the	manner	 in	which	metaphysics	 is	made	possible,	 and,	
subsequently	 conditioned,	 by	 technical	 apparatuses.	 Beardsworth	 acknowledges	 that	
with	 concepts	 such	 as	 différance	 and	 iterability	Derrida	 explores	 the	 issue	 of	 original	
technicity	and	that	he	deploys	this	framework	in	his	later	works	that	discuss	the	politics	
of	 the	 nation-state	 and	 democracy	 explicitly.	 However,	 Beardsworth	 also	 argues	 that	
Derrida	fails	to	go	far	enough	in	exploring	how	original	technicity	affects	the	condition	of	
the	political.		
In	 Spectres	 of	 Marx,	 Beardsworth	 suggests,	 Derrida’s	 discussion	 of	 how	 politics	 is	
destabilised	by	contemporary	spectral	effects	fails	to	consider	that	these	developments	
have	the	capacity	to	transform	the	impact	of	deconstruction	upon	an	alternative,	more	
inclusive	 political	 project	 (1996,	 pp.	 147-148).	 For	 Beardsworth	 the	 problem	
underpinning	 this	 issue	 is	 that	 Derrida’s	 emphasis	 on	 the	 trace	 undermines	 the	












aporia	 for	 Beardsworth	 is	 that	 they	 show	 that	 Derrida’s	 cosmopolitanism,	 with	 its	
emphasis	upon	exchanges	more	generally	rather	than	in	relation	to	specific	subjects,	and	
emphasis	 upon	deconstruction	 to	 inform	more	 inclusive	 decisions,	 is	 idealistic,	 overly	
focused	on	abstract	philosophical	concerns	with	‘choice	and	limit’,	and	provides	an	alibi	









scientific,	 technological,	 and	 economic	 developments	 in	 society	more	 generally,	 there	
needs	to	be	a	closer	attention	to	empirical	conditions.	As	a	consequence,	he	suggests	that	
Derrida’s	 ‘understanding	 of	 singularity	 and	 of	 political	 risk’,	 pinned	 to	 debates	 about	
metaphysics,	also	overlooks	how	the	conception	of	‘the	sovereign	individual’	is	also	tied	
to	 political	 modernity	 through	 its	 relationship	 with	 law	 (2011,	 p.	 203).	 As	 such	
Beardsworth	suggests	 that	Derrida	neglects	 the	possibilities	 that	are	presented	by	 the	
 221 
 
singular	 subject	 or	 citizen.	 Thirdly	 and	 finally,	 while	 Beardsworth	 acknowledges	 that	
liberal	 law	 risks	 dissolving	 discussions	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 liberty	 and	
equality,	he	suggests	that,	as	deconstruction	would	suggest,	‘the	other	is,	in	the	language	
of	 deconstruction,	 “always	 already”	 in	 the	 liberal	 self’	 (2011,	 pp.	 203-204).	 As	 a	
consequence,	this	relationship	can	be	drawn	out	through	careful	attention,	particularly	to	










made	possible	by	 the	community,	and	the	community	made	possible	by	 the	 individual	
(2011,	 p.	 208).	 As	 a	 result,	 Beardsworth	 also	 argues	 that	 this	 has	 repercussions	 for	
Derrida’s	theory	of	unconditional	hospitality.	This	is	because	he	argues	that	we	‘should	
therefore	not	equate,	as	Derrida	does,	incalculable	singularity	with	freedom,	and	moral,	
legal	 and	 political	 calculation	 with	 equality’	 (2011,	 p.	 208).	 So,	 for	 Beardsworth	







politics,	 found	 in	 ‘formal	 or	 numerical	 equality’	 (2011,	 p.	 209).	 By	 not	 attempting	 to	
identify	what	determines	unconditional	hospitality,	Beardsworth	suggests	that	Derrida	
allows	 singularity	 to	 ride	 free	 of	 determination,	 and	 ignore	 how	 cosmopolitanism	
conceptualises	social	differentiation	(2011,	p.	209).	Thus,	if	Derrida	favours	the	perfection	
of	 law,	he	undermines	 it	by	 focusing	upon	such	an	abstract	 conception	of	 the	political	
(2011,	p.	210).	Here	Beardsworth	refers	again	to	his	sympathy	for	the	Hegelian	emphasis	
upon	speculation	that	he	refers	to	in	Derrida	and	the	Political	by	stating	that	he	favours	
the	 ‘Hegelian	 understanding	 that	 conceptual	 limits	 provide	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	
difference’	(2011,	p.	219).	He	finds	it	problematic	that	Derrida	refuses	to	speculate	upon	
the	 constitution	 of	 that	 which	 is	 radically	 other	 to	 the	 law	 (2011,	 p.	 220).	 Here	
Beardsworth	 turns	 to	 Derrida’s	 ‘On	 Cosmopolitanism’.	 Calling	 out	 Derrida’s	 argument	
that	 cosmopolitanism	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	 limited	 offer	 of	 hospitality,	 Beardsworth	
suggests	 that	 ‘rather	 than	 developing	 a	 bolder	 cosmopolitan	 right	 of	 resort,	 Derrida	
emphasizes,	 from	a	philosophical	perspective,	 the	aporetic	 logic	of	hospitality	 through	
which	all	more	inclusive	inventions	of	hospitality	must	necessarily	pass’	(2011,	p.	220).		
The	 conclusion	 that	 Beardsworth	 reaches	 here,	 as	 in	Derrida	 and	 the	 Political,	 is	 that	
Derrida	retains	a	certain	Heideggerian	impulse	with	his	emphasis	upon	conceptions	like	
the	 promise	 of	 différance,	 the	 ‘gift’,	 democracy	 to	 come,	 and	 unconditional	 hospitality	
















Now,	as	 I	discuss	 in	Chapter	One,	Geoffrey	Bennington	has	argued	 that	Beardsworth’s	
confidence	 in	 defining	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 current	 technoscientific	 epoch	 have	 two	
problems.	Firstly,	there	is	Bennington’s	accusation	that	Beardsworth’s	claims	about	the	
effects	of	contemporary	technoscience	are	deterministic	and	deny	the	role	of	decision	(in	
the	service	of	 the	 ‘lesser	violence’),	 to	the	point	of	being	fatalistic.	But,	secondly,	 I	also	
discuss	Bennington’s	 argument	 that	Beardsworth	overlooks	Derrida’s	 contributions	 to	









about	 whether	 Derrida’s	 cosmopolitanism	 sufficiently	 links	 the	 examination	 of	
inheritance	to	a	political	project	and	is	therefore	as	practical	as	Derrida	suggests.		
To	set	up	my	consideration	of	Derrida’s	linking	of	inheritance	and	cosmopolitanism	I	will	









an	 important	 source	 of	 comparison	 for	 responding	 to	 the	 crisis	 of	 2008.	 I	 examine	
Derrida’s	argument	that	a	media	spectacle	such	as	9/11	involves	an	act	of	terror	not	only	
in	the	sense	of	the	actual	loss	of	life,	but	the	disturbance	brought	to	knowledge.	As	such	


















emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 responsibility	 towards	 examining	 inheritance	 on	 the	
basis	of	an	empirically	concerned	proposal	 that	 the	restriction	of	an	engagement	with	
inheritance	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 threat	 facing	 political	 interventions.	 For	 this	 reason,	
alongside	the	deconstruction	of	terror,	Derrida	also	undertakes	a	deconstruction	of	other	
concepts	 that	 are	 integral	 to	 the	 contemporary	 nation-state	 and	 the	 restriction	 of	 the	






more	sustained	analysis	of	 the	relationship	between	 inheritance	and	 the	political.	As	 I	
explain,	this	text	is	also	of	interest	to	Beardsworth.	He	suggests	that	it	is	a	rare	instance	
where	Derrida	emphasises	the	political	in	contrast	to	the	‘gift’	that	is	found	in	literature	




However,	 by	 contrast,	 I	 argue	 that	 Derrida’s	 discussion	 in	 ‘Force	 of	 Law’	 of	 the	
relationship	between	sovereignty	and	deconstruction	–	that	sovereignty	(or	rather	law)	







proliferation	 of	 the	 technological	 (and	 specifically	 teletechnological).	 Indeed,	 Derrida	
suggests	the	contemporary	return	of	the	religious	needs	to	be	considered	in	terms	of	a	




Furthermore,	 I	 explain	 that	 for	 Derrida	 this	 is	 not	 only	 problematic	 from	 a	 detached,	
intellectual	point	of	view.	Rather,	I	explain	that	it	provides	a	means	of	considering	how	he	
moved	towards	his	 later	 interventions	 in	contemporary	politics,	 to	 the	point	at	which,	
despite	 significant	 reservations,	 he	 is	 willing	 to	 support	 the	 acts	 of	 nation-states,	 a	





to	 the	 state),	 and	 the	 nation-state,	 can	 provide	 moments	 of	 exchange	 that	 explicitly	
inscribe	responsibilities.	The	problem	being	that	these	moments	of	exchange	are	being	
disrupted	 by	 developments	 in	 contemporary	 technologies	 and	 ideologies,	 but	 Derrida	
also	suggests	 that	 liberal	democratic	 institutions	can	provide	a	 ‘bulwark’	against	 these	
developments.	Subject	to	deconstruction	they	are	‘perfectible’.	However,	as	I	also	set	out,	
Derrida	 makes	 substantial	 arguments	 against	 liberal	 democracy,	 cosmopolitanism,	









the	 disruptive	 character	 (and	 promise)	 of	 democracy.	 Specifically,	 in	 relation	 to	
cosmopolitanism,	 Derrida	 is	 concerned	 about	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 concept	 suggests,	
through	 the	 reference	 to	 the	 ‘cosmos’,	 that	 it	 is	 both	 possible	 and	 desirable	 to	
conceptualise	 the	conditions	of	 the	world,	despite	accepting	difference	and	 the	 role	of	
faith.	That	is,	an	idealistic	framework	that	is	maintained	from	St	Paul	through	to	Kant	and	
today’s	neoliberalism.	Derrida’s	response	is	therefore	to	focus	upon	the	intersection	of	
the	 political	 and	 that	which	 it	 prohibits;	 that	which	 is	 ‘unconditional’.	 This	 calls	 for	 a	
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project	 that	 engages	with	 politics	 but	must	 also	 go	 beyond	 it,	 taking	 place	 in	 society,	





view	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 trace,	 the	 spectre,	 and	 subsequently	 unconditional	
hospitality.	In	relation	to	Beardsworth’s	claim	that	Derrida	is	inattentive	to	the	question	
of	 the	 individual	subject	and	 the	promise	of	phenomena	of	 reciprocity,	obligation,	and	
responsibility,	I	want	to	again	emphasise	here	the	importance	of	inheritance	in	Derrida’s	
work.	 This	 approach	 leads	 me	 to	 suggest	 that	 Beardsworth’s	 approach	 to	
cosmopolitanism	does	not	really	offer	a	radical	supplement	 to	 the	conditional	support	






In	 response	 to	 Beardsworth’s	 argument	 that	 to	 focus	 a	 democratic	 politics	 upon	
unconditional	 hospitality	 is	 fanciful,	 I	 think	 that	 this	 overlooks	 the	 manner	 in	 which	
Derrida	does	not	set	out	unconditional	hospitality	as	a	project	but	rather	an	articulation	
of	 the	 spectral.	 Given	 that	 Beardsworth	 references	 Derrida’s	 short	 essay	 ‘On	




argues	 that	 hospitality	 always	 involves	 a	 haunting	 of	 the	 home	 –	 a	 tension	 between	
conditional	and	unconditional	hospitality	–	such	that	ethics,	if	we	are	to	take	it	to	mean	
‘one’s	 home’,	 is	 ‘thoroughly	 coextensive	 with	 the	 experience	 of	 hospitality’,	 such	 that	
‘ethics	 is	hospitality’	(2001c,	pp.	16-17,	 italics	in	original).	But	this	approach	is,	 in	turn,	
underpinned	 by	 Derrida’s	 emphasis	 upon	 examining	 inheritance.	 As	 abstract	 from	
contemporary	political	considerations	as	 this	might	seem	(as	Beardsworth	suggests),	 I	
argue	that	Derrida’s	approach	provokes	vital	questions	about	 the	 impact	of	 terror,	 the	




In	 my	 previous	 section	 I	 therefore	 work	 to	 counter	 Beardsworth’s	 criticisms	 of	 a	
Derridean	approach	to	the	crisis	by	focusing	upon	the	contribution	that	can	be	made	from	
attention	to	inheritance,	because	of	how	this	broadens	an	awareness	of	what	the	political	

















political	 alternatives	 be	 explored	 and	 pedagogically	 disseminated,	 along	 with	 other	
ethical,	technical,	and	economic	interventions	more	generally.	But	before	I	focus	upon	the	

























ignores	 the	 contemporary	 existence	 of	 religious	 fundamentalisms	 and	 ‘secular	 faith’.	
Rather,	Stiegler	suggests	that	these	phenomena	are	‘convulsive’,	to	the	extent	that	today	
the	predominant	experience	is	one	of	‘disinheritance	and	disorientation’	(2001,	p.	238).	




For	 Stiegler	 the	 ‘arche-writing’	 that	 Derrida	 sets	 out	 in	 Of	 Grammatology	 should	 be	








Derrida	calls	 teletechnologies	–	 involve	a	play	between	 faith	and	 technicity,	Derrida	 is	
wrong	in	‘Faith	and	Knowledge’	when	he	equates	teletechnology	fully	with	science	and	




approach	 from	 Derrida	 to	 the	 work	 of	 Edmund	 Husserl	 with	 regards	 to	 memory,	 or	
‘retention’.		
If	 for	Husserl	primary	retention	refers	to	the	perception	of	certain	objects	 in	the	short	
term,	and	secondary	retention	refers	 to	 the	recollection	of	memories	 in	 the	 long	term,	
Stiegler	conceptualises	a	level	of	tertiary	retention	or	memory	that	refers	to	the	way	in	
which	primary	and	secondary	retention	are	only	made	possible	by	an	amalgamation	of	
















of	 Marx,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 hospitality:	 ‘a	 politics	 of	memory	 and	 hospitality	 –	 of	 heritage,	













cultural	 studies	 as	 a	 discipline.	 In	 this	 text	 Stiegler	 translates	 his	 suggestion	 of	 the	
empirical	disruption	of	the	symbolic	into	his	approach	to	the	university.	Specifically,	he	






argues,	 but	 a	 more	 practical	 question	 of	 how	 successive	 generations	 are	 to	 be	
incorporated	into	the	technical	apparatuses	of	existing	society.	Thus,	Stiegler	encourages	
an	 intervention	 in	 this	 moment	 of	 incorporation.	 This	 means	 focusing	 upon	 how	 the	
young	are	anticipated	by	capitalism	at	the	level	of	labour	and	professionalism,	but	also	at	








reflection	 upon	 sovereignty,	 for	 Stiegler	 it	 is	 a	 site	 of	 reflection	 on	 the	 technical.	 The	
principle	 example	 for	 Stiegler	 here	 is	 the	 development	 of	 digital	 technologies.	 For	 if	
quantum	 mechanics	 has	 been	 the	 attempt	 to	 understand	 and	 contribute	 to	 the	




Stiegler	 suggests	 that	 the	 reflection	 upon	 sovereignty	 does	 not	 derive	 from	 a	




By	 focusing	 upon	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 university,	 as	 opposed	 to	 its	 encounter	 with	
unconditionality,	 Stiegler	 therefore	 suggests	 that	we	 can	more	proactively	explore	 the	
possibilities	 of	 a	 relationship	 between	 the	 inside	 of	 the	 university	 and	 its	 outside,	 an	
impetus	 that	 Derrida,	 Stiegler	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 actually	 particularly	 lucid	 in	 ‘The	
University	without	Condition’,	 in	relation	to	the	 interdisciplinary	engagement	between	
the	humanities	and	the	sciences	(2015,	p.	210).	Stiegler	argues	that	promise	is	to	be	found	
in	 intergenerational	cultural	activities	–	even	Facebook	–	where	anyone	 is	 invited	 to	a	
‘banquet	where	all	are	equal’	in	the	companionship	of	the	techno-logical	symposium	that	





So,	 the	 question	 that	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 here	 is	 whether	 Stiegler’s	 argument	 that	 the	
possibilities	 of	 scholarship	depend	upon	a	 critical	 and	 robust	 cultural-political	 project	
escapes	the	critique	of	Beardsworth’s	cosmopolitanism	that	I	set	out	in	section	one.	That	
is,	whether	 Stiegler	 also	 restricts	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 political.	 Before	 I	will	 consider	my	
findings	in	Chapter	Four,	I	will	briefly	touch	on	Geoffrey	Bennington’s	reading	of	Stiegler’s	

















already	 permit	 this	 approach	 but	 provide	 the	 basis	 for	 an	 ongoing	 project	 that	 the	
necessity	to	foreclose	around	original	technicity	prohibits	(2000,	p.	171).	So,	in	this	sense	
my	intention	in	the	rest	of	this	section	is	to	consider	how	Derrida’s	approach	provides	the	
basis	 for	 a	 more	 inclusive	 response	 to	 the	 crisis	 that	 is	 not	 sentimental	 about	 its	
possibilities	but,	rather,	attentive	to	how	the	emphasis	upon	the	need	for	specific	critical	
approaches	and	specific	alternative	approaches	has	restrictive	implications	for	examining	










basis	 for	 new	 unforeseen	 forms	 of	 deconstruction,	 that	 require	 examination	 most	
significantly	in	the	development	of	discourses	and	practices	of	human	rights,	hence	the	
significance	for	Derrida	of	the	humanities.	Derrida	is	attentive	to	how	this	raises	certain	
problems	 with	 regards	 to	 traditional	 notions	 of	 empiricity	 and	 ontology,	 and	
subsequently	 for	 articulating	with	 any	 certainty	 the	 significance	 of	 particular	 kinds	 of	
inheritance.	Nonetheless,	for	Derrida	the	way	through	this	difficulty	rests,	I	explain,	in	the	
three	elements	that	Derrida	identifies	in	the	spectre:	mourning,	language,	and	work.	So,	




difference	 with	 Stiegler,	 Derrida	 argues,	 by	 way	 of	 a	 critique	 of	 Marx’s	 approach	 to	
spectres,	that	we	should	avoid	privileging	certain	spectres	over	others.	It	is	this	emphasis	
upon	certain	types	of	spectrality	that	Derrida	pins	to	the	out	of	joint,	and	how,	in	turn,	it	
provides	 the	basis	 for	 a	 project	 that	 promises,	mistakenly,	 the	possibility	 of	 a	 joining,	
coming	 together,	 or	 more	 credible	 economy.	 I	 explain	 that	 Derrida	 draws	 from	
Heidegger’s	proposals	on	the	violence	of	metaphysics	to	make	this	point	but,	in	turn,	is	
cautious	to	acknowledge	how	Heidegger	uses	this	framework	to	articulate	a	destructive	














marginalisation,	 such	 that	 scholarship	can	exacerbate	 the	problems	of	 technoscientific	
capitalism	 as	much	 as	 it	 is	 conditioned	 by	 it.	 To	 intervene	 here	 Derrida	 articulates	 a	
distinction	 between	 confession	 and	 a	 very	 specific	 reading	 of	 ‘profession’.	 While	
profession	 is	 more	 commonly	 articulated	 in	 terms	 of	 uniquely	 skilled	 employment,	













of	 the	 limits	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 spectrality.	 That	 said,	 in	my	 examination	 of	Derrida’s	
privileging	of	a	humanities	to	come	that	resists	identification	in	contemporary	academic	
disciplines	 and	 departments,	 I	 argue	 that	 just	 as	 he	 places	 an	 emphasis	 upon	 the	






attention	 to	 the	 secretion	 of	 the	political	 through	 the	media,	 and	with	 an	 attention	 to	
symbolic	exchange.	Now,	Derrida	would	hardly	be	resistant	to	this.	Indeed,	in	a	similar	




I	 am	 particularly	 attentive	 here	 to	 Stiegler’s	 articulation	 of	 widespread	 ‘systemic	




am	 hesitant	 here	 about	 the	 political	 efficacy	 of	 deploying	 accusations	 of	 stupidity.	










the	 with	 about	 a	 Western-centric	 notions	 of	 knowledge,	 and	 how	 an	 emphasis	 upon	
prosthetic	 competency	 conditions	 the	 implications	 of	 something	 –	 as	 discussed	 in	





advances	 in	media	 technologies.	 More	 specifically,	 I	 focus	 upon	 how	 teletechnologies	
involve	the	secretion	of	the	political.	Here	Michael	Naas	is	helpful	because	of	the	manner	
in	which	he	refers,	in	Miracle	and	Machine	(2012),	to	the	‘underworlds	and	afterlives’	of	
the	 religion,	 science,	 and	 the	media	 (2012,	 p.	 197).	 In	 Chapter	One	 I	 turn	 to	 this	 text	
because	of	its	emphasis	upon	Derrida’s	relationship	with	the	media.	However,	here	my	
attention	is	upon	articulating	the	unsentimental	Derrida	that	I	depict	in	my	previous	two	
sections.	 In	 doing	 so	 I	 identify	 three	 aspects	 to	 Naas’	 text	 that	 are	 different	 from	my	
reading	of	Derrida’s	work.	Firstly,	I	discuss	how	Naas	undertakes	a	sort	of	volte-face	in	




teletechnologies	 (2012,	 p.	 197).	 Secondly,	 I	 discuss	 how	 Naas	 substantiates	 this	 turn	





crisis	 to	 inheritances	by	way	of	 the	 concept	of	 the	 spectre.	And	yet,	 here	 I	 suggest	 an	
unease	with	Naas’	suggestion	that	something	is	going	on	under	the	surface.	In	particular	I	
am	 concerned	 about	 an	 injunction	 this	 brings	 to	 delimit	 a	 speculative	 component	 to	
investigating	 spectres.	 My	 reference	 here	 is	 Derrida’s	 hesitance	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	
Spectres	of	Marx	to	give	figuration	to	certain	spectres,	preferring	instead	to	work	with	the	
concept	 of	 the	 spectre	 as	 a	 means	 of	 responding	 to	 issues	 of	 oppression	 and	
marginalisation	by	considering	the	role	of	différance.	This	approach,	I	suggest	here,	is	in	
contrast	to	Naas’	emphasis	upon	specific	figurations,	including	the	specific	figurations	of	




the	 gestures	 to	 privileged	 texts	 and	 examples	 that	 limits	 a	 critical,	 deconstructive	
engagement.	Now,	I	do	not	have	the	space	here	to	undertake	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	
Naas’	 work,	 but	 then	my	 intention	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 not	 to	 defend	 Derrida	 or	 attack	
Beardsworth,	 Stiegler,	 and	 Naas.	 Rather,	 my	 intention	 is	 to	 further	 reflect	 upon	 the	






My	 concern	 begins	 with	 Naas’	 suggestion	 that	 Derrida’s	 ‘Faith	 and	 Knowledge’	 is	
important	because	it	‘condenses	a	great	deal	of	Derrida’s	prior	work	and	anticipates	much	
of	his	work	in	the	decade	to	follow’,	to	the	point	at	which	Naas	‘will	try	to	demonstrate	in	







turns	 here	 to	 the	manner	 in	which	Naas	 engages	with	 the	 concept	 of	 deconstruction.	
Alluding	 to	 the	 encounter	 with	 the	 unconditional	 that	 frames	 my	 understanding	 of	
deconstruction,	Naas	explains	that	he	works	with	‘Faith	and	Knowledge’	in	conjunction	
with	 other	 texts	 by	 Derrida	 to	 consider	 how	 it	 is	 ‘immediately	 compromised	 and	
multiplied,	automatically	divided’	(2012,	p.	5).		








taken	 out	 of	 its	 original	 context	 and,	 sometimes,	 brought	 closer	 to	 “home”.	
(2012,	p.	8)	
For	Naas	 this	means	 bringing	 deconstruction	 to	 his	 specific	 home	 –	 to	 America.	 Naas	
recognises	that	America	is	‘a	‘‘privileged’’	reference	for	Derrida	in	‘‘Faith	and	Knowledge’’	
and	 elsewhere,	 particularly	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 religion,	
globalization,	global	media,	and	the	hegemony	of	the	Anglo-American	idiom’	(2012,	pp.	7-
8).	However,	his	emphasis	upon	America	derives	 from	his	 take	on	deconstruction	that	
emphasizes	 repetition	over	 inheritance;	 the	 framework	of	 analysis	 that	 I	 utilise	 in	my	









lead	 not	 only	 to	 the	 miracle	 of	 an	 unrepeatable	 event	 but	 to	 mass	 delusions	 or	
unimaginable	mass	 destruction’	 	 (2012,	 p.	 8).	 In	 this	 line	 I	 identify	 a	 reference	 to	 the	
progressive	messianicity	that	Derrida	formulates	in	democracy	to	come	(the	chance	of	the	





To	 examine	 this	 reservation,	 I	 will	 jump	 in	 the	 following	 paragraphs	 between	 Naas’	
comments	 on	Underworld	 in	 his	 text’s	 Prologue,	 two	 Interludes,	 and	 Epilogue.	 In	 his	
Prologue	he	sets	out	how	Underworld	introduces	‘an	American	prophesy	followed	up	by	
an	American	tale	of	faith	and	knowledge,	testimony	and	technology,	the	miracle	and	the	
machine’	 (2012,	 p.	 13).	 More	 specifically,	 Naas	 refers	 to	 a	 prophecy	 that	 would	 not	
‘generally	be	recognized	to	be	a	religious	text’,	nor	‘about	the	future,	about	some	future	
event	that	has	not	yet	taken	place’	(2013,	p.	13).	Rather,	it	is	a	prophecy	that	‘is	promised	





footage;	with	history.	History	 is	 therefore	 always	playing	 catch	up.	 In	 this	 context	 the	





DeLillo	 follows	 ‘its	 implications	 and	 its	 consequences	 as	 a	 way	 of	 exploring	 and	
encapsulating	the	entire	latter	half	of	the	twentieth	century	in	America’	(2013,	p.	15).	It	is	








as	 if	DeLillo’s	novel	 ‘called	for	the	supplement	of	a	text	by	Derrida’	 for	an	explanation.	
That	 Derrida’s	writings	 can	 help	 to	 draw	 out	 how	 sport	 is	 linked	 to	 nuclear	warfare:	
‘between	the	ordinary	and	the	extraordinary,	 the	playful	and	the	apocalyptic,	a	simple	
horsehide	baseball	and	the	plutonium	core	of	a	nuclear	weapon’	(2013,	p.	18).	
In	 ‘Interlude	 I’	 these	 implications	 start	 to	be	 summarised	with	Naas’	depiction	of	how	
DeLillo	moves	 links	 the	sacred	to	 the	profane,	 the	messianic	event	of	a	championship-
winning	 homerun	 to	 waste	 disposal.	 With	 particular	 reference	 to	 the	 relationship	
between	 nuclear	weapons	 and	 nuclear	waste,	 Naas	 tells	 us	 how	DeLillo	 sets	 out	 how	
waste	and	destruction	is	‘not	just	the	by-product	but	in	many	ways	the	main	product	of	
entire	 industries	 that	 do	 not	 just	 result	 in	 waste	 but	 aim	 at	 creating	 it	 through	


















their	 doubts.	 For	myself,	 DeLillo’s	 turn	 to	 the	 reader	 involves	 a	 didactic	 injunction	 to	
dismantle	notions	of	the	miraculous.	However,	Naas	takes	this,	in	the	spirit	of	a	certain	
deconstructive	approach,	as	an	acceptance	of	the	inevitable	role	of	faith,	and	an	injunction	




for	 the	 engagement	 with	 inheritance.	 Now,	 this	 seems	 churlish	 given	 that	 Naas’	 text	
undertakes	such	an	extensive	examination	of	Derrida’s	writings	on	inheritance.	However,	
my	 concern	 here	 is	with	 how	Naas	 emphasises	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 surprise	 (of	 the	
‘arrivant’)	 in	a	manner	 that	undermines	 the	 importance	of	 identifying	 locations	where	
such	an	event	can	take	place.	Key	here	is	a	contrast	I	see	in	Naas’	approach	to	the	aleatory	







it	 strikes	 me	 that	 the	 tension	 between	 examining	 inheritances	 and	 intervening	 in	












be	more	 specific	 about	 the	 contours	 of	 a	 politics	 of	 memory.	 This	 is	 because	 of	 how	
Derrida	identifies	a	particular	affinity	between	the	paradox	of	teletechnological	secretion	
and	the	global	hegemony	of	the	United	States.	Namely,	that	faith	is	articulated	not	only	in	










intersection	we	 have	 a	 situation	 in	which	 the	 actors,	 institutions,	 and	 concepts	 of	 the	
nation-state	 are	 supplemented	 by	 ever-more	 elaborate	 forms	 of	 teletechnoscientific	
apparatuses,	to	the	point	at	which	the	affiliation	that	has	brought	them	into	existence	is	
at	least	threatened	with	the	spectre	of	being	replaced	with	the	very	teletechnoscientific	
apparatuses	 themselves	 (as	with	 religious	 fundamentalisms).	 Thus,	 here	we	 have	 the	
capacity	 for	 a	 more	 reactive	 politics,	 supplementing	 the	 politics	 of	 emergency	 and	
securitisation	that	has	been	involved	in	the	response	to	the	attacks	of	9/11	through	the	






for	 a	 more	 inclusive	 politics	 of	 affiliation	 that	 are	 raised	 by	 contemporary	 media	 or	
‘teletechnologies’.	Nonetheless,	I	complete	my	examination	of	Derrida’s	approach	to	the	
media	my	emphasising	 the	promise	 that	 is	presented	by	 them.	Specifically,	 I	 lead	with	
Derrida’s	 argument	 that	 by	 instigating	 différance,	 teletechnologies	 have	 promise	 for	
democracy	to	come.	As	careful	as	he	is	around	destabilising	political	institutions	that	are	
imperfect	but	perfectible,	I	emphasise	how	Derrida	is	concerned	to	work	at	the	limits	of	




Totalitarianism,	 to	 the	case	of	Rodney	King,	 to	medical	 imaging.	Moreover,	 I	articulate	
Derrida’s	 emphasis	 on	 the	 promise	 of	 sharing,	 before	 it	 is	 bound	 together	 in	 specific	
syntactical	order.	The	problem,	however,	is	that	there	needs	to	be	a	simultaneous	attempt	
to	meditate	on	how	the	dissonance	of	the	media	is	received	and	responded	to.	There	needs	

















the	 political,	 and	 thus	 provide	 a	 focus	 of	 intervention.	 This	 approach	 Naas’	 text	




is	 that	 Naas	 undermines	 a	 deconstructive	 possibility	 of	 encouraging	 contemporary	
political	interventions.	Specifically,	my	concern	is	how	this	undermines	a	consideration	
of	how	‘inheritance’,	as	Derrida	suggests	in	Spectres	of	Marx,	‘is	never	one	with	itself’.	The	
religious	 secret	demands	 that	 ‘one	must	 filter,	 sift,	 criticize,	 one	must	 sort	out	 several	








throughout	 this	 thesis	 between	 an	 emphasis	 upon	 contemporary	 issues	 and	 a	 turn	 to	
inheritance	 to	 help	 respond	 those	 issues.	 With	 a	 reading	 of	 works	 by	 Richard	
Beardsworth	 and	 Bernard	 Stiegler	 this	 chapter	 negotiates	 rather	 critical	 positions	 on	
Derrida’s	 commitment	 to	 inheritances,	 but	 with	 the	 work	 of	 Michael	 Naas	 there	 is	 a	
slightly	 different	 direction,	 since	 I	 consider	 that	 Naas	 overemphasises	 the	 impact	 of	
inheritance.	Firstly,	my	engagement	with	a	later	text	by	Richard	Beardsworth	discusses	
the	question	of	Derrida’s	political	 significance.	For	Beardsworth	argues	 that	 there	 is	 a	









in	 culture	 and	 education,	 facilitated	by	 a	 very	 specific	 ‘politics	 of	memory’	 that	 relays	
competent	prosthetic	technologies	to	future	generations,	as	opposed	to	an	engagement	
with	the	singular	oeuvres	of	academics.	However,	to	reach	this	argument	I	have	discussed	
Stiegler’s	more	 long-term	philosophical	 project	 of	 taking	deconstruction	 in	 a	 different	
direction.	 Specifically,	 I	 have	 discussed	 his	 argument	 that	 deconstruction	 needs	 to	 be	
applied	 to	 the	 limitations	of	 the	disruptive	possibilities	of	writing	 (or	of	what	Stiegler	
prefers	 to	 specify	 as	 ‘orthographic’	 technologies).	 However,	 while	 I	 have	 argued	 that	
Stiegler’s	examination	of	the	limitations	of	the	orthographic	open	up	valuable	questions	
about	 how	 cognition,	memory,	 and	 the	 libido	 can	 be	manipulated,	 I	 have	 agreed	with	
Geoffrey	Bennington’s	argument	that	this	overlooks	the	role	of	responsibility	in	Derrida’s	
attentiveness	 to	 difference,	 how	 this	 can	 accommodate	 Stiegler’s	 commitment	 to	




examination	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 religiosity,	 reason,	 politics,	 and	 the	media.	 I	





to	 explaining	 the	 religiosity	 of	 the	 media,	 identifying	 exemplary	 texts	 to	 do	 so,	 and	
recuperating	the	messianic	promise	of	the	way	in	which	the	media	proliferates	the	onto-























how	 the	 spectre	of	 their	 inadequacy	haunts	 sovereign	 conceptions	and	conceptions	of	
sovereignty.	 It	 has	 examined	 his	 proposal	 that	 attention	 needs	 to	 be	 placed	 upon	 the	








epistemologically	daunting.	The	proposal	 to	 take	the	concept	of	 the	spectre,	as	well	as	
specific	 case	 studies,	 as	 both	 points	 of	 departure	 and	 provocations	 to	 reflect	 on	
responsibility	 presents	 an	 unnerving	 degree	 of	 latitude	 and	 invites	 the	 kinds	 of	





I	 have	 argued	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 such	 a	 project	 is	 not	 only	 theoretically	 sound	 (as	
Beardsworth	 suggests)	 but	 practicable,	 given	 that	Derrida	 supplements	 his	 call	 for	 an	
awareness	of	the	‘being-with	spectres’	with	a	call	for	a	‘politics	of	memory,	of	inheritance,	
and	 of	 generations’	 (Derrida,	 2006,	 p.	 xviii,	 italics	 in	 original).	 My	 suggestion	 is	 that	
Derrida	sustains	such	a	politics	through	the	link	between	his	work	on	spectres	and	his	
earlier,	 seminal	 works	 on	 ‘logocentrism’.	 I	 argue	 that	 Derrida’s	 works	 involve	 a	
commitment	 to	 the	 deconstruction	 of	 logocentrism,	 and	 that	 this	 also	 means	 a	
commitment	to	redirecting	that	which	makes	the	logocentric	possible,	ultimately	leading	
to	the	possibilities	of	a	politics	of	justice	of	the	media	in	the	broadest	sense	of	term.	As	a	
























state	 is	 significant	 because	 of	 how	 its	 symbolic	 sovereignty	 over	 terror	 is	 inscribed	





has	 been	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 post-crisis	 nation-state	 policies	 of	 austerity	 but	 also	
hospitality	to	spectres	and	inheritances	by	the	nation-state	more	generally,	by	way	of	faith	
and	knowledge	(most	acutely	 through	 its	relationship	with	 the	media).	Subsequently	 I	
focus	 upon	 Derrida’s	 argument	 that	 with	 the	 reconstitution	 of	 the	 nation-state’s	
relationship	with	 the	 spectral	 through	 its	 hospitality	 to	 spectres	 such	 as	 those	 of	 the	
global	 financial	 crisis	 there	 is	an	autoimmune	deconstruction	of	 its	organisation.	 In	so	
doing	I	discuss	how	this	risks	further	amplifying	a	spectre	of	intellectual	disconnection	
and	technological	incompetence	–	of	being	left	behind	–	that	feeds	fundamentalist	politics,	




Four	to	the	role	of	scholarship.	 I	have	done	so	because	of	 the	way,	particularly	 in	 ‘The	
University	without	Condition’,	in	which	Derrida	articulates	the	university	as	a	potential	
site	 for	 reflecting	 upon	 ‘unconditional	 sovereignty’.	 Specifically,	 I	 examine	 Derrida’s	
suggestion	that	scholarship	–	and	particularly	the	humanities	–	is	a	site	of	reflection	on	
the	 logocentric	 and	 the	 spectral.	 After	 setting	 out	 how	 the	 relationship	 between	
scholarship	 and	 sovereignty	 can	 be	 investigated	 by	 considering	 the	 role	 of	 expertise	
required	 of	 contemporary	 technoscientific	 capitalism,	 and	 how	 philosophy	 can	 be	






biological.	 In	setting	out	 these	risks	 I	 support	Derrida’s	argument	 for	 interdisciplinary	
interventions	 that	 link	 up	 the	 humanities	 with	 the	 natural	 sciences.	 But	 I	 also	 argue,	
against	his	explicit	criticisms,	that	such	a	project	could	benefit	from	a	tradition	of	cultural	




–	 that	 I	 identify	 the	 most	 difficult	 and	 most	 promising	 location	 of	 intervention	 for	 a	
response	to	spectres	 like	those	of	 the	global	 financial	crisis.	After	setting	out	Derrida’s	
arguments	about	how	the	political	is	involved	in	discrete	acts	of	selecting,	filtering,	and	
ordering,	 I	 consider	 how	 he	 subsequently	 links	 these	 phenomena	 to	 questions	 of	
inheritance.	As	a	result,	 I	argue	 that	 the	spectres	of	 the	global	 financial	crisis	can	be	a	
catalysts	for	an	amplification	of	the	‘return	of	the	religious’,	the	‘nationalist’,	and	so	many	




take	 away	 from	 an	 examination	 of	 how	 they	 facilitate	 age-old	 forms	 of	 violence,	 and	
specifically	gendered	and	sexual	violence	towards	women.	And	yet,	I	also	argue	that	the	






have	 read	 its	 significance	 in	 rather	 different	 ways.	 Through	 a	 reading	 of	 Richard	
Beardsworth’s	 critique	 of	 Derrida’s	 cosmopolitanism	 (and	 his	 more	 assertive	
cosmopolitan	political	theory)	I	work	to	further	emphasise	my	interpretation	that	Derrida	
sets	out	an	 important	means	of	working	with	contemporary	 liberal	democracies	while	
acknowledging	 the	 need	 for	 a	 more	 hospitable	 politics	 that	 actively	 draws	 from	
inheritance	and	responsibility.	Secondly,	I	have	examined	Bernard	Stiegler’s	calls	for	an	



















religion	or	 the	state	of	 religion	 in	1994,	no	Muslims	 to	speak	of	or	 to	represent	 Islam,	
which	is	clearly	not	just	one	religion	in	the	contemporary	world’	(Derrida	in	Smith,	2014,	
p.	234).	And	yet,	Smith	suggests	that	in	relation	to	Derrida’s	offer	to	speak	for	the	other	in	












towards	 the	 media	 that	 I	 emphasise	 in	 this	 thesis?	 My	 suggestion	 here	 would	 be	 to	
consider	 the	 role	 that	 I	 attribute	 to	 cultural	 studies	 as	 an	 academic	 project	 for	
investigating	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 symbolic	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 marginalisations	 and	
oppression.	
Ultimately	my	intention	in	this	thesis	has	been	to	argue	that	attention	should	be	placed	










making.	My	 substantive	 chapters	 have	 attempted	 to	 attribute	 fidelity	 to	 three	 specific	
indissociable	domains,	in	politics	in	the	traditional	sense,	in	scholarship,	and	in	the	media	
industries.	However,	my	suggestion	here	is	to	direct	attention	to		responsibility	for	the	
secretion	 of	 the	 political	 through	 spectral	 effects,	 be	 it	 in	what	we	 understand	 by	 the	
“media”	or	elsewhere.	
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